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LABOR LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. * The Right to a Jury Trial in a Duty of Fair Representation Suit:
Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry'
In 1967, in Vaca v. Sipes, the United States Supreme Court held
that a labor union has a duty of fair representation to its members
that is implied from the union's role as the exclusive bargaining
representative. 2 The Vaca Court further ruled that the duty of fair
representation encompasses a duty on the part of the union to act
honestly and in good faith, to represent its members without hos-
tility or discrimination, and to avoid arbitrary conduct) Finally, the
Vaca Court stated that a labor union's duty of fair representation
extends to its enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 4
Since the Vaca decision, a conflict has arisen among the United
States courts of appeals concerning whether plaintiffs in a duty of
fair representation suit have a right to a jury trial. 5 Specifically,
courts are divided over whether claims for breach of duty of fair
representation are legal or equitable) One view is that such claims
are equitable and therefore do not entitle claimants to a jury trial.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted this position in the 1988 case of Leach
v. Pan American World Airways, holding that employees had no right
to a jury trial in a suit against their union for breach of fair rep-
resentation. 7 The Leach court analyzed the question of whether the
Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution afforded the em-
ployees the right to a jury trial by first determining whether the
nature of the plaintiffs' claim was legal or equitable. 8 The court
* By Susan M. Landers, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
I
 494 U.S. 558, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 133 L.R.R.M. 2793 (1990).
2
 386 U.S. 171, 177, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1967).
' Id.
4 Id.
• See, e.g., United Transp. Union, Local 74 v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 881 F.2d 282,
286, 131 L.R.R.M. 3145, 3147-48 (6th Cir. 1989) (allowing plaintiff the right to jury trial);
Leach v. Pan American World Airways, 842 F.2d 285, 288, 128 L.R.R.M. 2126, 2128 (11th
Cir. 1988) (denying plaintiff the right to jury trial).
6 See Consolidated Rail, 881 F.2d at 289, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3150 (breach of duty of fair
representation claim is legal); Leach; 842 F.2d at 288-90, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2128-30 (breach
of duty of fair representation claim is equitable).
842 F.2d at 286, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2126-27.
9 Id. at 286-87, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2127-28.
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then examined whether the nature of the plaintiffs' remedy was
legal or equitable.9
Examining the nature of the claim, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that a claim of breach of duty of fair representation most closely
resembles a charge of unfair labor practice, which is statutorily
denied the right to a jury trial.'° The court refused to consider state
law analogies in making its decision, reasoning that such analogies
do not sufficiently resemble the right of a labor union's duty of fair
representation." Instead, the court stated that it would examine
analogies to labor law.' 2 The court justified this choice by stating
that the need for uniformity in labor law is a fundamental national
interest permitting courts to ignore state law analogies in favor of
federal labor law analogies."
With respect to the nature of the remedy, the Leach court held
that the employees' request for monetary damages against the labor
union was "inextricably intertwined" with their equitable request to
vacate an arbitration decision involving their employer, Pan Amer-
ican." The court stated that the plaintiffs' attempt to distance the
damages claim, which is a legal remedy entitled to a jury trial, from
the equitable request to nullify the arbitration, was inconsistent, and
refused to allow a jury trial based on the remedy sought." Thus,
the Leach court held that neither the nature of the claim nor the
nature of the remedy afforded a plaintiff the right to a jury trial in
a suit against a labor union for breach of duty of fair representa-
tion."
Several circuit courts of appeals have adopted a view contrary
to the Leach court's, including the Sixth Circuit in the 1989 case of
United Transportation Union, Local 74 v. Consolidated Rail Corp." In
Consolidated Rail, the court held that plaintiffs who seek compen-
9 Id.
'° Id. at 289-90, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2129.
" Id. at 289, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2129.
' 7 Id.
13 Id.
m Id. at 290, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2130.
' 5 Id. at 290-91, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2130.
' 6 Id. at 288-91, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2128-30.
17 881 F.2d 282, 289, 131 L.R.R.M. 3145, 3150 (6th Cir. 1989) (granting plaintiff a jury
trial in action for breach of duty of fair representation); see also Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teams-
ters and Helpers, Local 391, 863 F.2d 334, 339, 130 L.R.R.M. 2179, 2183 (4th Cir. 1988)
(same); Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d 637, 646, 116 L.R.R.M. 3321, 3328 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(same); Roscello v. Southwest Airlines Co., 726 F.2d 217, 220, 119 L.R.R.M. 3372, 3374 (5th
Cir. 1984) (same).
March 1992]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 309
satory damages in a suit for breach of duty of fair representation
are entitled to a jury trial.'" The Consolidated Rail court focused on
the nature of the remedy sought, stating that a claim for damages
which properly encompasses both legal and equitable elements is
entitled to a jury trial.'" The court also pointed out that the mere
absence of a close analogy to state law does not support the conclu-
sion that a duty of fair representation action is equitable in nature
for Seventh Amendment purposes.'" Thus, the Sixth Circuit re-
jected the view that a hybrid action containing both equitable and
legal elements compels a rejection of the right to a jury tria1. 2 '
Instead, the court held that a claim which involves at least a partial
legal remedy is entitled to a trial by jury. 22
During the Survey year, in Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, the
United States Supreme Court examined the issue of an employee's
right to a jury trial in a suit for breach of a labor union's duty of
fair representation. 23 The Supreme Court settled the split in the
circuit courts by holding that employees who sue for injunctive relief
and compensatory damages based on a labor union's alleged breach
of fair representation are entitled to a jury trial."
The plaintiffs in Teamsters Local 391 were truck drivers em-
ployed by McLean Trucking Company ("McLean") and were mem-
bers of the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers Union No. 391
(the "union"). 25 As part of a change in operations, McLean trans-
ferred the truck drivers to a new terminal, agreeing that in return
the truck drivers would have special seniority rights over "inactive"
employees of the new terminal who had been temporarily laid off. 26
Subsequently, the Teamsters Local 391 plaintiffs were laid off and
recalled many times, each time subject to McLean's policy of strip-
ping laid-off drivers of their special seniority rights."
The truck drivers filed a grievance with the union, challenging
the order of layoffs and recalls, as well as McLean's policy of nul-
lifying seniority rights upon rehiring laid-off workers. 29 The union's
18 881 F.2(1 at 289, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3150.
1° Id. at 286, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3148.
2° Id. at 288, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3149.
21 Id. at 289, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3149.
22 Id .
23 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1344, 133 L.R.R.M. 2793, 2795 (1990).
24 Id. at 1343-44, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2794.
25 Id. at 1342, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2793.
26 Id. at 1343, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2793-94.
27 Id. at 1343, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2794.
28 Id.
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grievance committee ruled for the truck drivers. 29 A later grievance
filed by the truck drivers, however, failed to show that new layoffs
by McLean had circumvented the initial decision of the grievance
committee." When the truck drivers sought to file a third grievance,
based on McLean's continued layoffs and recalls, the union refused
to refer the charges to the grievance committee on the ground that
the relevant issues had been determined in the two prior proceed-
ings. 3 '
The truck drivers then sued in federal district court, alleging
that McLean had breached its collective bargaining agreement with
the union and the truck drivers in violation of section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act. 32 The truck drivers also con-
tended that the union had violated its duty of fair representation."
The truck drivers sought injunctive relief and compensatory dam-
ages for lost wages and health benefits, and also requested a jury
trial. 34 Subsequently, the action against McLean and the request for
injunctive relief were dismissed after McLean petitioned for bank-
ruptcy, leaving the union as sole defendant to the suit. 35 The union
then moved to strike the request for a jury trial, arguing that no
right to a trial by jury exists in a suit for breach of duty of fair
representation. 36 The district court denied the motion to strike and,
after an interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Seventh Amend-
ment afforded the truck drivers a right to trial by jury on their
claim for money damages. 37
The Supreme Court granted the union's petition for certiorari
and affirmed the Fourth Circuit decision." Writing for the majority,
Justice Marshall first noted that the Seventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial in suits
at common law where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars.39 The Court interpreted "suits at common law" as encom-
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32
 Teamsters Local 391, 110 S. Ct. at 1343, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2794.
33 Id.
" Id.
33 Id.
39 Teamsters Local 391,110 S. Ct. at 1343, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2794.
37 Id.
' Id. at 1343-44, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2794.
39 Id. at 1344, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2795. The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
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passing those suits in which legal, as opposed to solely equitable,
rights and remedies are involved." Applying this interpretation,
the Court engaged in a two-pronged analysis to determine whether
an action for breach of duty of fair representation involves legal
rights.'" First, the Court examined the nature of the plaintiffs' claim
to determine whether the claim was equitable or lega1. 42 The Court
stated that this determination could only be made by comparing
the action at hand to actions brought in colonial courts in the 1700s,
before the courts of law and equity were merged:Ls The second
question, which the Court noted was most important to its decision,
concerned whether the remedy the truck drivers sought was legal
or equitable in nature."
Applying the first prong of the test, the Court noted that,
because the action for breach of duty of fair representation did not
exist in eighteenth century England, the Court must look toward
an analogous cause of action that existed at that time to determine
whether the nature of the claim was legal or equitable." The Court
held that the fair representation action most closely resembled an
action by a trust beneficiary against a trustee for breach of fiduciary
duty, an action traditionally in the exclusive jurisdiction of courts
of equity." The Court compared a trustee's duty to act in the best
interest of the trust beneficiaries to a union's duty to act in good
faith on behalf of its members. 47 In addition, the Court observed
that, just as a beneficiary cannot directly control a trustee's actions,
an employee does not directly control a union's actions." Finally,
the Court likened the broad discretion of a trustee to choose when
to sue third parties on behalf of a beneficiary to a union's exclusive
authority to decide when and how to pursue a member's grievance
against an employer."
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law,
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII.
45 Teamsters Local 391,110 S. Ct. at 1344, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2795.
41 Id. at 1345, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2795.
42 Id.
45 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
" Id. at 1346, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2796.
47 Teamsters Loco-1391,110 S. Ct. at 1345, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2795.
48 Id.
Id.
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The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that their action for
breach of duty of fair representation most closely resembled an
attorney malpractice action, which was historically an action at law. 5°
The Court held that although an attorney malpractice suit is similar
to a breach of fair representation action, it does not resemble the
relationship between the union and the plaintiff-employees as fully
as the trust analogy does." The Court stated that, unlike members
of a union, a client controls the important decisions made by an
attorney on his or her behalf and can fire the attorney if unhappy
with the attorney's performance.52 The Court thus held that a
breach of duty of fair representation action most closely resembles
the equitable action for breach of a trustee's fiduciary duty."
The Court, however, stated that the trust analogy was not
enough to characterize plaintiffs' claim as wholly equitable. 54 The
Court noted that to prove a breach of fair representation by the
union, the truck drivers also needed to prove that McLean's action
violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 55 The
Court thus determined that while the duty of fair representation
was analogous to a trustee's fiduciary duty, the violation of the
collective bargaining agreement most closely resembled a breach of
contract, which was a legal issue. 58 Therefore, because the plaintiffs'
action encompassed both equitable and legal issues, the first prong
of the Seventh Amendment analysis left the Court undecided on
the jury trial issue. 57
Applying the second prong of the test, the Court held that the
remedy sought by the truck drivers was legal in nature. 58 The Court
pointed out that the only remedy sought by the truck drivers was
compensatory damages.59 The Court acknowledged that the mere
fact that the damages were in the form of monetary relief did not
automatically characterize the remedy as legal in nature. 80 The
Court held, however, that the compensatory damages sought by the
5° Id. at 1346-47, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2796-97.
51 Id. at 1346-47, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2797.
5' Id.
53 Id. at 1346, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2796.
54 Id. at 1347, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2797.
55 Teamsters Local 391, 110 S. Ct. at 1347, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2797.
" Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1348, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2797.
59 Id. at 1347, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2797.
" Teamsters Local 391, 110 S. Ct. at 1347, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2797.
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truck drivers did not have the equitable attributes that need to be
present for the Court to label the damages equitable." The Court
noted that the compensatory damages representing backpay and
benefits were neither restitutionary, nor incidental to injunctive
relief, and thus lacked the attributes commonly associated with
equitable relief. 62
In addition, the Court rejected the union's argument that, be-
cause the Court had previously labeled backpay awarded under title
VII as equitable, the backpay sought in a fair representation suit
was equitable.° Justice Marshall distinguished the title VII cases,
pointing out that Congress specifically labeled title VII backpay
awards as equitable relief but that it has never made a similar
legislative pronouncement with respect to awards in fair represen-
tation suits." Thus, the Court concluded that the remedy sought in
the truck drivers' suit for breach of duty of fair representation was
legal in nature, and therefore the suit was a legal action, triable by
a jury. 6'
Justice Brennan concurred, in part, with the majority deci-
sion.66 Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's holding that the
remedy sought was legal in nature and that the Seventh Amend-
ment grants plaintiffs a right to trial by jury in legal actions, but he
disagreed with the Court's use of historical analysis to find a cause
of action that was analogous to the breach of duty of fair represen-
tation suit. 67 Justice Brennan asserted that Seventh Amendment
questions should be decided solely on the basis of the remedy
sought. 68 Justice Brennan noted that the majority's use of the two-
pronged historical test has repeatedly discounted the first prong
and emphasized the importance of the second prong. 69 He reasoned
that, because the existence of a right to a jury trial already turns on
the nature of the remedy, there is little purpose in holding on to
an analysis of the nature of the claim." Thus, absent congressional
delegation to a specific decisionmaking body, Justice Brennan in-
61 Id. at 1347-48, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2797.
62 Id. at 1348, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2797-98.
65 Id. at 1348-49, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2798.
" Id.
65 Teamsters Local 391, 110 S. Ct. at 1349, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2798.
66 Id. at 1349, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2799 (Brennan, J., concurring).
67
 Id.
66 Id. at 1350, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2799 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66 Teamsters Local 391,110S. Ct. at 1350, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2799 (Brennan, J., concurring).
76 Id.
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dicated that he would hold that a right to a jury trial exists when
the relief sought is the kind historically sought in courts of law."
Justice Stevens also concurred in part, but reasoned that a
breach of duty of fair representation suit more closely resembles an
attorney malpractice action than an action for a trustee's breach of
fiduciary duty. 72 Justice Stevens distinguished the fair representa-
tion action from a trust action because trustees are appointed to
protect beneficiaries from their own judgment, whereas a union's
duty, like an attorney's duty to a client, is to advance its members'
interests against adverse parties." In addition, Justice Stevens noted
that the doctrine of a union's duty of fair representation developed
through suits tried to juries, and that in most actions involving a
duty of fair representation the issues are "typical grist" for a jury
decision. 74 Justice Stevens therefore concluded that the truck drivers
were entitled to a jury trial in their suit for breach of duty of fair
representation. 75
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, dis-
sented.7° Justice Kennedy approved of the majority's use of the two-
pronged historical analysis, and further agreed with the majority's
conclusion that the nature of the breach of duty of fair represen-
tation claim most closely resembles an equitable trust action." Jus-
tice Kennedy disagreed, however, with the majority's holding that
the truck drivers were entitled to a jury tria1. 78 First, Justice Kennedy
argued, the fact that the 'plaintiffs' claim contains both legal and
equitable elements does not justify granting them the right to a jury
trial. 79 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the action for breach of
duty of fair representation is an equitable claim, and that the Su-
preme Court has never "parsed legal elements out of equitable
claims" without specific procedural justifications, which were absent
in this case.8°
Second, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the majority's finding
that money damages are necessarily characterized as legal relief. 8 '
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1353, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2802 (Stevens, J., concurring).
73 Id. at 1354, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2802 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74 Id.
72 Id. at 1354-55, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2803 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 1355, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2803 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77 Id.
72 Id. at 1357, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
" Teamsters Local 391, 110 S. Ct. at 1358, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2805 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
E" Id. at 1359, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy conceded that the presence of money damages
may cause some actions to resemble legal suits, but stated that the
presence of monetary relief in a duty of fair representation suit
does not make the action more legal than equitable. 82 In addition,
Justice Kennedy asserted that, while the nature of the remedy is an
important factor in Seventh Amendment analysis, the Court should
look at the remedy together with all other relevant factors to deter-
mine whether an action is legal or equitable in nature." According
to Justice Kennedy, when all rights and remedies are considered,
an action for breach of duty of fair representation resembles an
equitable suit more than a legal action and the Court should not
grant the truck drivers a right to trial by jury."
The Teamsters Local 391 decision establishes that workers who
sue their union for allegedly denying them fair representation are
entitled to a jury trial if they seek monetary compensation such as
backpay.85 The Supreme Court's reasoning reflected its concern that
a jury trial, as a fundamental constitutional right, should be care-
fully preserved, and that any apparent curtailment of the right
should be critically analyzed with the utmost care. 86 Thus, the de-
cision is compatible with the Court's stated policy favoring jury
trials.87
The Teamsters Local 391 decision benefits workers who seek to
recover from their union for breach of duty of fair representation
in two ways. First, the decision gives workers flexibility in choosing
whether to try their case before a judge or a jury. Depending on
the particular circumstances of each case, workers can elect to be
heard before the trier of fact who would be most sympathetic to
their case. Second, assuming that employees do choose to exercise
the jury option authorized by Teamsters Local 391, a jury trial might
produce a more favorable outcome. Juries are arguably more em-
pathetic than judges toward employee claims of unfair treatment.
Jury members may be able to relate better to the workers' situation,
and thus be more apt to find for the employees. The more egregious
82 Id.
85 Id.
84 Id. at 1357, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
es Id. at 1349, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2798-99.
as Id. at 1344-45, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2795 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
339 U.S. 500, 501 (1959)). In Beacon Theatres, the Supreme Court had noted that
"[InJaintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm
a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care." 339 U.S. at 501.
87 See Teamsters Local 391, 110 S. Ct. at 1344-45, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2795.
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the facts, the more advantageous a jury trial would be to the work-
ers. Trial by jury, however, poses no danger that workers will receive
excessive damage payments because punitive damages are not al-
lowed in a breach of duty of fair representation suit. 88
The Teamsters Local 391 decision should also have a positive
impact on union activity. By allowing a favorable forum for workers
to seek relief from unions who have allegedly breached their duty
of fair representation, the decision will encourage better represen-
tation by unions. The decision thus may have a powerful deterrent
effect on union misconduct with respect to its duty of fair repre-
sentation.
Because the Supreme Court's analysis in Teamsters Local 391 was
fact-specific, it is not clear whether the Court's holding applies to
all breach of duty of fair representation claims or only those seeking
backpay damages. Because the monetary nature of the relief sought
was so important to the Supreme Court's decision, employees suing
their union will probably emphasize compensatory damages and
downplay requests for equitable relief in their complaints. Even if
the decision is interpreted narrowly, plaintiffs who request backpay
relief in their complaint should be able to argue successfully for a
jury trial in an action for breach of duty of fair representation.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court held in Teamsters Local 391
that employees who seek backpay against a union based on alleged
breach of duty of fair representation have a constitutional right to
a jury trial. Although the Court held that a breach of fair represen-
tation claim contains both legal and equitable elements, the Court
concluded that the compensatory damages such as backpay are a
form of legal relief and therefore entitle a plaintiff to a jury trial.
Thus, the Supreme Court settled a split in the circuits and expanded
the options of workers who seek relief for their union's alleged
breach of duty of fair representation.
II. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. * Collective Bargaining Units in Acute Health Care Facilities:
American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB'
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("Act") encourages
collective bargaining and protects employees' freedom of associa-
88 See United Transp. Union, Local 74 v. Consolidated Rail . Corp., 881 F.2d 282, 286,
131 L.R.R.M. 3145, 3148 (6th Cir. 1989).
* By Lori McLaughlin, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
111 S. CL 1539, 137 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1991).
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tion, self-organization and designation of representatives for em-
ployment negotiations. 2 Under section 6 of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board") has the authority to make, amend
and rescind rules and regulations that are necessary to implement
these policy objectives.' When disagreement arises between labor
and management over the appropriateness of a collective bargain-
ing unit, the Board is authorized by section 9(b) of the Act to decide
the controversy. 4
When labor and management disagree over the appropriate-
ness of a collective bargaining unit, the Board typically has decided
the particular controversy on a case by case basis.' When faced with
the need to determine the appropriateness of a collective bargaining
unit for an acute health care hospital, however, the Board eventually
abandoned this case by case approach.' Instead, the Board chose to
invoke its substantive rule-making power.' The Board's first indus-
try-wide unit classification rule specified eight employee units ap-
propriate for collective bargaining purposes in acute health care
facilities: physicians, registered nurses, other professional employ-
ees, medical technicians, skilled maintenance workers, clerical work-
ers, guards and other non-professional employees.' The Board rec-
ognized three exceptions to the general eight-unit rule:
extraordinary circumstances; pre-existing, non-conforming units;
and the combining of two or more units by labor. 9
2 Id, at 1541, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2003. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1989).
1 American Hosp.,111 S. Ct. at 1542, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2003. See National Labor Relations
Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156.
4 National Labor Relations Act 9(b), 29 U.S.C, § 159(b). The pertinent language of
9(b) states:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to ensure employees the
full benefit of their right of self-organization and to collective bargaining, and
otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the
purpose of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof.
Id,
See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 705, 132 L.R,R.M. 2033, 2034
(N.D. III. 1989), rev'd, 899 F.2d 651, 133 L.R.R.M. 3073 (1990), cert. granted, 111  S. Ct. 242
(1990), aff'd, 1 1 1 S. Ct. 1539, 137 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1991).
" Id. at 708, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2037.
7 Id.
8 American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 653, 133 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3074 (7th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 242 (1990), aff'd, 111  S. Ct, 1539, 137 L.R.R.M. 2001
((991),
9
 American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111  S. Ct. 1539, 1541, 137 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2002
(1991).
318	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:305
During the Survey year, in American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, the
United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Stevens, held that the Board's exercise of its rule-making
authority under section 6 was valid and legitimate.'° The Court
addressed and dismissed three arguments advanced by the Ameri-
can Hospital Association: that section 9(b) of the Act requires case
by case determination as to the appropriateness of bargaining units;
that the rule disregards a congressional admonition against undue
proliferation of collective bargaining units; and that the rule is
arbitrary and capricious." As a result, the Board's authority to
promulgate a substantive, industry-wide rule was affirmed. 12
The controversy resolved by the Court in American Hospital Ass'n
originated in a dispute known as Saint Francis Hospital. 13 The •re-
gional director of the NLRB had determined that a bargaining unit
consisting of the hospital's maintenance personnel was appropri-
ate." The hospital filed a request for review with the Board pro-
testing that all the service and maintenance employees, together,
comprised the appropriate bargaining unit."' Following its usual
procedure for appeals of a director's decision, the Board used a
two-tier process to evaluate the appropriateness of collective bar-
gaining units. 16 First, the Board determined whether the petitioned-
for unit fell within one of the "potentially appropriate" bargaining
units. 17 Second, the Board determined whether the traditional
"community of interest" existed within the ranks of the unit's The
community of interest test is satisfied when the concerns and inter-
ests of the petitioned-for unit are sufficiently separate from other
employee units to justify certification of the proposed unit.° Using
10 Id.
" See id. at 1541, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2002-03.
See id. at 1547, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2007.
" See generally St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1982), vacated,
271 N.L.R.B. 948, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1984), enforcement denied, 814 F.2d 697, 124 L.R.R.M.
2994 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
14 Id.
15 See id. at 1025, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1154.
IS See id. at 1029, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
17 See id. at 1031, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1160. There are eight potentially appropriate units:
physicians, registered nurses, other professional employees, technical employees, business
office clerical employees, skilled maintenance employees, guards, and other non-professional
employees. See id.
'" See id. at 1029, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
19 Id. at 1025-26, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1154-55. The criteria evaluated when determining
"community of interest" include the following: same supervision, skill level, work integration,
location and interaction with other departments. Id.
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this two-tier process, the Board in Saint Francis determined that a
collective bargaining unit for maintenance personnel was appro-
priate."
Despite the Board's affirmation of the hospital's maintenance
employees as an appropriate bargaining unit, however, the hospital
refused to bargain with the unit's bargaining representative, the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 21 The union filed
charges against the hospital with the NLRB. 22 In response, the
hospital denied that the unit, determined to be appropriate by the
Board in Saint Francis, was actually an appropriate unit for collective
bargaining." Upon reviewing its decision, the Board decided to
vacate its earlier decision and chose to adopt a "disparity of interest"
test. 24 This test emphasizes the dissimilarity of employee interests
and requires greater disparities for approval of unit certification."
The Board adopted this test because it believed the disparity of
interest standard best comported with congressional intent to pre-
vent proliferation of collective bargaining units in acute care hos-
pitals. 26
The union appealed the issue to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. 27 The court found the disparity of interest test
within the Board's authority but not mandated by the Act or
congressional admonition. 28 It remanded the case for further clar-
ification of the test. 29 On remand, the Board proclaimed its intention
to exercise its rule-making powers instead of further utilizing its
disparity of interest approach." In announcing its intention, the
Board stated that it would review the empirical evidence and lessons
20 Id. at 1033-34, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1161-62.
SI St. Francis Hosp,, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1984), remanded, 814 F.2d
697, 124 L.R.R.M. 2994 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
22 See id.
28 See id.
24 See id. at 950, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
20 See id. at 935, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470.
20 Id. Using this approach, the Board seemed to restrict the appropriate bargaining
units to "professional" and "non-professional" unless labor could justify additional units. See
IBEW, Local Union 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 709, 124 L.R.R.M. 2993, 2995 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
27 See IBEW v. NLRB, 814 F.2d at 698, 124 L.R.R.M. at 2995.
28 See id. at 708, 124 L.R.R.M. at 3002. The court stated that Congress did not alter the
Board's power of bargaining unit certification under § 9(a) of the Act when enacting the
Health Care Amendment of 1974. This amendment brought the health care industry within
the Board's power. Id.
28 See id. at 715, 124 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
50 See St. Vincent Hosp., 285 N.L.R.B. 365, 125 L.R.R.M. 1329, 1330 (1987).
320	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 33:305
learned through its unsuccessful doctrinal approaches in order to
arrive at an informed judgment as to the appropriate bargaining
units.31
The American Hospital Association, however, reacted to the
NLRB's decision by seeking an injunction against the Board." The
United States District Court for Illinois enjoined enforcement" but
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed." The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance
of the case and affirmed the Board's authority to promulgate an
industry-wide, substantive rule under section 6 of the Act. 35 In
reaching its decision, the Court first held that the "in each case"
requirement of section 9(b) did not prohibit the Board from prom-
ulgating general rules to define appropriate bargaining units. 36 Sec-
ond, it held that the Board gave extensive consideration to congres-
sional concern for undue proliferations' Finally, the Court
determined the Board's exercise of its power was based on appro-
priate, reasoned analysis, and therefore was not arbitrary or capri-
cious. 38
The petitioner's first argument in American Hospital Ass'n was
that the "in each case" requirement of section 9(b) prohibited the
Board from promulgating an industry-wide rule under section 6.'
The Court disagreed, stating that a more natural interpretation,
consistent with past interpretations of similar regulatory statutes,
was that the Board must resolve the issue whenever a dispute arises
3 ' See id. at 365-66, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1330. The court cited the following reasons from
the Board's notice of proposed rule-making: reduction of costly and time-consuming "case-
by-case" adjudication by providing predictability, utilization of recurring patterns of needs
within the industry, and the improbability of agreement among the circuits concerning the
standard to be applied. Id,
32 See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 705, 132 L.R.R.M. 2033, 2034
(N.D. III. 1989), rev'd, 899 F.2d 651, 133 L.R.R.M. 3073 (1990), cert. granted 111 S. Ct. 242
(1990), aff'd, 111 S, Ct. 1539, 137 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1991).
33
 See id. at 716, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2043.
34
 American Hosp. Ass'n v NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 660, 133 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3079 (7th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, I 1 1 S. Ct. 242 (1990), aff'd, 111  S. Ct. 1539, 137 L.R.R.M. 2001
(1991). The court stated that the case by case adjudication process proved to be ineffective.
The Board could experiment with rule-making given this failure and the lack of any statutory
obstacle. Id.
35
 American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539, 1541, 137 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2003
(1991).
56 See id. at 1543, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2005.
37 See id. at 1545, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
38 See id. at 1546, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2006-7.
59 See id. at 1542, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2003.
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concerning the appropriateness of a unit. 4° In rejecting the "case
by case" argument, the Court furthermore stated that even if a
statute prescribed individualized determinations, an agency still has
the power to decide issues of general application by rule-making
unless Congress clearly expresses a contrary intent.'" The Court
found no such intent within the legislative history of the Health
Care Amendment.42 Additionally, the Court noted that the Board
may be guided not only by the Act's policies but by the rules the
Board develops to guide the exercise of its discretion in disputed
cases." Finally, the Court held that the rule reflected the Act's policy
of facilitating labor organization and recognition because it defines
in advance the groups that may be properly organized."
The second argument advanced by the hospital was that the
Board failed to give "due consideration" to the congressional ad-
monition against undue proliferation of collective bargaining units
when enacting the rule. 45 Congress believed that proliferation of
units could result in heavy bargaining costs and could thus further
increase the rising costs of health care. 46 Additionally, fragmentation
of the labor force could result in a number of small bargaining
units that frequently strike and consequently impair the ability of
the health care facility to respond to patients' needs. 47 The Court,
upon examining the record of the Board's rule-making proceed-
ings, held that the Board gave "extensive consideration" to congres-
sional concerns. 48 Additionally, the Court declared the admonition
merely a warning that Congress may legislate if the Board fails to
give due consideration to the concern about undue proliferation. 49
The third and final argument advanced by the petitioner was
that the Board's rule was arbitrary and capricious because it ignored
the critical differences that exist among acute health care facilities. 50
4° See id. at 1542-43, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
41 See id, at 1541, 137 L.R.R.M, at '2004.
42 See id. at 1544, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2004-5.
45 See id.
" See id. at 1543-44, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
45 Id. at 1541, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
40 See St. Francis Hosp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1026, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153, 1155 (1982),
vacated, 271 N.L.R.11. 948, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1984), enforcement denied, 814 F.2d 697, 124
L.R.R.M. 2994 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
42 See American Hosp., ill S. Ct. at 1545, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
45 See id. at 1545, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2006.
49 See id.
5a See id. at 1546, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2006. The differences cited by the hospital include
"size, location, operations, and work-force organization." Id,
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Although the Board initially rejected application of the rule-making
approach to the health care industry, it noted certain recurring
trends concerning the appropriateness of units within the acute
care branch of health care. 5 ' The Court found no inconsistency with
earlier decisions that anticipated the emergence of typically appro-
priate units from recurring fact patterns. 52
 The Court stated that
even if there were inconsistencies, section 6 contemplates the
Board's reshaping of policies based on its experience and that a
change of viewpoint does not undermine the validity of the rule
founded on "substantial evidence" and "reasoned analysis." 53 Ad-
ditionally, the Court stated that the "extraordinary circumstance"
exception allowed for departure from the rule when its application
would be arbitrary or capricious."
The major impact of the American Hospital decision may be the
rise in effective labor organization within the health care industry.
Labor organizers can now classify their workforce into the eight
prescribed units, confident that such units are appropriate and will
be recognized by employers without administrative or courtroom
battles. 55
 This will undoubtedly increase efficiency and the strength
of labor mobilization efforts.
Additionally, a rise in union membership can most likely be
expected. By specifying eight units instead of relying upon the
statutory minimum of three, 56
 the Board has facilitated the differ-
entiation of the distinct facets of the workforce. Because laborers
are grouped with others who share their concerns and needs, it will
be easier for them to agree on goals and strategies that will lead to
more effective bargaining. 57
 This solidification of needs and power
will increase the lure of unionization to workers.
Finally, given the unanimity of the Court and the deference it
showed, the Board may expand its use of regulation to supplement
or replace its prior decisions. The Board may once again use its
authority under section 6(a) to bring order out of chaos in industries
plagued by inconsistent or challenged decisions regarding unit clas-
" See id.
53 See id.
53 See id, 137 L.R.R.M. 2006-07.
M See id. at 1547, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2007.
35
 See American Hosp., Ill S. Ct. at 1543-44, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2004.
'43
 See National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(1)(b). Professional, non-
professional and guards are the statutory minimum bargaining units prescribed by the Act.
Id.
53 See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 654, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3073, 3074-
75 (1990).
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sification. In addition, the Board may use its newly-found power to
solidify its prior decisions in industries where it has consistently
applied a well-developed standard. Health care is a highly contro-
versial industry given the fear of rising costs and work stoppages
and given the Board's lackluster performance record in this area. 58
With the Court's approval of a rule pertaining to this industry, it is
unlikely that the Board would face judicial opposition in well-set-
tled, non-controversial industries.
The Court's well-reasoned opinion in American Hospital Ass'n
confirms the Board's power to promulgate a substantive, industry-
wide rule regarding appropriate bargaining units. Labor organiza-
tions within the acute health care industry benefit from the decision
because they can effectively organize their bargaining within fixed
and legitimate units. In addition, their fear of being limited to the
statutory minimum of three bargaining units (professional, non-
professional and guards) has been eliminated. The Board will likely
further experiment with its rule-making authority to define appro-
priate units in other industries.
B.* Social Policy v. Credible Fact Finding: NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific Inc.'
Under section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
("Act"), it is an unfair labor practice to interfere with, coerce or
restrain employees when they are exercising the rights guaranteed
to them by the Act. 2 In addition, under section 8(a)(5) of the Act,
it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representative of his or her employees. 3 In
interpreting this statutory language, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that an employees' union, upon certification by the
National Labor Relations Board ("Board") as such employees' ex-
clusive bargaining representative, has an irrebuttable,presumption
of majority support for one year.4 Throughout this year, an em-
ployer's refusal to bargain with a certified union is a per se unfair
labor practice under section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 5
55 See id. at 655, 660, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3075, 3079.
s' By Andree Saulnier, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 133 L.R.R.M. 3049 (1990).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1988).
Id. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
• Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 37, 125 L.R.R.M. 2441,
2445 (1987).
5 See Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951).
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The Board has determined, subsequent to the expiration of
this protected year, that this presumption continues but may be
rebutted by employers. 6
 To rebut this presumption, an employer
must show that, at the time of the employer's refusal to bargain,
the union did not in fact have majority support.' An employer may
also rebut this presumption by showing that the employer had a
good faith doubt, based on objective evidence, that the union no
longer enjoyed majority support. 8
Whether employers may establish a good faith doubt of union
majority support, by assuming that permanent replacements do not
per se support the union, has long troubled the Board.9 Early Board
decisions determined that strike replacements did not support the
union.rn In later cases, however, the Board changed its position and
determined that strike replacements may in fact support the
union." By the late 1980s, several United States Courts of Appeals
had rejected the Board's union support approach. 12 Thus, in the
1987 decision of Station KKHI, the Board again changed its position,
ruling that it would not adopt either an anti-union or pro-union
presumption, but instead would determine its views on a case-by-
case basis.i 8
6 See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 482 U.S. at 38, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2445.
7
 Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1340, 125 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1282 (1987), enforced ,
891 F.2d 230, 230, 133 L.R.R.M. 2175, 2175 (9th Cir. 1989).
8 Id,
9 See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1545-46, 133 L.R.R.M.
3049, 3049-51 (1990).
18 See Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 196, 215, 49 L.R.R.M. 1466, 1469 (1962)
(concluding that employer had good cause to doubt the union's majority support because
replacements had not authorized the union to represent them); Stone Rubber Co., 123
N.L.R.B. 1440, 1444, 44 L.R.R.M. 1133, 1134 (1959) (asserting that employers might rea-
sonably assume that strike replacements did not support the union).
" See Windham Community Memorial Hosp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1070, 95 L.R.R.M.
1565, 1570 (1977)'(strike replacers are presumed to support the union in same proportion
as the workers they have replaced), enforced, 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978); Cutten Supermarket,
220 N.L.R.B. 507, 509, 90 L.R.R.M. 1250, 1251 (1975) (assuming that strike replacements
support the union in the same ratio as the employees they replace); Peoples Gas System,
Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 944, 947, 87 L.R.R.M. 1430, 1434 (1974) (stating that it was possible that
strike replacements did in fact favor union representation).
' 2 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1546, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3051.
' 3
 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344, 125 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1286 (1987). The Board determined
that the pro-union presumption was not logical, because replacement workers often knew
that the union's primary concern was for the welfare of the strikers, and not for the welfare
of the replacements. Id. The Board determined, however, that an anti-union presumption
was also illogical. Id, The Board reasoned that strike replacements may have personal financial
concerns that force them to cross the picket line, but these replacements may nevertheless
support the union. Id. Furthermore, the Board maintained that the adoption of an anti-
March 1992]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 325
In the 1987 case of Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., the Board
applied the Station KKHI case-by-case approach for the first time."
Specifically, the Board determined that the employer had failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove the existence of anti-union
sentiment among replacement workers, and thus had committed an
unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act."
The employer appealed the Board's decision to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals."
The Fifth Circuit declined to enforce the Board's decision)?
Instead, the Curtin Matheson court adopted the presumption of anti-
union support among replacement workers." The court noted that
the number of replacement workers now exceeded the number of
strikers.' Therefore, based on the anti-union presumption, the
Curtin Matheson court held that the employer had established a good
faith doubt of continued majority support for the union. 2° A circuit
split developed on the question of whether the Board must adopt
a presumption of pro-union or anti-union sentiment among re-
placement workers. 2 '
During the Survey year, in National Labor Relations Board v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., the United States Supreme Court upheld
and adopted the no presumption case-by-case approach. 22 In Curtin
Matheson, the Court enforced the Board's decision that the employ-
er's refusal to bargain with its employee's union was an unfair labor
practice under sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act." In reaching this
conclusion, the Court rejected the presumption that strike replacers
union presumption may impair the strikers' ability to strike by increasing the chances that
they would lose their bargaining representative. Id.
" Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 350, 352, 127 L.R.R.M. 1114, 1116-
17 (1987), cert. granted, 859 F.2d 362, 129 L.R.R.M. 2801 (5th Cir. 1988).
1:51d, at 353-54, 127 L.R.R.M. at 1117. First, the Board determined that the five workers
who had crossed the picket line may have done so for personal economic reasons rather than
because they opposed the union. Id. Second, the Board determined that the resignation from
their jobs of two original bargaining unit employees, after the strike began, also did not
indicate opposition to the union. See id. Third, the Board dismissed the statements of several
employees, which might have indicated the existence of anti-union sentiment, as inconclusive.
Id.
16 Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 362, 129 L.R.R.M. 2801,
2801 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1542, 133 L.R.R.M. 3049 (1990).
11 Id. at 367-68, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2804-05.
os Id.
' 9 Id. at 365, 129 L.R.R.M. at 2804.
20 Id. at 367, 129 LR.R.M. at 2804-05.
11 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1548-49, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3052-53.
12 Id. at 1550, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3054.
28 See id. at 1554, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3057.
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never support the union. 24
 Consequently, after Curtin Matheson, an
employer must prove that its strike replacements have actually re-
jected the union's protection before the employer can withdraw
recognition from the union. Employers cannot rely on the pro-
union or anti-union presumption previously adopted by their cir-
cuit.
In Curtin Matheson, the one-year period guaranteeing a pre-
sumption of majority support for the union had elapsed. 25
 At this
time, the employer had refused to continue negotiations with the
employees' union. 26
 Prior to the expiration of the one-year period,
several strikers had crossed the picket line, and the employer had
hired permanent replacement workers. 27
 At the time the employer
withdrew its recognition of the employees' union, the bargaining
unit contained nineteen strikers, twenty-five replacement workers
and five strikers who had crossed the picket line. 28
 The employer
argued that it was reasonable to assume that neither the strikers
who had crossed the picket line nor the replacement workers sup-
ported the union.29
 Thus, the employer maintained that because
the union no longer enjoyed majority support, it did not have to
recognize the union. 30
The Supreme Court rejected Curtin Matheson's argument."
To support its position, the Curtin Matheson Court cited to and
adopted the factual findings of the Board.32 In its review of the
case, the Board refused to adopt the anti-union presumption, and
consistent with Station KKHI, conducted an individual analysis of
the facts of the instant case." After its review, the Board concluded
that the respondent had not clearly established that the union lacked
majority support." The Curtin Matheson Court maintained that the
Court should accord a high degree of deference to Board findings,
and thus it was appropriate for the Court to adopt their findings. 35
See id.
23 See id. at 1547, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3051,
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
" See id. at 1550, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3054.
3° See Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1550, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3054.
3 Id. at 1550-51, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3054.
32 Id. at 1547-48, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3051-52.
" Id.
" Id. at 1548, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3052.
" Id. at 1554, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3057. In previous cases, the United States Supreme Court
has consistently ruled that courts should extend deference to Board rules. See Fall River
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Furthermore, the Curtin Matheson Court concluded that the no
presumption rule was rational as an empirical matter.s 6 The Court
noted that the circumstances of each strike and the strength of each
union vary greatly." Hence, the Court reasoned that a case-by-case
analysis was the only logical way to determine if any employer's
belief that the union had lost majority support was reasonable."
Next, the Court rejected the employer's argument that strike
replacements never support the union because the union is acting
contrary to their interests." The employer argued that strike repla-
cers are always pitted against the union because they know they will
lose their jobs if the union is successful.° To rebut this position,
the Curtin Matheson Court noted that unions do not always demand
that employers fire strike replacements after the strike ends.4 ' More-
over, the Court maintained that even if the interests of strike re-
placements and the union conflict during the strike, their interests
may converge after the strike.42 In the Court's opinion, strikers are
able to look beyond the circumstances of the strike and determine
that in the future they may want the representation of the union.43
These reasons were sufficient to cast doubt on the anti-union pre-
sumption and to require an ad hoc analysis of the facts of each
case. 44
In addition, the Curtin Matheson Court maintained that its re-
fusal to adopt the anti-union presumption is consistent with the
Act's overarching policy of achieving industrial peace. 45 The Court
Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42, 125 L.R.R.M. 2441, 2447 (1987) (stating
that courts should accord Board rules considerable deference and uphold Board rules as
long as they are rational and consistent with the Act); NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.
251, 256-66, 88 L.R.R.M. 2689, 2694 (1975) (asserting that deference should be given to
Board rules even if such rules depart from prior Board decisions).
38 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1550, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3054.
37 Id. at 1552, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3055.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 1551-52, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3054-55.
40 Id. at 1551, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3054-55.
41 Id. at 1552, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3054-55.
42 Id.
43 Id. Note that the Curtin Matheson Court maintained that strike replacements can see
beyond the immediate concerns of the strike. Id. Because replacements potentially hold this
long term view, the Court believed that the Board's position in the case at bar did not conflict
with the Board's holdings in Leveld Wholesale and Service Electric Co. Id.; see Service Elec., 281
N.L.R.B. 633, 641, 124 L.R.R.M. 1318, 1318 (1986) (concluding that there is an inherent
conflict of interest between strikers and their replacements); Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218
N.L.R.B. 1344, 1345, 89 L.R.R.M. 1889, 1889 (1975) (stating that strike replacers can rea-
sonably predict that if the union is successful they will lose their jobs).
Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1552, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3055-56.
41 Id. at 1552, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3056.
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asserted that the case-by-case approach allows unions to negotiate
without worrying that they need a prompt settlement to remain
bargaining representatives." The Court also stated that this ap-
proach limits the ability of employers to oust unions without show-
ing clear evidence of lack of support for these unions. 47 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the case-by-case approach rule encourages
negotiated solutions to strikes."
Finally, the Court insisted that if it adopted the anti-union
presumption, it would allow employers to oust unions through hir-
ing practices. 49 Such hiring practices would mean that the workers
would have less of a chance of reinstatement after the strike because
they would lose their bargaining representative. 5° Furthermore, the
Court stated that the fear of permanent loss of employment would
negatively impact the ability of workers to strike. 5 '
In a concurring opinion in Curtin Matheson, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the no presumption rule stretches, but does not exceed,
the limits of deference to which the Board is due. 52 Justice Rehn-
quist recognized that the no presumption rule sharply limits the
ability of employers to establish a good faith doubt of union sup-
port. 53 He also asserted that the assumption that replacement work-
ers might support the union is contrary to common sense." Never-
theless, as Justice Rehnquist believed that the Court should extend
a great deal of deference to Board decisions, he concurred with the
decision of the Court. 55
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia maintained that the Court
logically could not conclude that replacement workers would sup-
port the union. 56 According to Justice Scalia, the economic interests
of replacement workers inevitably conflict with the interests of strik-
ers.57 To support his position, Justice Scalia noted that the Board,
in other contexts, consistently had ruled that the interests of strikers
and replacement workers were at odds. 58 Furthermore, he stated
46 Id. at 1553-54, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3056.
47 Id.
48 Id.
46 See id.
"° Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1554, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3056.
" Id.
" Id. at 1554-55, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3057 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
ss Id. at 1555, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3057 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
" Id.
55 Id. at 1554, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3057 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
'6 Id. at 1557, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3059 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Id.
58 Id. at 1561, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3062 ( Scalia, J., dissenting); see Service Elec., 281 N.L.R.B.
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that he did not find anything in the record of the case at bar which
indicated that these replacements had shown support for the
union.59 Thus, Justice Scalia believed that the employer in Curtin
Matheson had a good faith doubt of the union's majority support."
In addition, Justice Scalia maintained that the majority was
imposing too high a burden of proof on the' respondents. 6 ' He
asserted that an employer does not have to establish with one
hundred percent certainty that the union lacked majority support.
Instead, the employer has to establish that there existed a reasonable
doubt of such support. 62
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the policy reasons the majority
offered for their conclusions." First, Justice Scalia argued that the
Court should not ignore the facts to promote policy." Second, he
maintained that the majority opinion allowed the Board's order to
be upheld on the grounds that it was counterfactual to assume that
replacements do not support the union." Justice Scalia stated that
prior to the Court's review, lower courts had reviewed the Board
decisions to determine whether given the facts of the instant case,
there existed a reasonable doubt of majority support. 66 Thus, he
believed that the majority was ruling on issues different from those
the Board and lower courts had decided.° To allow this different
decision, Justice Scalia opined, would be to deprive the respondent
of potential legal defenses that it had no opportunity to present to
the lower courts."
Justice Blackmun wrote a second dissenting opinion in Curtin
Matheson. 69 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun accepted Justice Scalia's
633, 641, 124 L.R.R.M. 1318, 1323 (1986) (determining that unions cannot represent the
best interests of strike replacements because they likely will be negotiating for strikers to take
their jobs); Beacon Upholstery Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1360, 1365, 94 L.R.R.M. 1334, 1340 (1976)
(asserting that the interests of strikers and strike replacements during negotiations are
diametrically opposed); Leveld Wholesale, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1350, 89 L.R.R.M. 1889,
1890 (stating that strike replacements can reasonably predict that if the union is successful
they will lose their jobs).
6° Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1562, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3063 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 1557, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3059 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61 Id.
62 Id,
65 Id. at 1565, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3065 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Id.
65 Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1565, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3065 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1565-66, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3065 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 1565, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3065 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 1555, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3057 (Blackrim, J., dissenting).
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arguments, but stated that his own approach was to emphasize the
decision-making processes. 7° According to Justice Blackmun, courts
should review agency decisions carefully. 7 ' He asserted that this
review should not be an attempt to substitute the Court's judgment
for that of an expert agency, but that courts should make sure the
agency has adequately explained its decision. 72 Justice Blackmun
maintained that courts should insure that various agency policies
are consistent with each other." He also opined that that courts
must exercise control over non-elected agency officials. 74 Ultimately,
Justice Blackmun concluded that the Board's decision in Curtin
Matheson did not survive this kind of review, and thus he dissented. 75
The decision in Curtin Matheson is weak and likely to be over-
turned. First, the Court split five to four. Justice Rehnquist's con-
curring opinion reveals that he was not as impressed with the merits
of the no presumption argument as with the idea of deference to
the Board and its decisions. Furthermore, Justices Brennan and
Marshall were among the majority in the instant case, and it is
questionable whether Justices Souter and Thomas will vote to up-
hold this decision in the future. Second, lower courts and previous
Board decisions have been divided on whether to adopt either a
pro-union or an anti-union presumption. The Station KKHI ap-
proach was, in many ways, a compromise designed to avoid a prob-
lematic issue. 76 Finally, the inference that strike replacers do not
support the union is strong. Not only did the dissenting Justices
support this theory, but noted labor scholar Robert Gorman believes
it to be true." In fact, this anti-support presumption has become
so closely associated with Gorman's labor writings and theories that
courts often refer to it as the "Gorman" presumption.78
There are also strong factual reasons why courts might want
to adopt the anti-union presumption. For example, if a strike is
70 See id. at 1555-56, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3057-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1556, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3058 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1557, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3058 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun,
however, did not offer an explicit analysis as to why he reached this conclusion. Id.
76 By adopting this approach the Board avoided the factually illogical pro-union pre-
sumption, but also avoided the policy pitfalls of the anti-union presumption. Station KKHI,
289 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1390, 125 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1282, enforced 891 F.2d 230, 133 L.R.R.M.
2175 (9th Cir. 1989).
77 See Curtin Matheson, 110 S. Ct. at 1548 n.6, 133 L.R.R.M. at 3052-53 n.6 (citing ROBERT
GORMAN, LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND CouxcrivE BARGAINING 112 (1976)).
70 See, e.g., id.
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successful and strikers go back to work, employers are unlikely to
keep both the strikers and their replacements on the payroll. There-
fore, for the replacement, the union's success will likely lead to the
elimination of his or her job. Even if the replacement workers want
long-term union support, as Justice Scalia suggests in his dissenting
opinion, they can accomplish this goal without having to support
the current union. For after the collapse of the current negotiations,
when the replacements' jobs are secure, they can vote in and recer-
tify the union."
Thus, in addressing this problem, courts are faced with the
situation of having a problematic and illogical factual inference
pitted against a desirable social policy. The Curtin Matheson majority
correctly noted that if employers are allowed to establish reasonable
doubt based on the existence of replacement workers, then they can
effectively hire their way out of a strike. 8° Employers could drag
negotiations out beyond the one-year irrebuttable presumption pe-
riod, hire replacements, withdraw recognition of the union, and
thus circumvent the union and the strike. To allow such a result
would greatly jeopardize the ability of employees to organize and
negotiate successfully with their employers, and more importantly,
would violate the overarching policy of the Act to promote and
encourage negotiated settlements of labor disputes.
Several possible solutions to this problem exist. The courts
could determine that hiring replacements after the lapse of the one-
year irrebuttable presumption period violates the overall goals of
the Act. This is in substance the position adopted by labor com-
mentator Joan Flynn." Flynn argues that the courts should adopt
an economic strike bar. 82 In other words, the courts should prohibit
either the withdrawal of recognition of union support by employers
or elections by employees while the strike is ongoing. 83 Such a
position promotes industrial peace and bargaining stability by forc-
ing employers to negotiate with unions until either a settlement is
reached or the strike ends." Although no language of the Act
specifically authorizes this position, Flynn contends that it is per-
22 Justice Scalia also relied on these arguments in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 1562,
133 L.R.R.M. at 3063 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88 Id, at 1553-54,133 L.R.R.M. at 3056.
81 See Joan Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Per-
manent Replacements, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 691, 711 (1988).
82 Id.
88 Id.
84 Id.
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missible under section 9(c)(3) of the Act. 85 Flynn notes that despite
the lack of specific language authorizing the Board to do so, the
Board has sanctioned bars on elections and withdrawals of recog-
nition in other contexts, 86 including the 1954 Supreme Court case
of Brooks v. NLRB."
The implementation of Flynn's economic strike bar is highly
desirable. This proposal would protect the ability of workers to
strike by preventing employers from hiring their way out of strikes.
Thus, consistent with the overarching policy of the Act, the adop-
tion of an economic strike bar would promote industrial peace.
Moreover, this position would allow the courts to achieve their policy
goals, but also would avoid the smoke and mirrors of illogical factual
presumptions.
In addition, Flynn offers two "lesser alternative" solutions. In
alternative one, Flynn argues that the courts could prohibit em-
ployer withdrawal of recognition but allow employee decertification
elections. 88 If adopted, this system would, through employee decer-
tification elections, provide a more accurate measure of continued
union majority support. In her second alternative, Flynn maintains
that the courts again should prohibit employer withdrawal of rec-
ognition of the union during an economic strike, and subsequently,
require employers to file for an election if they wish to challenge
the union. 89 The second alternative, like the first, seeks to measure
union support through employee elections. Both of these methods,
however, are less desirable than the economic strike bar solution as
they require administratively burdensome and time-consuming pro-
cedures.
In conclusion, in Curtin Matheson, five United States Supreme
Court Justices ruled that an employer had failed to establish that it
had a good faith doubt of union support, and thus that it had
engaged in an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a)(1) and (5)
65
 Id. at 712, 715. Specifically, Flynn argues that the language in the legislative history
of section 9(c)(3) of the Act supports her position. Id. at 715. She maintains that the language
in the history of section 9(c)(3), which rejected bans on incumbent unions during strikes, also
prohibits the Board from either disallowing elections or withdrawing recognition while a
strike is ongoing. Id.
86 See Flynn, supra note 81, at 717. In particular, Flynn noted that the Board has
prohibited challenges to an incumbent union's status either during a "reasonable period"
after its informal recognition by the employer or during the term of a written, signed
collective bargaining agreement of three years' length or less. Id.
87 Id, at 717 (citing Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954)).
88 Id, at 719,
BD Id. at 720.
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of the Act. In so ruling, these Justices explicitly upheld and vali-
dated the Board's holding in Station KKHI that the determination
of whether replacement workers supported the union should be
made on a case-by-case basis. In dissent, four Justices argued that
employers should be able to establish they had a good faith doubt
by arguing that replacement workers do not support the union.
These Justices believed that employers should be able to presume
anti-union sentiment among strike replacements. Although the anti-
union inference is logical, it threatens to jeopardize the overriding
policy of the Act. Such a policy would clearly inhibit the ability of
employees to organize and negotiate with their employers. Hope-
fully, the courts instead will adopt one of Flynn's solutions, and thus
secure the integrity of the Act.
III. DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
A. *The Right of Fair Representation: The Meaning of Arbitrary
Conduct Under the Vaca Standard: Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'l v. O'Neill'
The Supreme Court of the United States has established that
under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") 2 and the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"), 5 labor unions have an implied statutory .
obligation to provide fair representation to all union members.' In
the 1967 case of Vaca v. Sipes, the United States Supreme Court set
forth the standard for fair representation when it prohibited labor
unions from bad faith, discriminatory or arbitrary conduct toward
members of the collective bargaining unit. 5 In applying the Vaca
standard, subsequent courts have had difficulty determining what
* By Susan T. Kelly, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I 111 S. Ct. 1127, 136 L.R.R.M. 2721 (1991).
2 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1990). The duty of fair representation was
first established in Steele v. Louisville Sc N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204, 15 L.R.R.M. 708,
713 (1944). See infra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of Steele.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. MI 151-169 (1988). The Supreme Court
applied the doctrine of fair representation to a claim under the NLRA in Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 332, 31 L.R.R.M. 2548, 2549 (1953). See infra note 8 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Huffman.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1967) (fair representation
duty is implied from the labor union's statutory role as exclusive bargaining agent).
5 Id. at 190, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2376.
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constitutes "arbitrary" conduct. 6
 In addition, it has remained un-
clear whether the duty of fair representation that the Vaca standard
represents applies to all union activity, or only to a union's disparate
treatment of an individual or group of individuals.?
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the RLA to require
that a union fairly represent employees in order to protect the union
minority's interests. 8
 Subsequently, the courts struggled to define
what behavior breached the duty of fair representation.g In 1967,
the Supreme Court, in Vaca v. Sipes, defined the duty of fair rep-
resentation using a three part standard.w The Vaca Court held that
a union did not breach its duty of fair representation when it failed
to pursue an individual employee's unfair discharge claim after a
private medical report failed to support the employee's allegation
that he was fit for work." The Court reasoned that the union had
6 See, e.g., Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1514, 123 L.R.R.M. 2705, 2713 (9th
Cir. 1986) (stating that various cases have elaborated different possible standards); Dutrisac
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 749 F.2d 1270, 1272, 113 L.R.R.M. 3532, 3534 (9th Cir.
1983) (stating that the standard for "arbitrary" is still evolving).
See, e.g., Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909, 917, 132 L.R.R.M. 3052,
3057 (7th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that the discretion given to unions under the duty of fair
representation varies with different functions); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510,
1519, 129 L.R.R.M. 2539, 2545 (11th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that the nature of the duty is
dependent on context). The duty of fair representation has virtually always been applied
only to allegations that individuals or minority groups of individuals have made against a
union regarding a union's conduct in an administrative capacity, such as grievance arbitration,
rather than claims the union membership as a whole has made based on union conduct in a
contract negotiation capacity. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl v. O'Neill, I I 1 S. Ct. 1127, 1135,
136 L.R.R.M. 2721, 2725 (1991).
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204, 15 L.R.R.M. 708, 713 (1944). In
Steele, the Supreme Court considered an employee's allegation that a union had bargained
for more favorable contract terms for white employees than for black employees. Id. at 194-
95, 15 L.R.R.M. at 709-10. In holding that the union had breached the duty of fair repre-
sentation, the Court concluded that pursuant to the union's statutory authority as exclusive
bargaining representative under the RLA, the duty of fair representation required union
actions to be in good faith and without discrimination on behalf of all employees, not only
union members. Id. at 204, 15 L.R.R.M. at 713.
In the 1953 case of Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, the Supreme Court redefined the duty
of fair representation to allow a wide range of conduct. See 345 U.S. 330, 338, 31 L.R.R.M.
2548, 2551 (1953). Huffman involved employees' allegations that their union had agreed to
special seniority concessions for military personnel, which had lowered the seniority of many
non-military employees. Id. at 332, 31 L.R.R.M. at 2549-50. In holding that the union had
not breached its duty, the Court reasoned that although the duty of fair representation
required unions to act with good faith, the union was allowed a wide range of reasonableness.
Id. at 338, 31 L.R.R.M. at 2551.
9 Steele, 323 U.S. at 204, 15 L.R.R.M. at 713 (requiring union conduct to be in good
faith without discrimination); Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338, 31 L.R.R.M. at 2551 (requiring the
union to act in good faith within a wide range of reasonableness).
10
 386 U.S. 171, 190, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2376 (1967).
II Id. at 174-76, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2370-71.
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a duty to act without discrimination, with good faith and to avoid
arbitrary conduct. 12 Nevertheless, because the private report justi-
fied the union's conduct, the Court concluded that the union had
not acted in bad faith and had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons
for abandoning the claim.'3 Thus, after Vaca, a breach of the duty
of fair representation occurs only when a "union's conduct toward
a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or in bad faith.""
Although the Vaca test established broad prohibitions on certain
union conduct, the Vaca Court failed to clarify what constituted
arbitrary behavior. 15 Consequently, following Vaca the lower courts
have created their own definitions of "arbitrary." One circuit has
determined that arbitrary conduct exists where a union has acted
negligently. 16 Other circuits have stated that union actions that in-
adequately represent an individual union member breach the
duty." Several other circuits have determined that where a union
fails to act rationally, it has acted arbitrarily. 18 Another circuit re-
quires a showing of a union's intentional misconduct. j9 Still another
12 Id. at 190, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2376.
13 See id. at 194-95, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2378.
14 Id. at 190, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2376.
" See cases cited supra note 6. For a general discussion of the courts' treatment of the
duty of fair representation, see generally Steinhauer, IBEW and Foust: A Hint of Negligence in
the Duty of Fair Representation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1981); Lea S. VanderVelde, A Fair
Process Model for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983).
16 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310, 90 L.R.R.M. 2497, 2500 (6th
Cir. 1975) (union's negligent handling of claim constituted breach of duty). The negligence
approach to the duty of fair representation appears to have been eliminated by a recent
United States Supreme Court case. See United Steelworkers, AFL-C10-CLC v. Rawson, 110
S. Ct. 1904, 1913, 134 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2158 (1990) (stating that union negligence is not
sufficient for a breach of the duty of fair representation).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 282, Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters, 740 F.2d 141, 147, 116
L.R.R.M. 3292, 3297 (2d Cir. 1984) (union's omissions may be so egregious as to be arbitrary);
NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d 1249, 1255, 103 L.R.R.M. 3045, 3048
(8th Cir. 1980) (a union's lack of effort or inadequate notice may constitute a breach).
18 See, e.g., O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl, 886 F.2d 1438, 1444, 132 L.R.R.M.
2876, 2881 (5th Cir. 1989) (union decision must be a rational result of the consideration of
various factors), rev'd, 111  S. Ct. 1127 (1991); Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1514,
123 L.R.R.M. 2705, 2713 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that a breach of duty may occur where
there is no rational and proper basis for the union's conduct); NLRB v. General Truck
Drivers, 545 F.2d 1173, 1175, 93 L.R.R.M. 2747, 2749 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that unions
must adhere to rational decision making processes). The Ninth Circuit has differentiated
between situations where union procedure was arbitrary and situations where union conclu-
sions were arbitrary. See, e.g., Burkevich v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl, 894 F.2d 346, 349,
133 L.R.R.M. 2433, 2436 (9th Cir, 1990); Salinas v. Milne Truck Lines, Inc., 846 F.2d 568,
569, 128 L.R.R.M. 2365, 2366 (9th Cir. 1988).
19 See, e.g., Grant v. Burlington Indus., 832 F.2d 76, 79, 126 L.R.R.M. 2486, 2488 (7th
336	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 33:305
court has held that perfunctory handling of a claim is arbitrary
conduct. 2° In sum, few courts agree on what constitutes arbitrary
conduct.
In addition to the difficulty of defining "arbitrary" within the
Vaca standard, it was not completely clear if all union activity should
be subject to the duty of fair representation that the standard sets
forth.2 ' Several commentators and courts have advocated that union
actions involving individuals or small groups • should be distin-
guished from actions involving the union membership as a whole. 22
These opinions suggest that although the duty of fair representation
should extend to all union activity, a higher standard should be
applied to individual grievance claims than to union conduct when
negotiating on behalf of the whole membership. 23
 Thus, although
the Vaca Court established a standard for the duty of fair represen-
tation, it failed to clarify whether it is the proper standard for
evaluating all union activity. 24
During the Survey year, in Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill,
the Supreme Court attempted both to define "arbitrary" behavior
under the Vaca standard and to clarify the standard's applicability
to all union activity. 25 Confronted with a pilots' claim alleging that
their union had settled a contract dispute on potentially worse terms
than if the pilots themselves had unilaterally ended the strike, the
Court held that the duty of fair representation applies to all union
Cir. 1987) (plaintiff must show union's intentional misconduct); Hoffman v. Lonza, Inc., 658
F.2d 519, 523, 108 L.R.R.M. 2311, 2314 (7th Cir. 1981) (breach of duty is limited to instances
of intentional misconduct).
20 See, e,g., Findley v. Jones Motor Freight, 639 F.2d 953, 960, 106 L.R.R.M. 2420, 2424
(3d Cir. 1981) (perfunctory conduct may constitute a breach of the duty).
21 See, e.g., Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909, 917, 132 L.R.R.M. 3052,
3057 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that a union needs more latitude under the duty when negoti-
ating than when arbitrating grievances); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1519,
129 L.R.R.M. 2539, 2545-46 (I lth Cir. 1988) (concluding that the standard for negotiations
may be different than for processing grievances).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 299, Int'l Board of Teamsters, 782 F.2d •46, 51-52, 121
L.R.R.M. 2378, 2483 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that the duty of fair representation is implicated
only when an individual or group is treated differently than the collective); see also Finkin,
The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 197-98 (1980)
(arguing that the standard for fair representation applied to union conduct in individual
grievances should be more restrictive than the standard applied to union conduct in its
negotiating capacity).
• See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
24 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111  S. Ct. 1127, 1134, 136 L.R.R.M. 2721,
2725 (1991) (Supreme Court notes that an ambiguity existed whether or not the duty of fair
representation applies to both contract administration and contract negotiation).
• Id. at 1130, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2721-22.
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activity, including contract negotiation." In addition, the Court con-
cluded that an action is "arbitrary" only if it "is so far outside a wide
range of reasonableness, as to be irrational." 27 Applying the Vaca
standard, the Court reasoned that the union had reasonably be-
lieved that it was making a fair settlement for the pilots and had
not acted arbitrarily under the Vaca standard." Consequently, Air
Line Pilots settled that all union activity is subject to the duty of fair
representation that the Vaca standard sets forth, and will be evalu-
ated within a wide range of reasonableness."
Air Line Pilots involved a contract dispute between Continental
Air Lines ("CAL") and its pilots' union, Air Line Pilots Association,
International ("ALPA"). 3° In September, 1983, after CAL was un-
able to negotiate major financial concessions from ALPA, the airline
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 and unilaterally
cut the pilots' benefits and wages by more than half." Because the
Chapter 11 filing repudiated CAL's existing collective bargaining
agreement with ALPA, the pilots began a legal strike and ALPA
filed suit to enforce the agreements' The bankruptcy court ap-
proved CAL's repudiation of the prior agreement and ordered
ALPA and CAL to negotiate a new agreement."
By employing numerous cross-over strikers and hiring replace-
ment pilots, CAL was able to continue business." CAL and ALPA
met numerous times but were unable to agree on new terms, and
in August, 1985, CAL announced that it would no longer recognize
ALPA as the pilots' exclusive bargaining agent." ALPA responded
with a lawsuit charging that CAL was unlawfully refusing to nego-
tiate a new agreements€ Subsequently, CAL announced a large
number of available positions in its Supplementary Base Vacancy
2$ id .
27 Id. at 1130, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2722.
26 See id. at 1137, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2727.
29 Id. at 1130, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2722.
3u Id.
31 O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl, 886 F.2d 1438, 1440, 132 L.R.R.M. 2876, 2877-
78 (5th Cir. 1989).
32 Id, at 1440, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2877.
33 Id.
" Air Line Pilots, Ill S. Ct. at 1130, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2722. Initially, all but 200 of the
2,000 CAL pilots supported the hostile strike, but as it continued, approximately 400 aban-
doned the strike and agreed to return to work on the airline's terms (crossed over). Id. These
pilots were accepted for reemployment in order of reapplication. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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bid ("85-5 bid").37 Because the bid was unusually large,58 and all
bids had to be submitted within nine days, ALPA authorized the
strikers to bid while continuing to strike." CAL challenged the
striking pilots' willingness to return to work and announced that all
of the positions had been awarded to working pilots."
After intensified negotiations, ALPA's negotiations committee
and CAL reached an agreement that the bankruptcy court entered
as an order.'" The agreement provided for an end to the strike,
reallocation of the 85-5 bid and disposition of all pending litiga-
tion." Striking pilots were offered three options." First, pilots who
waived all claims against CAL could become eligible with modified
seniority for some of the positions previously awarded to the work-
ing pilots.'" Second, the pilots could elect not to work for CAL and
receive severance pay." Third, the pilots could retain their individ-
ual claims against CAL and become eligible to return to work only
after all the pilots choosing the first option were reinstated."
Several months after this settlement, the former striking pilots
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas against ALPA, claiming that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation in negotiating and accepting
the settlement. 47 The district court granted ALPA's motion for sum-
57 Id. at 1130-31, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2722. For years CAL had used a procedure to fill
vacancies where pilots could submit bids specifying preferred position, base of operation,
and aircraft type for available positions. Id. at 1131, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2722. The bids were
normally posted well in advance to allow the required training time for any equipment
changes. Id.
" Id. at 1131, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2722. The bid offered 441 future captain and first officer
positions and an undetermined number of second officer vacancies. Id. Seniority was estab-
lished as of the date the pilot first flew with CAL. Id.
55
 Id. This authorization was to protect the strikers from being permanently locked out
of the jobs. Id.
40 Id.
" Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
" Id. CAL assigned the initial base and aircraft type for a returning striker, but for
working pilots, base and aircraft type were determined by their bids. Id. Seniority determined
future changes in bases and equipment, and striking pilots who were in active service when
the strike began received seniority credit for the period of the strike. Id.
45 Id. Severance pay was $4,000 per year of service or $2,000 per year if the pilot had
been furloughed before the strike began. Id.
45 Id. at 1131, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2722-23.
47 Id. at 1131-32, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2723. The complaint included four total counts:
breach of the duty of fair representation, violation of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. $ 911 breach of fiduciary duty in violation of
LMRDA, and breach of contract. Id. at 1131 n.2, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2723 n.2.
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mary judgement, stating that although the settlement looked atro-
cious in retrospect, it was not a breach of duty to settle the strike
badly."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed, ruling that the Vaca standard applies to contract negotia-
tion." In addition, the court concluded that for a union action not
to be "arbitrary" it must have been based upon permissible union
factors, a rational result of consideration of these factors, and im-
partial consideration of all the employees' interests. 50 Despite AL-
PA's claim that there were no vacancies, the appellate court rea-
soned that at the time of the settlement, the 85-5 bid positions were
still available because the working pilots had not yet been trained
for the positions." Thus, the appellate court reasoned that the
settlement allowed the striking pilots access to less that half of the
available positions and was therefore not a positive gain for the
union.52 Moreover, the appellate court accepted the pilots' assertion
that CAL would have retained all prior seniority for the striking
pilots, which was more favorable than the modified seniority in the
ALPA settlement." Therefore, the appellate court concluded that
the settlement was not a rational consideration of all factors because
it left the pilots worse off than if they had completely surrendered
to the airline. 54 Because the court held that a jury. could find that
the union had acted arbitrarily, it vacated and remanded the district
court's ruling. 55
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that although
the appellate court correctly applied the Vaca standard to the pilots'
complaint, its interpretation of "arbitrary" within the standard was
too narrow." The Court reasoned that the. Vaca standard was ap-
plicable because previous opinions discussing fair representation
suggested that all union activities, including contract negotiations,
fell under the standard. 57 In addition, because it reasoned that
45 Id. at 1132, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2723. The district court gave only a verbal opinion and
did not discuss its reasoning. O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,	 886 F.2d 1438, 1442-43,
132 L.R.R.M. 2876, 2880 (5th Cir. 1989).
4° Air Line Pilots, 111 S. Ct. at 1132, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2723.
5° Id. (quoting Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957, 92 L.R.R.M. 2990,
2994-95 (5th Cir. 1976)).
51 Id. at 1132, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2723-24.
" See id.
55 See id. at 1132 n.4, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2722 n.4.
54 See id. at 1132, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2723.
55 Id. at 1132, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2724.
u. See id. at 1135, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2726.
57 Id. at 1135, 196 L.R.R.M. at 2725.
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union functions are not easily categorized as either contract nego-
tiation or contract administration or enforcement, but often involve
aspects of each, the Court concluded that contract negotiations are
included within the standard. 58
On the issue of what constitutes "arbitrary" conduct, the Su-
preme Court stated that the standard the appellate court had used
was too restrictive of a union's activity.59 Reasoning that a union's
role is similar to that of other fiduciaries, the Court stated that a
union has a duty to its members beyond merely acting in good
faith.6° Nevertheless, the Court also reasoned that because Congress
had intended the unions to have wide latitude in their bargaining
ability, judicial evaluation of union actions must be highly defer-
entia1. 8 ' Therefore, the Air Line Pilots Court stated that a union
action is arbitrary under the Vaca rule only if "it can be fairly
characterized as so far outside a wide range of reasonableness that
it is wholly irrational or arbitrary."fie
The Supreme Court interpreted the facts differently than had
the appellate court, reasoning that given the hostility between ALPA
and CAL, it was possible that CAL would not have retained the
pilots' prior seniority or given them access to the 85-5 bid positions."
The Court stated that the appellate court's conclusion that the
positions were technically vacant was not a settled issue when ALPA
was negotiating with CAL." Also, the Court reasoned that the op-
tion of not returning to work and receiving severance pay would
not have existed had ALPA not settled. 65 Therefore, the Court
concluded that ALPA's decision to settle with CAL had been rea-
sonable and not arbitrary. 66 In sum, the Supreme Court agreed with
the Fifth Circuit that the Vaca standard should be applied to all
union activity including contract negotiation." Nevertheless, based
on its interpretation of the facts, the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court and held that the union had not acted arbitrarily, but
" Id.
59 Id. at 1135, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2726.
60 Id. at 1134, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2724.
61 See id. at 1135, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2725.
62 Id. at 1136, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2726.
65 Id. at 1136-37, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2726-27.
64 Air Line Pilots. 111 S. Ct. at 1136-37, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2726-27.
65 Id. at 1137, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2727.
66 Id.
See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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instead was well within the requirements for fair representation
under the Vaca standard. 68
Air Line Pilots potentially creates a less restrictive standard for
the union's duty of fair representation. 69 Although Air Line Pilots
established that all union activity is subject to the duty of fair rep-
resentation," the Supreme Court stated that actions must reach the
level of irrationality to qualify as arbitrary under the Vaca stan-
dard." Plaintiffs alleging breach of the duty of fair representation
may find it difficult if not impossible to show irrationality in union
conduct. Consequently, the high threshold of irrationality put forth
in Air Line Pilots may diminish the fair representation doctrine as a
tool for policing union conduct.
In addition, by including all union activities under the Vaca
standard for determining the duty of fair representation, the Su-
preme Court extends the Air Line Pilots "irrational" definition of
"arbitrary" to individual arbitration cases as well as contract nego-
tiation cases. 72 This expansion essentially ignores earlier arguments
that unions should be more accountable to individual members with •
grievances than to group allegations in negotiation representation."
Apparently the Supreme Court failed to consider the impact that
the new definition of arbitrary might have on individual complaints
when it lessened union accountability.
Finally, the Supreme Court's definition of arbitrary under Vaca
may cause more confusion than clarity among the lower courts. Air
Line Pilots failed to address directly the different definitions of
arbitrary used by thelower courts; thus, ambiguity remains whether
the "reasonableness standard" replaces the standards the circuit
courts had previously adopted. Although some circuits have applied
the irrationality standard set forth in Air Line Pilots, at least one
circuit court refused to hold that Air Line Pilots preempts. The
Seventh Circuit, although acknowledging Air Line Pilots, continues
"s See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
55 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mr Line Pilot's
interpretation of the duty of fair representation.
7° Mr Line Pilots, 1 l 1 S. Ct. at 1129, 1126 L.R.R.M. at 2722,
7I Id.
72 See e.g., Brown v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No.
58, 936 F.2d 251, 255, 137 L.R.R.M. 2747, 2750 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying the "irrational"
standard of Air Line Pilots to a contract ratification issue); Papavaritis v. Communication
Workers of America, AFL-C10, 772 F. Stipp. 604, 606 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (applying the "irra-
tional" standard of Air Line Pilots to individual grievance action).
75 See supra note 22-23 and accompanying text.
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to equate arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct with inten-
tional misconduct.74
 Thus the lack of uniformity among the circuits
in defining "arbitrary" will continue. In sum, the Supreme Court
in Air Line Pilots makes it more difficult to show "arbitrary" conduct
under the Vaca standard, while at the same time failing to resolve
the ambiguity of the definition. In addition, by extending the ap-
plication of the Vaca standard for fair representation to include all
union activity, the Court has lessened the power of the doctrine to
regulate union conduct with respect to individual employee claims.
IV. ARBITRATION
A. * Interpreting the Scope of the Taft-Hartley Act's Federal Remedy
Provision: Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener
Division'
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Har-
tley) Act ("LMRA") provides a remedy in federal court for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement. 2
 The United States Supreme
Court has held that section 301 authorizes federal actions by and
against individual employees as well as actions between employers
and unions. 3
 Access to the courts, however, can be denied where
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement have agreed on an
alternative method for settling disputes.4
 The statutory authority
for a judicial remedy becomes somewhat less clear where the col-
" Richardson v. Kraft-Holleb Food Serv. Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(stating that the duty is not breached without substantial evidence of Fraud, deceitful action
or dishonest conduct); Rakestraw v. United Airlines, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 474, 492, 137
L.R.R.M. 2586, 2599 (N.D. 111. 1991) (stating that a union only breaches duty of fair repre-
sentation if it intentionally causes harm to an employee).
* By Timothy J. Fallon, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
111 S. Ct. 498, 135 L.R.R.M. 3121 (1990).
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (hereinafter "LMRA"), § 301(a), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
Id.
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 562, 91 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2484 (1976).
LMRA, 1 203(d), 29 U.S.C. 173(d) (1988). Section 203(d) of the Act states: "Final
adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement." Id.
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lective bargaining agreement does not provide a final, compulsory
and binding alternative but does include language authorizing a
strike or a lockout. 5 Federal courts of appeal have been divided on
the issue of whether such an authorization of economic pressure
represents the exclusive remedy for labor disputes and thus bars
any action in federal court.°
In the 1973 case Associated General Contractors v. Illinois Confer-
ence of Teamsters, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that a contract provision reserving the parties' right to
use economic warfare could not be interpreted as an agreement to
strip the court of jurisdiction to resolve labor disputes absent explicit
exclusive remedy language.? The court recognized that the right to
strike is protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.° In addition, the
court ackowledged that the United States Supreme Court had held
that the dispute resolution mechanisms chosen by the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement are required to be "given full play."
The court reasoned, however, that even though the parties had not
agreed to compulsory arbitration and had reserved the right to use
economic warfare, the parties were not thereby limited to the use
of force as their only means of resolving disputes. 1 ° The court noted
that any attempt to bar judicial action in favor of economic action
would have to be set forth explicitly in the collective bargaining
agreement." The court, therefore, concluded that the mere au-
thorization of economic warfare, without an explicit provision man-
dating a final non-judicial remedy, could not be read to prevent the
court from exercising jurisdiction under section 301. 12
° See generally Groves, 111  S. Ct. at 501-04, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122-24.
° Compare Dickeson v. Daw Forest Prods., 827 F•2d 627, 629-30, 126 L.R.R.M. 2249,
2250 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the lack of language indicating that the agreement's
grievance procedures would be the exclusive remedy means that a judicial remedy should
be available); S.J. Groves & Sons v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 627, 581 F.2d
1241, 1243-44, 99 L.R.R.M. 2623, 2624-25 (7th Cir. 1978) (same) and Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972, 976, 84 L.R.R.M. 2555, 2557-
58 (7th Cir. 1973) (same) with Fortune v. National Twist Drill & Tool Div., Lear Siegler, 684
F.2d 374, 375-76, 1 1 1 L.R.R.M. 2189, 2190-91 (holding that the existence of grievance
procedures in the agreement, whether exclusive or not, precludes a judicial remedy).
486 F.2d 972, 976, 84 L.R.R.M. 2555, 2557-58 (7th Cir. 1973).
Id.
" Id. at 976, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2557 (citing United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 566 (1960)).
1° Id. at 976, 84 L.R.R.M• at 2557-58.
II Id. at 976, 84 L.R•R.M. at 2558.
12 Id. at 976, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2557; see also Dickeson v. Daw Forest Prods., 827 F.2d 627,
629, 126 L.R.R.M. 2249, 2250 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the right to strike, while being a
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Conversely, in the 1982 case Fortune v. National Twist Drill &
Tool Division, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that where a collective bargaining agreement fails to
provide for final arbitration but allows the parties to resort to eco-
nomic weapons in the event of a failure of the grievance procedure,
the only available recourse in the event of such a failure is eco-
nomic.'s The court reasoned that because the employees who were
seeking review of their discharges had not claimed that the union
had in any way breached its duty of fair representation, their only
recourse was that provided for in the agreement." The court also
noted the strong judicial policy favoring deference for the dispute
resolution methods agreed upon by the parties. 15 Unlike the Asso-
ciated General Contractors court, the Fortune court concluded that even
in the absence of explicit language, a reservation of the right to
resort to economic recourse represents the exclusive remedy avail-
able to the parties upon failure of the grievance procedure. 18
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in the 1966 case Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
concluded that an employee's wrongful discharge suit was barred
from federal court by the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. 17 Unlike Fortune, however, Haynes involved an agree-
ment which specifically provided that the result of the grievance
procedure was to be final and binding. 18 The agreement made clear
that the only available option after exhaustion of the grievance
procedure was for the union to strike. 19 On these facts, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the decision arrived at under the grievance
procedure was final and that the employee was barred from federal
court absent a showing that the procedure was infected in some
way.2o
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court, in
Groves v. Ring Screw Works, held that a collective bargaining agree-
protected right, is not the preferred method of dispute resolution and should not be the
exclusive remedy available to the parties absent explicit contractual language to that effect).
13 See Fortune v. National Twist Drill & Tool Div., Lear Siegler, 684 F.2d 374, 375, 111
L.R.R.M. 2189, 2190 (6th Cir. 1982).
14 See id. at 375-76, 111 L.R.R.M. at 2190-91.
15 Id. at 375, 111 L.R.R.M. at 2190 (citing Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
362 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1966)); Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 437 F.2d 167,
171, 76 L.R.R.M. 2257, 2258-59 (5th Cir. 1971)).
16 See id. at 375-76, 111 L.R.R.M. at 2190-91.
" 362 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1966).
'° Haynes, 362 F.2d at 415.
Id. at 415-16.
2° Id. at 418.
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ment provision reserving the parties' right to use economic weapons
could not preclude a court from exercising jurisdiction under sec-
tion 301 absent explicit language providing an exclusive and final
remedy." The Groves court endorsed the Associated General Contrac-
tors court's holding, reasoning that the LMRA was intended to favor
the peaceful resolution of labor disputes over the use of strikes or
lockouts. 22 As a corollary to its holding, the Court said it will defer
to the dispute resolution methods decided upon by the parties only
in those situations where it is clear that the parties intended to
foreclose judicial action."
The Groves case focused on two essentially identical collective
bargaining agreements between the respondent, Ring Screw Works,
and the petitioner union to which petitioners Groves and Evans
belonged.24 Groves was terminated by Ring Screw Works for al-
legedly excessive, unexcused absences. 25 The company terminated
Evans for allegedly falsifying company records. 26 The petitioners,
contending that their dismissals were in violation of their respective
collective bargaining agreements, invoked the grievance procedures
provided for in the agreements." These procedures involved a
voluntary, multi-step process, but neither agreement required com-
pulsory final arbitration. 28 In addition, the agreements prohibited
21 III S. Ct. 498, 503, 135 L.R.R.M. 3121, 3124 (1990) (citing Associated Gen. Con-
tractors v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972, 976, 84 L.R.R.M. 2555, 2557-58
(7th Cir. 1973)).
22 Id. at 502-03, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3123.
29 See id.
24 Id. at 500, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3121. The union involved was the International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW)
Local #771. Id. at 500 n.2, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3121 n.2.
22 Id. at 501 n.5, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122 n.5.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 501, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122.
26 Id. at 500, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3121-22. One of the agreements provided:
Section 1. Should a difference arise between the Company and the Union
or its members employed by the Company, as to the meaning and application
of the provisions of the agreement, an earnest effort will be made to settle it as
follows:
Step I. Between the employee, his steward and the foremen of his depart-
ment. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then
Step 2. Between the Shop Committee, with or without the employee, and
the Company management. if a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then
Step 3. The Shop Committee and/or the Company may call the local Union
president and/or the International representative to arrange a meeting in an
attempt to resolve the grievance. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached, then
Step 4, The Shop Committee and the Company may call in an outside
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strikes or lockouts until all other methods of recourse had been
exhausted. 29
 Upon failure of the grievance procedures in the cases
of Groves and Evans, the company chose not to call for arbitration
and the union chose not to strike. 30 Thereafter, petitioners brought
suit in federal court pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA, 31
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision to grant the company's motion
for summary judgment. 32
 The appeals court noted that courts have
favored the use of arbitration to resolve labor disputes where the
collective bargaining agreement provides for it." The Sixth Circuit
also noted that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement must
exhaust all such procedures provided in the agreement before
bringing an action under section 301. 34
 In addition, the court stated
that if the agreement provides exclusive and final grievance pro-
cedures, the aggrieved party's right to bring an action under section
301 can be "severely restricted."" Moreover, relying on the Fortune
case, which was binding authority, the court reasoned that even in
the absence of language indicating that the grievance procedure is
representative to assist in settling the difficulty. This may include arbitration by
mutual agreement in discharge cases only.
Id. at 500 n.3, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122 n.3.
29 Id. at 500, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122. The clause limiting strikes and lockouts provided:
The Union will not cause or permit its members to cause, nor will any
member of the Union take part in any strike, either sit-down, stay-in or any
other kind of strike, or other interference, or any other stoppage, total or
partial, of production at the Company's plant during the terms of this agreement
until all negotiations have failed through the grievance procedure set forth
herein. Neither will the Company engage in any lockout until the same grievance
procedure has been carried out.
Id. at 501, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122. Further, one of the collective bargaining agreements
contained a provision stipulating that any unresolved disputes "shall be handled as set forth
in [the grievance procedure above at note 28]." Id. at 501 n.4, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122 n.4.
The parties never contended that this clause distinguished the agreement from the other
agreement and required different treatment. The Court, therefore, did not address this
possibility. Id.
'" Id. at 501, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122.
51 Id. The petitioners brought their actions separately, and the two were consolidated
on appeal. Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 882 F.2d 1081, 1082, 132
L.R.R.M. 2306, 2306 (fith Cir. 1989), rerld, 111 S. Ct. at 503, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3124 (1990).
92 Groves, 882 F.2d at 1087, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2310.
93 Id. at 1084, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2307.
34 Id.
" Id. With regard to such restrictions upon the availability of a judicial remedy, the
Dickeson court noted that where an employee has unsuccessfully exhausted the grievance
procedures intended under the collective bargaining agreement to be final, he or she cannot
bring a federal action under section 301 absent some showing that the grievance procedure
was infected (for example, where the union has breached its duty of fair representation).
Dickeson v. Daw Forest Prods., 827 F.2d 627, 629, 126 L.R.R.M. 2249, 2250 (9th Cir. 1987).
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to provide a final and exclusive remedy, such a procedure can be
deemed exclusive." Nevertheless, the court did express some am-
bivalence about the soundness of the Fortune court's reasoning. 37 In
addition, the court noted that other circuits had decided that a
judicial remedy under section 301 was appropriate under similar
circumstances." The court, nonetheless, was bound by its previous
decision in Fortune and concluded that the action had been appro-
priately barred by the district court. 39
On grant of certiorari to resolve this conflict among the circuit
courts, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's
holding and held that the lack of an explicit exclusive remedy
provision precludes the barring of a judicial remedy under section
301.4° Writing for the Groves majority, Justice Stevens began by
recognizing the strong presumption favoring judicial enforcement
of labor agreements.'" The Court also agreed with the company,
however, that this presumption can be overcome where the collec-
tive bargaining agreement provides an alternative, binding method
of resolution. 42 Thus, the Court reiterated its policy, and the policy
of section 203(d) of the LMRA, of deferring and giving meaning
to the intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement. 43
The Court, however, did not agree that this policy of deference
was applicable to the situation in Groves." The Court reasoned that
section 203(d)'s reference to "the desirable method for settlement
36 See Groves, 882 F.2d at 1084, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2308.
33 Id. at 1086-87, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2309-10. The court stated:
Such resolution, by work "stoppage or other interference" is not a happy
solution from a societal standpoint of an industrial dispute, particularly as it
relates to the claim of a single employee that has been wrongfully discharged.
Were we deciding the issue with a clean slate, we might be disposed to adopt
the rationale of Dickeson .. .
Id. at 1086, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2309.
33 Id. at 1085, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2308.
36 Id. at 1087, 132 L.R.R.M. at 2310. The court concluded, "[Ole only means to reex-
amine this policy would be by en bane consideration of the Fortune holding and rationale. We
are compelled by the authority herein set out to [affirm] the decision of the district court as
to both Groves and Evans." Id.
4U Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 111 S. Ct. 498, 500, 503, 135
L.R.R.M. 3121, 3121, 3124 (1990).
41 Id. at 502, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122 (citing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S.
554, 562, 91 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2483-84 (1976)). The Groves Court noted, "under § 301, as in
other areas of the law, there is a strong presumption that favors access to a neutral forum
for the peaceful resolution of disputes." Id. at 502, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3123.
43 Id. at 502, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3123.
43 Id.; see also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960);
LMRA, § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988).
44 See Groves, 111 S. Ct. at 602-03, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3122-24.
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of grievance disputes" was intended to favor peaceful methods of
dispute resolution and not strikes or lockouts. 45 The Court sup-
ported this conclusion by noting that strikes and lockouts do not
end a dispute by looking to the merits of each party's position;
rather, such methods involve one party's use of economic muscle
designed to compel the other party to accept the first party's de-
mands.46 The Court concluded that resort to economic weapons
was not the kind of peaceful solution favored by Congress when it
passed the LMRA. 47
The Court, therefore, favored the reasoning of those courts
that had chosen to provide a judicial remedy under section 301 in
these circumstances.48 Expressing approval of the Associated General
Contractors decision, the Court noted that the employer was seeking
a judicial remedy in Associated General Contractors." Nevertheless,
the Court concluded that where the employee is seeking such a
remedy rather than the employer, the issue is the same. 5° The Groves
Court quoted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning approvingly and con-
cluded that Groves and Evans should not have been denied access
to a federal forum. 5 ' Thus, the Supreme Court held that the mere
reservation of a right to resort to economic weapons, unaccompan-
ied by any provision indicating that the parties intended to foreclose
judicial relief, cannot preclude a court from exercising jurisdiction
under section 301. 52
The Court's decision in Groves restricts section 203(d)'s policy
of deference for the dispute resolution methods agreed upon by
the parties to those situations in which it is clear that the parties
intended an alternative, binding method." Thus, parties to collec-
tive bargaining agreements attempting to foreclose the possibility
of having to litigate in federal court must make that intention
explicit in their agreement. This limitation reasserts the Court's
previously articulated policy of providing a neutral forum for the
45 Id. at 502, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3123 (citing LMRA, 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) ( 1 988)).
See supra note 4 for the language of section 203(d).
48 Id. at 503, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3123.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 503, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3124.
49 Id. at 503, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3123-24.
5° Id. at 503, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3123.
31 Id. at 503, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3123-24.
57 Id. at 500, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3121.
53 See LMRA, 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988). See supra note 4 and accompanying
text for a discussion of section 203(d)'s policy of deference for the parties' agreed upon
method of dispute resolution.
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peaceful resolution of labor disputes. 54 Thus, in Groves, the Court
struck a delicate balance between two important policy considera-
tions: the need to give meaning to the parties' intentions under the
agreement, on the one hand, and the need to provide a neutral
forum in which to resolve labor disputes 'on the other.
In addition to providing a federal forum for those cases in
which the parties have not explicitly agreed to some variety of
binding arbitration, the Groves decision will undoubtedly serve to
encourage parties engaged in labor negotiations to include such
final and binding mechanisms in their agreements. Thus, more
disputes are likely to be resolved in a peaceful manner (either in
federal court, or in arbitration or mediation) based upon the merits
of the dispute rather than upon the ability of one side or the other
to exercise superior economic muscle. The Court's decision, there-
fore, allows those parties who would be disadvantaged in an eco-
nomic struggle, often individual employees, to have their claims
heard on their merits.
The Groves case also serves to resolve a conflict among the
circuit courts as to this issue." Close analysis of the case law in this
area, however, suggests that the Groves decision is less of a departure
from previous federal case law than it would first appear. The
Supreme Court's decision essentially reinforces the rationale that
most federal courts had previously employed in this area.
First, it is important to keep the facts of Groves in mind when
comparing it to previous federal cases. The agreement in Groves
was silent as to whether a strike or lockout would be the exclusive
option available to the parties upon failure of the grievance pro-
cedure. 56 The intended remedy of the parties was ambiguous and
it was, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, for the court to give
meaning to that intent.
By contrast, where a court is presented with an agreement
calling for a final and exclusive remedy, whatever that remedy might
be, the situation is distinguishable from that in Groves. 57 For exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Haynes involved a collective bar-
gaining agreement under which the union and employer had ex-
pressly agreed upon an exclusive method for dispute resolution that
" Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 562, 91 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2483-84
(1976).
M Groves, 111  S. Ct. at 500, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3121.
56 Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 882 F.2d 1081, 1085, 132
L.R.R.M. 2306, 2308 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, I I 1 S. Ct. at 503, 135 L.R.R.M. at 3124 (1990).
57 See, e.g., Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966).
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would be final unless the union notified the employer that the union
intended to strike.58 The Court's holding in Groves does not reach
the factual situation presented in Haynes because the parties in
Haynes had stated their intentions as to dispute resolution clearly in
the agreement. Presumably, section 301 suits under collective bar-
gaining agreements containing an explicit provision as to the exclu-
sivity and finality of the grievance procedures will continue to be
barred absent a showing that the grievance procedures were in-
fected in some way. Thus, cases such as Haynes are reconcilable with
the Court's opinion in Groves.
Moreover, even where there is no final and binding dispute
resolution method in the agreement, the only court that had
reached an opposite result from that in Groves later expressed its
uncertainty as to its result. 59 That court, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Groves, did choose not to overrule its Fortune rationale. 60
The Supreme Court's decision in Groves reversing that result, there-
fore, resolves the immediate conflict over this issue. In terms of
policy, however, there really was no sharp conflict among the circuits
prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Groves, given the Sixth
Circuit's ambivalence as to its prior holding. Rather, it appears that
in Groves, the Sixth Circuit felt compelled by stare decisis and not
by any strong policies that would favor denying a judicial remedy
in this situation. Thus, given the narrow factual setting in Groves
(namely, the lack of an explicitly final and binding dispute resolution
mechanism in the agreement) and given the Sixth Circuit's ambiv-
alence over its own decision in Fortune, the Supreme Court's decision
in Groves does not significantly alter the law that had prevailed
among the circuit courts on this issue.
In sum, during the Survey year, the United States Supreme
Court in Groves v. Ring Screw Works held that where the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement have failed to provide for an exclu-
sive and final method of dispute resolution, the mere authorization
of economic warfare does not represent the exclusive remedy avail-
55 Id. at 415-16. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
terms of agreement in the Haynes case.
59 Compare Fortune v. National Twist Di -ill & Tool Div., Lear Siegler, 684 F.2d 379,375—
76,111 L.R.R.M. 2189,2190-91 (6th Cir. 1982) (court held that judicial remedy is foreclosed
even in the absence of an alternative, final and binding method of resolution) with Groves,
882 F.2d at 1086-87,132 L.R.R.M. at 2309-10 (court expressed uncertainty as to its holding
in Fortune). See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's
uncertainty as to the result it had reached in Fortune.
60 Groves, 882 F.2d at 1087,132 L.R.R.M. at 2310.
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able and does not foreclose judicial relief under section 301 of the
LMRA. While the Court did succeed in overruling the Fortune ra-
tionale that had prevailed in the Sixth Circuit, this result was not,
in any real sense, revolutionary given the essential agreement
among the circuits regarding judicial intervention in labor disputes.
What is more important about the Groves decision, however, is its
admonition to those engaged in labor negotiations that the Supreme
Court takes seriously its policy of providing for the peaceful reso-
lution of labor disputes in a judicial forum unless the parties have
been absolutely clear in providing for a final and exclusive alter-
native method. After Groves, parties wishing to foreclose the possi-
bility of having to litigate labor disputes in federal court must make
this intention clearly known in their collective bargaining agree-
ment.
B.* A More Rigorous Standard for Post-Expiration Enforcement of
Arbitration Clauses: Litton Financial Printing v. NLRB'
In the 1977 case of Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Bakery Workers, the Su-
preme Court held that a collective bargaining agreement's broad
arbitration clause could be used to compel arbitration of a post-
expiration dispute which arose under the agreement. 2 In Nolde
Bros., the Court required an employer to arbitrate a dispute over
severance pay owed to workers laid off after a collective bargaining
agreement had expired. 3 The Court stated that the expired agree-
ment's broad arbitration clause created a presumption that the
clause would survive and that it would apply to post-expiration
disputes arising under the agreement. 4 The Court found that this
presumption was not rebutted by any express language in the agree-
ment.' The Court then reasoned that severance pay was a right
which vested prior to the expiration of the agreement, and that
therefore a dispute over such pay arose under the agreement and
should be forced into arbitrations
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nolde Bros.,
courts have been widely split on the proper standard to be applied
* By Michael J. Hartley, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I l 1 S. Ct. 2215, 137 L.R.R.M. 2441 (1991).
2 430 U.S. 243, 255, 94 L.R.R.M. 2753, 2757 (1977).
3 Id.
• See id.
5 See id. at 252-53, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2756-57.
6 Id. at 248, 249, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2755.
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in determining whether a dispute arises under an expired collective
bargaining agreement and thus becomes arbitrable. The National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
and the Michigan Supreme Court, for example, have found that
only disputes involving rights vested prior to an agreement's expi-
ration "arise under" the agreement and are arbitrable.' The Third,
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, have not applied this vested-
rights standard. These circuits have instead concluded that if the
arbitration clause of an expired agreement can be plausibly inter-
preted so as to cover a dispute, the dispute arises under the agree-
ment and is arbitrable. 9 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated that a dispute is arbitrable if it occurs within a limited period
following the collective bargaining agreement's expiration. 9
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court, in
Litton Financial Printing v. NLRB, reviewed the substantial disagree-
ment over what constitutes a dispute that arises under an expired
See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Gold Star Sausage Co.,
897 F.2d 1022, 1026, 133 L.R.R.M. 2765, 2769 (10th Cir. 1990) (right to be discharged for
just cause, right of seniority and right to exclude supervisors from performing work reserved
under contract for bargaining unit employees are not vested rights, and therefore dispute
over such rights do not arise under the contract); Chauffeurs Local Union 238 v. C.R.S.T.,
Inc., 795 F.2d 1400, 1403-04, 122 L.R.R.M. 2993, 2995-96 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1007, 123 L.R.R.M. 3192 (1986) (right to be discharged for cause did not vest prior
to agreement's termination and so dispute over such right did not "arise under" terminated
agreement); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 284 N.L.R.B. 53, 60, 125 L.R.R.M. 1097, 1105
(1987) (dispute based on post-expiration events "arises under" the contract within the mean-
ing of Nolde Bros. only if it concerns contract rights capable of accruing or vesting to some
degree during the life of the contract and ripening or remaining enforceable after the
contract expires); County of Ottawa v. Jaklinski, 423 Mich. I, 7, 120 L.R.R.M. 3260, 3261
(1985) (right to be discharged only for just cause is not vested right and therefore dispute
over such right does not arise under the agreement).
0 See, e.g., Seafarers Int'l Union v. National Marine Servs., Inc., 820 F.2d 148, 154-55,
125 L.R.R.M. 3069, 3074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953, 126 L.R.R.M. 2960 (1987)
(dispute over recognition clause of collective agreement "arose under" agreement and was
arbitrable because arbitration clause of agreement was susceptible to interpretation that
covered the dispute); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Royal Ctr., Inc., 796 F.2d 1159, 1162-63,
123 L.R.R.M. 2347, 2349 (9th Cir. 1986) (dispute over union rights under collective bargain-
ing agreement after employer sold business is arbitrable because arbitration clause was
susceptible to interpretation that covered the dispute); Federated Metals Corp. v. United
Steelworkers, 648 F.2d 856, 861, 107 L.R.R.M. 2271, 2275-2276 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1031, 108 L.R.R.M. 2924 (1981) (dispute over disability and pension rights "arose under"
contract not because rights were vested, but because dispute concerned interpretation of
agreement).
9 See, e.g., Local 703, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Kennicott Bros., 771 F.2d 300, 304, 120
L.R.R.M. 2306, 2308 (7th Cir. 1985) (grievances not arbitrable because dispute occurred
more than six months after expiration of the collective bargaining agreement).
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collective bargaining agreement.° In Litton, the Court held that a
post-expiration dispute is arbitrable where it concerns rights vested
or accrued prior to the termination of the agreement." In so doing,
the Court expanded on its previous decision in Nolde Bros.' 2
Litton involved a dispute over the interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement ("Agreement") between petitioner Litton Fi-
nancial Printing Services and the union which represented Litton's
employees. The Agreement between Litton and its employees'
union set out a grievance procedure and required that if this pro-
cedure was unsuccessful in resolving any dispute arising under the
Agreement, the parties were to submit to binding arbitration.' 8 The
Agreement also provided that individual layoffs be determined by
the length of an employee's continuous service, if other criteria such
as aptitude and ability were equal." This Agreement expired on
October 3, 1979. 15 By late August, 1980, no new agreement had
been reached.' 6
The dispute between Litton and the union arose after the
expiration of their collective bargaining agreement.° Shortly after
the Agreement had expired, Litton, the operator of a check printing
plant in California,'s decided to eliminate its increasingly inefficient
-..pld-type printing presses.' 9 In the process, Litton laid off ten of
the forty-two workers at the plant. 2° These workers were either
primarily or exclusively involved with the cold-type press opera-
tion," and included six of the plant's ten most senior employees. 22
10 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2221, 137 L.R.R.M. 2441, 2444 (1991).
11 Id. at 2227, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2449.
See id. at 2225, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2447-48. The Court's interpretation of Nalde Bros.
confirmed the interpretation given to "arises under" by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and
the NLRB. See id. at 2221 n.1, 2225, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2444 n.1, 2447-48.
12 Id. at 2219, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2443. Section 19 of the Agreement, the arbitration
provision, stated: "[differences that may arise between the parties hereto regarding this
Agreement and any alleged violations of the Agreement, the construction to be placed on
any clause or clauses of the Agreement shall be determined by arbitration in the manner
hereinafter set forth." Id. Section 21 set out the two-step grievance procedure. Id.
14 Id.
' 2 Id. at 2219, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2442-43.
16 Id. at 2219, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2443.
17 Id.
IS Id.
II' Id.
" Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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The union filed grievances on behalf of these employees, 23
 but
Litton refused to submit to the grievance procedure or to arbitra-
tion.24
The union petitioned the NLRB to compel Litton to arbitrate
the dispute.25
 An administrative law judge declared that Litton had
to submit to arbitration because the arbitration clause could be
plausibly interpreted to cover the dispute. The administrative law
judge thus held that the dispute "arose under" the Agreement.26
Six years later, the Board found that Litton had no contractual
obligation to arbitrate the layoff dispute. 27
 The Board applied its
interpretation of Nolde Bros. to the case and concluded that the
dispute did not arise under the Agreement because the type of
employee seniority rights discussed in the Agreement did not vest
prior to its termination. 28
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered
that Litton submit the layoff dispute to arbitration. 29 The court
rejected the Board's vested-rights interpretation of Nolde Bros.' "aris-
ing under" standard of arbitrability. 3° The court held that the layoff
dispute arose under the contract, and was thus arbitrable, because
the expired arbitration clause could be plausibly interpreted as
covering the dispute. 3 '
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals to the extent that it disagreed with the Board's
2] Id.
24 Id.
23 Id. at 2219-2221, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2443-44.
25 Id. at 2219, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2443. The ALJ based his decision upon a previous NLRB
interpretation of Nolde Bros., American Sink Top and Cabinet Co., in which the Board argued,
like the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts, that a dispute "arose under" the agreement
if some plausible interpretation of the agreement's arbitration clause made it applicable to
the dispute. See American Sink Top, 242 N.L.R.B. 408, 408, 101 L.R.R.M. 1166, 1166-67
(1979). The Board later changed its interpretation of Nolde Bros., in Indiana & Michigan
Elec. Co., to make vested rights the standard for arbitrability. See 284 N.L.R.B. 53, 60, 125
L.R.R.M. 1097, 1103 (1987).
22
 Litton Business Sys., Inc., 286 N.L.R.R. 817, 821-22, 126 L.R.R.M. 1339, 1344 (1987).
28 Id. at 821-22, 126 L.R.R.M. at 1344. The interpretation of Nolde Bros. that the Board
applied was the one arrived at in its previous decision in Indiana & Michigan. Id. (applying
Indiana & Michigan, 284 N.L.R.B. at 60, 125 L.R.R.M. at 1103).
29 NLRB v. Litton Printing Div., 893 F.2d 1128, 1159, 133 L.R.R.M. 2354, 2362 (9th
Cir. 1990).
30 Id. at 1138-39, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2361-62. The court based its decision upon a previous
interpretation of Nolde Bros. by the Ninth Circuit in Royal Center. Id. at 1138, 133 L.R.R.M.
at 2361-62 (citing Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Royal Center, 796 F.2d 1159, 1163, 123
L.R.R.M. 2347, 2350 (9th Cir. 1986)).
31 See Lilton, 893 F.2d at 1138, 133 L.R.R.M. at 2361-62.
March 19921	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 355
interpretation of Nolde Bros." The Court first found that arbitration
clauses of expired collective bargaining agreements are not subject
to the statutory duty to bargain imposed on employers by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act." Because the Court found that these
clauses constitute a consensual surrender of the parties' freedom to
utilize their economic powers to reach a favorable agreement, the
Court argued that the proper mode of analysis for arbitration
clauses was contractual interpretation. 34 The Court therefore con-
cluded that only disputes that concern post-expiration contractual
obligations created by the collective bargaining agreement arise
under the agreement.35
The Supreme Court enumerated three bases upOn which a
dispute could be judged to concern a post-expiration contractual
obligation created by a collective bargaining agreement." First, the
dispute could stem from facts or occurrences that arose prior to the
termination of the agreement." Second, the dispute could stem
from an infringement of a right which, under normal principles of
contract interpretation, was intended to survive the expiration of
the agreement itself." Third, the dispute could stem from post-
expiration actions by the employer that infringe on rights which
vested or accrued before the agreement's expiration. 39
The Court applied this interpretation of Nolde Bros. to the facts
of Litton." After finding that the presumption of arbitrability cre-
ated by the broad arbitration clause was not rebutted by any express
language in the Agreement,'" the Court stated that the first two
32 Litton Fin. Printing v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 2215, 2227-28, 137 L.R.R.M. 2441, 2449-
50 (1991).
" Id. at 2222, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2445. This statutory duty to bargain in good faith requires
that an employer bargain to impasse over terms or conditions of employment before making
any unilateral changes to them. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1947); Litton, 111  S. Ct. at 2221,
137 L.R.R.M. at 2444. The Supreme Court has construed a breach of this duty to bargain
in good faith to be an unfair labor practice within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and
(5). NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 736, 50 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2178 (1962). In its brief to the
Supreme Court, the Union in Litton argued for reversal of Kates construction of the duty to
bargain in good faith. Litton, Ill S. Ct. at 2222, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2445.
34 Litton, 111 S. Ct. at 2222, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2445 ("'[A]rbitration is, at bottom, a
consensual surrender of the economic power which the parties are otherwise free to utilize.'"
(quoting Hilton-Davis Chem. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 241, 242, 75 L.R.R.M. 1036, 1038 (1970))).
35 Id. at 2225, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2447.
35 See id.
37 Id.
55 Id.
59 Id.
40 Id. at 2227, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2449.
41 The Court held that the Agreement's provision that its stipulations "shall be in effect
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bases of arbitrability it had enumerated were inapplicable in this
case.42
 First, the layoffs occurred after the expiration of the Agree-
ment. Second, the language of the agreement did not expressly
create rights which would survive the expiration of the Agreement
itself.43
 The Court therefore concluded that the Litton dispute could
only have arisen under the Agreement if the seniority rights ignored
by Litton in its layoff decisions were rights that had accrued or
vested prior to the Agreement's expiration."
The Supreme Court then held that the kind of seniority de-
scribed in the Agreement was not an accrued or vested right.45
Under the Agreement, seniority would not factor into layoff deci-
sions unless layoff candidates' abilities and aptitudes were equal. 46
The Court argued that, as Litton no longer needed cold-type press
operators, these employees' abilities and aptitudes were not equal
to those of the hot-type operators, and that therefore seniority
would not have factored into Litton's decision to lay off the cold-
type operators. 47
 The Court held that because this type of seniority
right did not accrue before the contract had expired," the dispute
did not arise under the contract. 49
 Litton therefore could not be
forced to arbitrate the layoffs."
Justice Marshall, in dissent, agreed with the majority's view that
the broad arbitration clause created a presumption of arbitrability
unrebutted by the express language of the contract, 51 but disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of Nolde Bros.' "arising under"
standard. 52
 Justice Marshall agreed with the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and argued that the layoff dispute did arise under the
Agreement because the Agreement's arbitration clause could be
plausibly interpreted so as to cover the dispute. 53
for the time hereinafter specified," its limiting of the no-strike clause to the term of the
agreement, and its provision for interest arbitration did not rebut the presumption of the
Agreement's unlimited arbitration clause, by which parties agreed to arbitrate all differences
that may arise between the parties. Id. at 2224-25, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2447.
43 See id. at 2227, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2449.
43 Id.
44 Id.
4' Id.
46
 Id.
47 Id.
43 Id.
43 Id.
" Id.
51
 See id. at 2228, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 2228-29, 127 L.R.R.M. at 2450-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33 See id. at 2229, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2450-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
J
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Justice Marshall also argued that the majority's interpretation
of Nolde Bros.'s "arising under" standard resulted in poor labor
policy." He stated that this interpretation would discourage arbi-
tration's efficient resolution of disputes, 55 because it would require
a case by case determination of when and if a disputed right
vested. 56 Justice Marshall also contended that such a case by case
determination by the judiciary could increase the likelihood of error
in the resolution of disputes," because unlike arbitrators, judges do
not have extensive expertise in the analysis of arbitration clauses."
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens argued for a somewhat
different interpretation of Nolde Bros." Justice Stevens wrote that
the "arising under" issue itself should be arbitrable.° He argued
that the majority should therefore only have required that a griev-
ance allege an accrued right for it to satisfy Nolde Bros. 6 ' An arbi-
trator could then decide whether a right had accrued and therefore
whether the dispute arose under the agreement, as well as deciding
the outcome of the dispute itself. 62 Justice Stevens partially agreed
with Justice Marshall in that the dispute in Litton should have been
submitted to arbitration rather than have the Court reach its mer-
its.°
The Litton decision has several consequences for practitioners.
First, Litton's vested-rights-based standard for determining whether
a dispute arises under an expired collective bargaining agreement
must now be applied in all circuit courts. It is no longer enough for
practitioners to show that a dispute is arguably covered by some
plausible interpretation of the expired arbitration clause, or that
the dispute occurred within a certain period after expiration of the
agreement. Instead, practitioners will have the much more difficult
task of showing that the disputed right accrued or vested prior to
the agreement's expiration.
Second, the Litton decision may have created a new basis for
litigation over arbitration of post-expiration disputes. No clear stan-
dard emerges from Litton as to what rights accrue or vest before an
" See id. at 2228, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55 See id. at 2229, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 2229-30, 137 L.R.R.M .  at 2451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
se Id.
59 See id. at 2231, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2452-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 2231-32,137 L.R.R.M. at 2453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61 See id. at 2232, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" See Id.
65 See id. at 2231-32, 137 L.R.R.M. at 2453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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agreement expires. The Board and the courts must therefore first
determine on a case by case basis whether a right has vested or
accrued prior to expiration of a collective bargaining agreement
before they can decide whether that particular dispute did or did
not arise under the agreement.
The two other standards for determining arbitrability an-
nounced by the Court in Litton may also spawn new litigation. The
Court stated clearly that a dispute can arise under an agreement if
the dispute stems from facts or occurrences that arise prior to
termination of the agreement. Yet the Court did not decide how
long a party can wait after the expiration of an agreement to de-
mand arbitration of a dispute stemming from pre-expiration facts
or occurrences. In theory at least, the existence of such pre-expi-
ration facts or occurrences could create a right to arbitration in the
aggrieved party that could last for years.
The Court also clearly stated that a dispute could arise under
the expired agreement if the dispute stemmed from infringement
of a right that, under normal principles of contract interpretation,
was intended to survive the expiration of the agreement itself. Yet
the Court did not enumerate the decisionmaking principles covered
by the umbrella term "normal principles of contract interpretation."
Thus the first two bases of arbitrability enumerated by the Court,
although seemingly clear, may require that their meaning be deter-
mined through extensive litigation.
Given that Litton was decided five to four, however, a dramatic
increase in arbitrability-determining litigation might prompt the
Supreme Court to re-evaluate its decision. For this to occur, the
prophesies of the dissenters must come true. The increased use of
litigation to refine the meaning of the arbitrability standards an-
nounced in Litton would have to create a corresponding decrease
in the viability of arbitration as an efficient means of dispute reso-
lution. Also, the courts and administrative law judges would have
to make increasing numbers of errors in their determinations of
arbitrability.
Third, practitioners should note that a union might achieve
favorable results by alleging that an employer committed an unfair
labor practice, if an attempt to compel post-expiration arbitration
under the Litton standards does not succeed. Parties can still argue
that the employer's post-expiration actions in some way unilaterally
changed a term or condition of employment and so constituted an
unfair labor practice that must be remedied. This remedy could be
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constructed so as to achieve the same results as enforcement of post-
expiration arbitration.
The Supreme Court's decision in Litton Financial Printing v.
NLRB has settled the substantial disagreement among lower courts
over the proper application of Nolde Bros.'s requirement that a
dispute "arise under" a collective bargaining agreement for it to be
arbitrable after the agreement's expiration. In Litton, the Court held
that where a broad arbitration clause creates an unrebutted pre-
sumption of post-expiration arbitrability, an employer is only con-
tractually obligated to submit to arbitration in situations where the
dispute concerned rights that had accrued or vested prior to the
agreement's termination. The Court also held post-expiration dis-
putes arbitrable where the disputes stem from facts or occurrences
that arose plior to the agreement's termination or from infringe-
ment of a right that, under normal principles of contract interpre-
tation, was intended to survive the expiration of the agreement
itself. In interpreting Nolde Bros. this way, the Court rejected the
idea that a dispute arises under an expired agreement merely if the
agreement's arbitration clause can be plausibly interpreted so as to
cover the dispute.
The Court's imposition of more rigorous standards in Litton
nonetheless leaves several questions open for future cases. What
constitutes an accrued or vested right? For how long after an agree-
ment's expiration does a party have the right to arbitrate a dispute
that stems from pre-expiration facts or occurrences? What contract
principles are considered "normal" for purposes of determining
post-expiration arbitrability? The resolution of these questions may
provide new bases for litigation and new opportunities for attorneys
to delay or thwart determinations of arbitrability.
V. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
A. * Deference in the Interpretation of OSHA Regulations: Martin
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission'
The enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the
"Act") in 1970 created two independent administrative actors re-
sponsible for the regulatory activity under the Act. 2 The Occupa-
• By Gary L. Gill-Austern, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
3 111 S. Ct, 1171 (1991).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 651(a)(3) (1988).
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tional Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), a Department
of Labor agency that the Secretary of Labor (the "Secretary") heads,
sets and enforces standards designed to assure safe and healthful
working conditions. 3
 The Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (the "Commission"), an independent agency, adjudi-
cates any challenges to the standards that the Secretary sets. 4
This division of responsibility was a political compromise
reached in the Senate, 5
 designed to preserve due process and to
instill confidence in the two communities that the legislation most
significantly affected, business and labor. 6 At least one commentator
has noted that Congress failed, however, to provide a clear delin-
eation of policy responsibilities between the Secretary and the Com-
mission. 7
 This ambiguity resulted in institutional conflicts between
the two agencies over statutory and regulatory interpeetation.8
Various circuits have decided differently the issue of which
agency's interpretation is entitled to greater weight. Some circuits
have favored the Commission9
 and have concluded that Congress
3 See 29 U.S.C. f§ 655, 658, 659, 666; see also George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-
Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
315, 315 (1987).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(3), 659(c), 660(a)—(b), 661.
5 Johnson, supra note 3, at 318.
6 Id. at 319 (citing S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970), reprinted in SENATE
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 195 (Comm. Print 1971)).
See Neil Sullivan, Independent Adjudication and Occupational Safety and Health Policy: A
Test for Administrative Court Theory, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 183 (1979). Contrast this omission
with the inclusion of the following statement in the Senate Report that accompanied the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (which similarly divided the administrative
functions between two agencies): "Since the Secretary of Labor is charged with responsibility
for implementing this Act, it is the intention of the Committee, consistent with generally
accepted precedent, that the Secretary's interpretations of the law and regulations shall be
given weight by both the Commission and the courts." Id. at 203 n.122 (citing SENATE COMM.
ON HUMAN RESOURCES, FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977 REPORT, S. REP.
No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 183-94; Johnson, supra note 3, at 323-25.
6 A 1985 First Circuit Court of Appeals decision surveyed the circuits and delineated
their positions at that time. See Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 61, 64-65
(1st Cir. 1985). The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and possibly the Second Circuits favored the
Commission. Id. at 64; see also Usery v. Hermitage Concrete Pipe Co., 584 F.2d 127, 132 (6th
Cir. 1978) (Commission's ruling is entitled to great deference); Marshall v. Western Electric,
Inc., 565 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1977) (reviewing court should decide whether the Commis-
sion's interpretation of the regulation is unreasonable and inconsistent with its purpose);
Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 513 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir.
1975) (Commission's plain meaning interpretation of a regulation cannot be seen as unrea-
sonable); Brennan v. Gilles & Coding, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1262 (4th Cir. 1974) (Commission
was designed to have a policy role); Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
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intended the Commission to utilize its independent judgment, and
not merely to accede to the Secretary's regulatory interpretations."'
In contrast, other circuits have favored the Secretary, concluding
that final policy determinations had to reside with the Secretary, as
the rulemaking agency, provided its interpretation was reasonable."
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court decided a case that
considered in dicta the conflict between the two administrative ent-
ities and the accompanying split in the circuits. 12 In Cuyahoga Valley
Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union, a per curiam decision,
the Supreme Court held that the Secretary's decision to withdraw
a citation charging an employer with a violation of the Act was not
reviewable.'s In dicta, the Court noted the Act's detailed statutory
scheme, and stated that enforcement of the Act is the sole respon-
sibility of the Secretary.' 4 The Court further stated that the Com-
mission is to act only as a neutral arbiter.' 5 The Court concluded
that the commingling of the roles of prosecutor and adjudicator
that had occurred was the very problem Congress had sought to
avoid in creating the Commission. 16
In a 1986 decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
construed the Cuyahoga holding to be limited to the Secretary's
discretion to issue or to withdraw a ,citation.' 7 In Brock v. Bechtel
Power Corp., the Ninth Circuit rejected the Cuyahoga dicta and held
that deference is owed the Commission because of its expertise in
exercising the independent adjudicatory function that the Act as-
signed ft.'s The Bechtel court stated that the Supreme Court did not
specifically discuss the deference owed the Secretary's interpretation
Comm'n, 491 F.2d 1340, 1344 and n.12 (2d Cir. 1974) (simplistic to regard the meaning of
a regulation as best understood by its author, the Secretary).
10 See Johnson, supra note 3, at 334-38.
11 In 1985 the First, Fifth and Tenth Circuits favored the Secretary. See Donovan, 761
F.2d at 66 (Secretary speaks with greater authority when interpreting own rules); Brennan
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 513 F.2d 553, 554 (10th Cir. 1975)
(Secretary's interpretation should be accepted if reasonable); Brennan v. Southern Contrac•
tors Serv., 492 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1974) (Secretary's interpretation is controlling as long
as it is one of several reasonable interpretations).
12 Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 6-8 (1985) (per curiam).
13 Id. at 6. In Cuyahoga, the Commission declared that as a general rule it could review
the Secretary's decision to withdraw a citation, even though the administrative law judge had
previously allowed the Secretary to do so. Id. at 4-5.
14 Id. at 6-7.
15 Id. at 7.
18 Id.
17 Brock v. Bechtel Power Corp., 803 F.2d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1986).
18 Id, at 1000.
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of the meaning and application of a regulation when it conflicts
with that of the Commission. 19
Two months after the Bechtel decision the Administrative Con-
ference of the United States 2° issued a report on "The Split-En-
forcement Model for Agency Adjudication." 21. The report noted
that Congress's failure to specify the respective responsibilities of
the Secretary and the Commission had resulted in conflicts between
the agencies, and in confusion among the reviewing courts over
which agency's views were entitled to deference. 22
 It recommended
that Congress resolve these two issues, and specifically suggested
that the adjudicatory agency accept the rulemaking agency's inter-
pretation of a standard. 23
 To date Congress has taken no action.
During the Survey year, in Martin v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission, the United States Supreme Court, in a
unanimous opinion that Justice Marshall wrote, held that a review-
ing court should defer to the Secretary when both the Secretary
and the Commission present reasonable but conflicting interpreta-
tions of an ambiguous regulation that the Secretary promulgated.24
Consequently, after Martin, the conflict between the different cir-
cuits should be resolved." In the future, a reviewing court need
only inquire into the reasonableness of the Secretary's regulatory
interpretation, and defer to it, regardless of the position that the
Commission advanced.26
In August, 1979, an OSHA compliance officer visited the CF&1
Steel Corporation's ("CF&I") facility in Pueblo, Colorado, to ensure
12 Id, at 1001.
25
 The Administrative Conference of the United States is an independent agency created
by the Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C. Mi 571-576 (1988). See 1 C.F.R. § 301.1
(1991). Its purpose is to "develop improvements in the legal procedures by which Federal
agencies administer regulatory, benefit, and other Government programs." 1 C.F.R. II 301
(1991).
21
 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-4 (1991).
22 Id. The Administrative Conference's report followed a study of the split-enforcement
model. Id. The study was unable to determine whether the split-enforcement model achieved
greater fairness in adjudication than the traditional structural model. Id.
23 Id. This recommendation is the second of three that the Conference made. Id. It
recognized deference to the rulemaking agency's interpretation so long as that interpretation
is not arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Id. In the other two
recommendations, the Conference stated that Congress should act to resolve questions of
deference for existing agencies operating under the split-enforcement model, and that Con-
gress, in the future, should always specify which agency has overall responsibility for a
statutory program, thus justifying a reviewing court's deference. See id.
24 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1173-74 (1991). In Martin the Secretary and the Commission differed
over the interpretation of coke-oven emission standards. Id. at 1174.
25 Id. at 1175.
" See id. at 1179-80.
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compliance with the Secretary's coke-oven emissions standards. 27
The inspector issued a citation which claimed that because twenty-
eight employees failed an atmospheric test, 28 CF&I had not ensured
the proper fit of respirators on those employees. 29 As a result, the
employees were exposed to carcinogenic, coke-oven emissions ex-
ceeding the regulatory limit." This citation assessed a penalty of
$ 1 0,000. 31
The administrative law judge ("ALF) affirmed the Secretary's
citation in September, 1981. 32 More than five years later, however,
the Commission reversed the AL's decision." The Commission
found that the cited regulation was a training standard and did not
require the employer to assure proper fit of an employee's respir-
ator.34 The Commission asserted that the Secretary should have
cited a different regulation."
27 Id. at 1174; C.F.&I. Steel Corp., 1986 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 11 27,691 at 36,135.
28 An atmospheric test is used "to determine whether a respirator provides a sufficiently
tight fit to protect its wearer from carcinogenic emissions." Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1174. In a
1977 inspection of the CF&I plant the same OSHA inspector had instructed CF&1 to fit the
employees' respirators in a test atmosphere in which a test contaminant of low toxicity was
placed. C.F.&I. Steel Corp., 1986 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 27,691 at 36,142 & n.9. If an employee
detected any of the substance surrounding the respirator, it was deemed to have failed the
test. Id.
29 Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1174.
39 Id. The Secretary's compliance officer cited CF&I for a violation of 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1029(g)(3), which requires the employer to "institute a respiratory protection program
in accordance with § 1910.134.'" Id, at 1174. The Court noted that the reference to § 1910.134
included, most relevantly, § 1910.134(e)(5):
For safe use of any respirator, it is essential that the user be properly instructed
in its selection, use, and maintenance. Both supervisors and workers shall be so
instructed by competent persons. Training shall provide the men an opportunity
to handle the respirator, have it fitted properly, test its face-piece-to-face seal,
wear it in normal air for long familiarity period, and, finally, to wear it in a test,
atmosphere.
Id. at 1174 n.2.
31 Id. at 1174.
32 Id.; CF&I Steel Corp., 1981 0.5.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 25,688 (digest of ALJ's decision),
35 Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1174-75; C.F.&l. Steel Corp., 1986 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1127,691.
34 Martin, 111  S. Ct. at 1175; C.F.&I. Steel Corp., 1986 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 27,691 at
36,143. -
95 Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1175. The Commission asserted that 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(g)(4)(i)
pertained to the use and proper fit of respirators: "'the employer shall assure that the
respirator issued to the employee exhibits minimum facepiece leakage and that the respirator
is fitted properly.'" Id. at 1175 & n.3. Furthermore, the Commission's view was that the
Secretary's interpretation of § 1910.1029(g)(3) as requiring the employer to assure proper
respirator fit would deny any real meaning to § 1910.1029(g)(4)(i). See id. at 1175; C.F.&I.
Steel Corp., O.S.H. Dec. ¶ 27,691 at 36,143.
One commissioner dissented. C.F.&I. Steel Corp., O.S.H. Dec. ¶ 27,691 at 36,146. The
commissioner did not think that the question of whether § 1910.134(e)(5) was a training
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit heard the Secre-
tary's appeal of the Commission's decision, and concluded that the
Act was unclear as to whether the Commission or Secretary is em-
powered with final interpretive authority over OSHA regulations. 38
The Court of Appeals therefore looked to the legislative history
and determined that Congress had sought to endow the Commis-
sion with the normal aggregate of adjudicative powers that tradi-
tional administrative agencies possessed. 37 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that such an adjudicative function necessarily encompas-
sed the power to declare the law. 38
 Thus, the Tenth Circuit deferred
to the Commission's interpretation, and affirmed the Commission's
action. 39
On review, the Supreme Court in Martin acknowledged that
the Act presented an unusual regulatory structure that was designed
to achieve a greater separation of functions than the traditional
unitary agency provided. 40 The Court agreed with the court of
appeals that the Act failed to address the issue of deference:" The
Court reasoned, however, that the power to render authoritative
regulatory interpretations is a necessary adjunct of the Secretary's
powers to establish and to enforce standards. 42
 The Court further
reasoned that this power can be inferred from the Act's structure
and history. 43
The Court noted two structural advantages of deferring to the
Secretary." First, the Secretary, as rulemaker, creates the standards
standard or a use standard was a valuable distinction and noted that clearly there had been
a violation. Id. According to this commissioner, the evidence demonstrated that the employees
were not provided with respirators that fit and were not trained to comprehend the proper
fit of respirators, or to use the respirators properly. Id. at 36,147. The commissioner did not
deny the applicability of § 1910.1029(g)(4), the respirator usage standard. Id. The commis-
sioner went on to assert, however, that the Secretary had a legitimate concern with the initial
fit of respirators, and that it was within the Secretary's prosecutorial discretion to allege that
the employees were not trained•properly under 1910.134(e)(5). Id.
56
 Dole v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 891 F.2d 1495, 1497-98
(10th Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991).
57 Id. at 1498.
56 Id.
59
 Id. at 1499.
4° Martin, 111 S. Ct. 1171, 1176 (1991), Justice Marshall distinguished a "traditional
unitary agency," which combines rulemaking, enforcement and adjudication within one
administrative agency, and the split-enforcement model which has split the adjudicative
function into a separate agency. Id.
4 ' See id.
42 Id.
45 Id.
44 Id. at 1176-77.
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and is therefore better able to understand their purpose than the
Commission. 45 Second, the Court stated that the Secretary, as en-
forcer, has much greater exposure to the regulatory environment
and to regulatory problems, and can, therefore, better appraise the
impact of his or her interpretations:* In contrast, the Court noted
that the Commission deals only with that small subset of citations
that are challenged. 47
In reviewing the legislative history, the Martin Court focused
primarily on the report of the Senate committee responsible for the
administrative split-enforcement structure ultimately imple-
mented. 48 In its analysis of the report, the Court noted that the
legislature intended to create a single administrative actor that Con-
gress could hold accountable for the overall implementation of the
program." Consequently, the Court reasoned that whatever adju-
dicatory powers Congress had conferred on the Commission had
to be by definition qualified and limited in scope to avoid having
two actors responsible for implementing the Act's policy objectives. 5°
Based on this structural and historical analysis, the Martin Court
rejected the court of appeals' assertion that the normal array of
adjudicative powers were conferred on the Commission.'" The
Court stated that these powers could only be delegated to an ad-
judicative entity through the traditional unitary structure. 52 The
Court reasoned that Congress's choice not to explicitly delegate
lawmaking or policymaking mechanisms to the Commission pre-
cluded any court from inferring that Congress meant the Commis-
sion to have autonomous policymaking powers. 53 The Court further
reasoned that Congress intended the Commission merely to have
nonpolicymaking adjudicatory powers." The Court asserted that
Congress had empowered the Commission to review the Secretary's
45 Id.
45 Id. at 1177.
47 See id. (citing Jonathan J. Nadler, Note, Employee Participation in Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission Proceedings, 85 CoLum. L. REV. 1317, 1331 & n.90 (1985) (reporting
small percentage of Occupational Safety and Health Act citations contested between 1979
and 1985)).
45 Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1177.
43 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970), reprinted in SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 148 (Comm. Print 1971)).
5° Id.
5L See id.
52 Id.
53 See id. at 1177-78.
54 Id. at 1178.
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regulatory interpretations only for consistency with the regulatory
language and for reasonableness. 55
The Court rejected CF&I's two primary due process argu-
ments. 56
 CF&I first claimed that the separation of enforcement and
interpretive powers was the only way to protect employers from
regulatory bias. 57
 The Court conceded that allowing the Commis-
sion to substitute its reasonable interpretations for the Secretary's
might slightly increase regulated parties' protection from overzeal-
ous interpretations. 58
 The Court noted, however, that such an in-
dependent policymaking role would clearly frustrate Congress's in-
tent to make a single agency accountable for the overall
implementation of the Act's objectives. 59
The Court next responded to CF&I's second claim, that judicial
deference should not be accorded to a regulatory interpretation
given subsequent to the alleged violation. 60
 The Court noted that
its own precedents denying judicial deference have applied to in-
stances when that interpretation has been introduced for the first
time in a reviewing court. 6 ' The Court held that the Secretary's
interpretation had been advanced in the midst of administrative
adjudication, and thus was not a post hoc rationalization. 62 The Court
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1178-79; see also Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Brief for Respondent, CF&1 Steel
Corporation, at 20-22, Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 111 S.
Ct. 1171 (1991) (No. 89-1541).
57 Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1178. In its brief CF&I states:
The Commission was designed to be an adjudicator in order to preclude the
Secretary from being investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury .... Requiring a
circuit court of appeals to defer to the Secretary's interpretation over the Com-
mission's would eliminate the intent of Congress to make the Commission an
autonomous and independent adjudicatory body, and would be paramount to
ordering a district court to accord deference to a prosecutor's interpretation of
a criminal statute.
Respondent's Brief at 20, Martin, (No. 89-1541).
58 Martin, 111 S. Ct. at 1178-79.
59
 Id. at 1179.
6° Id. In its brief CF&1 states:
[Dleference to the Secretary's interpretation of a regulatory standard over that
of the Commission would create the danger of rulemaking by adjudication
. The enumerated procedures and the statutory framework of the Act are
designed to protect employers from being penalized by after-the-fact interpre-
tations of regulatory standards which were ambiguous in the first instance.
Respondent's Brief at 21, Martin, (No. 89-1541).
8] Martin, 111  S. Ct. at 1179 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
212 (1988); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,168 (1962)).
82 Id. The Court further noted that the Secretary's regulatory interpretation was docu-
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noted, however, that the reasonableness of a regulatory interpre-
tation offered for the first time in an administrative adjudication
could be challenged based on the adequacy of notice to regulated
parties, the quality of the Secretary's elaboration of pertinent policy
considerations, and other undefined factors. 63
Finally, the Martin Court explicitly narrowed its holding to the
division of powers between the Secretary and the Commission un-
der the Act." It further stated that its holding did not provide any
judgment with respect to any other agencies operating under the
split-enforcement model. 65 Determining that the Tenth Circuit had
not previously considered the reasonableness of the Secretary's in-
terpretation, the Supreme Court remanded the case for consider-
ation of that question. 66
The Supreme Courtrs unanimous decision in Martin is straight-
forward, and appears at first glance to have a predictable, restricted
impact. It will certainly resolve the conflict between the circuits
regarding which agency is owed deference when there are reason-
able but differing interpretations of OSHA regulations, and thereby
will eliminate forum shopping. 67 Moreover, to the extent that the
Secretary's regulations further the Act's purpose of ensuring
greater worker health and safety, the decision is a victory for labor,
the constituency seeking stricter compliance, and a defeat for busi-
ness, the constituency seeking greater leniency. Because the decision
reduces the Commission's autonomy, there will be fewer reversals
of the Secretary's citations. This conclusion is grounded not only in
an understanding of the historical and political positions of orga-
mented in the written citation, and that when so done the Secretary specifically utilizes an
interpretive mechanism for which Congress provided. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1988)).
In the same context the Court referred to informal measures that the Secretary utilizes
which can be used to some degree by a reviewing court to measure the consistency and
reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretations. Id. These include the promulgation of
interpretive rules and the publication of agency enforcement guidelines. Id.
6 See id. at 1180.
6, Id. at 1179.
55 Id.
66 Id. at 1180. Following the remand to the Court of Appeals, CF&I filed a letter, rather
than a supplemental brief, advising the Tenth Circuit that it was in chapter II bankruptcy.
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 941 F.2d 1051, 1053 (10th Cir.
1991). The court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation was reasonable. Id. at 1057.
It vacated the Commission's order to set aside the contested violation. Id. at 1059.
67 29 § 660(a) provides that an aggrieved party may seek review of an order of
the Commission "in any United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation
is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office, or in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit . ." 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1988).
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nizations and groups affected by the Act, but by reviewing the
parties filing amicus curiae briefs before the Supreme Court. 68
Finally, the decision to accord deference to the Secretary's reg-
ulatory interpretations, eliminating the Commission's policymaking
role, will result in regulatory predictability and, as a result, quicker
compliance and fewer appeals. 69 With only one agency interpreting
OSHA regulations, the regulated business community will no longer
be able to rely on a variant interpretation by the Commission as a
means to avoid or delay compliance. Therefore, the regulated com-
munity is more likely to comply with these regulations upon pro-
mulgation. In addition, those that do not initially comply but are
then cited for noncompliance are less likely to appeal because the
Commission can no longer offer an alternative regulatory interpre-
tation to the extent that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable.
But any analysis of the Martin decision must recognize that the
split-enforcement model, the creation of a political compromise,
still functions within a political arena comprised of several consti-
tuencies. The impact of the Court's decision depends on how the
relevant communities (labor, business, Congress, the administrative
agencies and the courts), independently, and in their interrelation-
ships, respond to the decision and its reasoning. After Martin, res-
olution of a number of matters lies ahead.
First, the Commission's participation in policymaking may have
been dealt a fatal blow. If prior to Martin the Commission's sole
forum for expressing its independent viewpoint has been in the
area of regulatory interpretation, then the Martin decision has ef-
fectively stifled the Commission's voice. If there are other ongoing
disputes not involving regulatory interpretation, however, between
66 See e.g., Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 2-3, Martin v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 111  S. Ct. 1171 (1991) (no. 89-1541) (filed on behalf of
the Secretary); Amici Curiae Brief of the National Association of Manufacturers and the
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association in Support of Respondents, at 4-5; Martin v.
OSHRC, 111  S. Ct. 1171 (1991) (no. 89-1541) (filed on behalf of the Commission); Brief
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the Industry Council on
the Environment, Safety, and Health, and the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 6-7, Martin v. OSHRC, 1 I 1 S. Ct. 1171
(1991) (no. 89-1541) (filed on behalf of the Commission); Brief of American Iron and Steel
Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, at 2-3, Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S. Ct.
1171 (1991) (no. 89-1541) (filed on behalf of the Commission).
69 It should be noted, however, that the interpretive disputes between the Secretary and
the Commission have been limited to approximately two per cent of all citations. Nadler,
supra note 47, at 1331 n.90 (1985).
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the two agencies, then the decision has not necessarily foreclosed
the Commission's policymaking contribution.
Second, the Commission or the reviewing courts, in their re-
views of the Secretary's regulatory interpretations, may seek to go
beyond the reasonableness requirement stated in Martin. Such an
effort would be based on the Supreme Court's statement that a
reviewing court may consult the Secretary's informal means of in-
terpreting regulations, comparing them with the interpretation at
hand to determine consistency and reasonableness. 7° Such increased
scrutiny would require that parties study the Secretary's regulations
and interpretive texts with more rigor, seeking new and different
ways to discredit them. 7 '
Third, the Secretary may seek to widen the definition of de-
ference beyond the narrow scope enunciated in Martin, to areas
other than the interpretation of ambiguous regulations. Matters
might come before the Commission, for example, that require sta-
tutory interpretation or procedural interpretation with which the
Commission would differ with the Secretary. Martin does not tell
us how a reviewing court should treat a Commission decision on
such issues that is at odds with the position of the Secretary.
On a different level, it is possible to deduce some guiding
principles from Martin. First, agency disputes will be adjudicated
on a case-by-case basis through an investigation of the historical
record. Other agencies functioning under an identical or similar
administrative structure may rely on Martin, but they will have to
ground their claim in their own legislative history. Second, where
due process mechanisms have been ineffective they will not be
maintained merely for appearance's sake. Structural clarity and
accountability are administratively essential, and need to be sup-
ported in the absence of any justification to the contrary." Finally,
the Martin decision states that interpretation is the chief tool of the
7° Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 111  S. Ct. 1171, 1179
(1991) (less formal means of interpreting regulations include the promulgation of interpretive
rules and the publication of agency enforcement guidelines).
71 The historical criticism of OSHA regulations has focused on their awkwardness, their
ambiguity, their out-of-dateness, and such problems will not disappear now that the Secretary
has been granted interpretive deference. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 323; Mark A. Rothstein,
OSHA After Ten Years: A Review and Some Proposed Reforms, 34 VANE). L. REV. 71, 73-75 (1981).
72 A critical point of the Administrative Conference's report, "The Split-Enforcement
Model for Agency Adjudication," was that through its study it was not able to conclude
whether the self-enforcement model achieved greater fairness than the traditional structural
model. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-4 (1991). See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Administrative Conference's report.
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policymaker. Because policymaking must reside with the rulemaker,
the power of interpretation must be granted to the rulemaker.
Where such a clear delegation of interpretive authority fails to
happen, policy disputes ensue. Invariably such disputes move from
the agencies up to the courts." Once such divisiveness happens, it
can only be repaired by a higher court. The Supreme Court appears
to have first spoken on the issue in the Cuyahoga per curiam decision.
When Congress fails to act, and when its own dicta is ignored, the
Court will act when presented with a case.
In sum, the Martin Court favored the Secretary in the narrow
area of the interpretation of ambiguous regulations. This cannot
eliminate the tensions that exist in the effort to forge a national
policy to ensure safe and healthy working environments when there
is more than one administrative actor. Ahead we shall see whether
the decision has broader applicability, whether the Court will be
called on to decide on other interagency disputes, or whether Con-
gress will act.
VI. ERISA
A. * Agency Discretion in Restoring Terminated Pension Plans Based on
the Existence of Follow-on Plans: Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. LTV Corp.'
Under title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA" or the "Act"), the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation ("PBGC"), a wholly-owned United States government
corporation, is empowered to act as a national insurer of pension
plans. 2
 The PBGC was created partly as a response to Congress's
concern about inadequately funded pension plans and the resulting
73 See Sullivan, supra note 7, at 193-94. Sullivan commented on the problems with
policymaking through the judicial process. Id. at 193. First, he noted that substantive policy
expertise will be weakened to the extent that appellate courts seek to insert their own policy
interpretations in the midst of conflicts between the Secretary and the Commission. Id.
Second, he observed that the appellate courts, acting independently, disagree regarding the
roles of the Secretary and the Commission, and because of that disagreement transfer the
conflict from the administrative level to the judiciary. Id. at 193-94.
* By Susan Scott Hallal , Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 110 S. Ct. 2668, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1593 (1990).
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1302 (1988). The
pension plans that are insured under ERISA are "defined benefit" pension plans, as opposed
to "defined contribution" or "individual account" plans. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2671 n.1, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1594 n.1; see also ERISA,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34), (35), 1321 (1988).
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deprivation suffered by employees entitled to pension benefits. 3 In
order to avert the tragedies created by underfunded plans, Con-
gress enacted ERISA and created the PBGC, charging it to encour-
age the maintenance of voluntary pension plans and provide for
consistent pension payments, while preserving low insurance pre-
miums.4
Under title IV of ERISA, employers may voluntarily terminate
an ERISA-insured pension plan. 5 In addition, the PBGC may ter-
minate a pension plan, particularly if the employer is unable to
provide sufficient funding for the plan. 6 When an employer or plan
administrator terminates a plan voluntarily, the employer must al-
locate the available assets of the pension plan according to certain
guidelines under ERISA.? When an employer's plan has been in-
voluntarily terminated, the PBGC may appoint a trustee to allocate
available assets of the pension plan and oversee the termination
process. 8
3 ERISA, 29 U.S.C. fa 1001(a).
See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 374, 2 Employee
Benefits Gas. (BNA) 1431, 1438 (1980) (quoting SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, 4793 (Comm. Print 1976) (statement of Sen. Bentsen)).
3 ERISA fa 4041, 29 U.S.C. 1341. Employers might be motivated to terminate a plan
in order to avoid paying , pension benefits earned by employees but not insured by the PBGC.
In re Chateaugay Corp., 87 B.R. 779, 813, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2209, 2242
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (district court opinion in Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.). The 1986
amendments to ERISA sought to address this problem by allowing "standard termination"
by an employer only when a plan was sufficiently funded, and "distress termination" only
when the employer could show sufficient economic distress. See id.; ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
44 I301(a)(16), 1341(b), (c)(2)(13). An employer may not, however, terminate a pension plan
if the termination would violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. ERISA
4041(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 4 134I(a)(3).
6 Id. § 4042, 29 U.S.C. 1342. The PBGC may terminate a pension plan under the
statute regardless of whether the plan was established according to a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. 4041(a)(3), 29 U,S.C. 1341(a)(3).
7 Id. § 4044, 29 U.S.C. 1344.
8 Id. § 4042(b), 29 U.S.C. 4 1342(b). The PBGC guarantees payment of the remaining
"nonforfeitable" pension benefits, subject to limitations. Id. § 4022, 4061, 29 U.S.C. 44 1322,
1361; 29 C.F.R. 2621.3 (1990). Nonforfeitable benefits are those to which employees are
entitled under the pension plan as of the date of its termination. ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
130I(a)(8); see also Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 373, 2
Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 1431, 1437 (1980) (definition of "nonforfeitable" relates to
an employee's right to collect pension as opposed to the amount an employee may collect).
The funds used to pay these benefits are collected by the PBGC in the form of insurance
premiums, which are paid by employers covered by PBGC insurance. ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
44 1306, 1307. The premiums were initially set at one dollar per individual plan participant,
but Congress has steadily increased the amount as the PBGC's deficit has increased. Id.; see
J. Robert Suffoletta, Jr., Who Should Pay When Federally Insured Pension Funds Go Broke?: A
Strategy for Recovering from the Wrongdoers, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 308, 313-14 (1990). In
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In addition to its power to terminate an underfunded pension
plan, under section 4047 of the Act, the PBGC may also restore a
plan that has been voluntarily or involuntarily terminated. 9 Once a
plan is restored, the PBGC is no longer liable for meeting the plan's
obligations, and the employer must once again take responsibility
for ensuring that the plan is adequately funded.'° The PBGC Ex-
ecutive Director may make a restoration decision following a rec-
ommendation by the Trusteeship Working Group, an administra-
tive group within the PBGC that advises the agency about plan
terminations and other issues under ERISA." If the PBGC decides
to restore a plan, the PBGC issues a Notice of Restoration to the
employer and seeks to enforce restoration. 12
Section 4047 of the Act does not explicitly set forth any restric-
tions or guidelines for the PBGC to follow in making a restoration
decision.' 3 Instead, the Act provides only that the PBGC may restore
addition, employers of underfunded pension plans are liable to the PBGC for the amount
required to fund the pension plan sufficiently. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 87 B.R. 779, 787-
88, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2209, 2215 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing 29 U.S.C.
1362(b)(1)(A)). Theoretically the PBGC may recover one hundred percent of its expendi-
tures. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1362(b).
ERISA 4047, 29 U.S.C. § 1347. Section 4047 of ERISA provides, in pertinent part:
In the case of a plan which has been terminated under [29 U.S.C.] section 1341
or 1342 of this title the corporation is authorized in any such case in which the
corporation determines such action to be appropriate and consistent with its
duties under this subchapter, to take such action as may be necessary to restore
the plan to its pretermination status, including, but not limited to, the transfer
to the employer or a plan administrator of control of part or all of the remaining
assets and liabilities of the plan.
Id.
10
 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2672, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1596.
II See In re Chateaugay Corp., 87 B.R. at 790-91, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at
2218-19.
Id. at 792, 9 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 2220.
is Id. at 808, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2237. In addition, the legislative history
of section 4047 does not provide any insight into the scope or nature of the PBGC's resto-
ration authority. Id. at 809 n.25, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2237-38 n.25. The
House Conference Report regarding this provision reads:
[T]he [PBGC] may cease any termination activities and do what it can to
restore the plan to its former status. As a result, a terminated plan being
operated by a trustee as a wasting trust may be restored if, during the period
of its operation by the trustee, experience gains or increased funding make it
sufficiently solvent.
Id. (quoting H.R. Cow. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 378 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5157-58). In addition, when Congress considered the Pension Protection
Act of 1987, it did not adopt a proposal that would have explicitly prohibited the establish-
ment of "replacement plans" or follow-on plans after a voluntary termination. Id. at 814-15,
9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2243-44.
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a plan when the PBGC "determines such action to be appropriate
and consistent with its duties under [title IV]." 14 One rationale
offered by the PBGC for restoring a terminated pension plan is the
PBGC's "anti-follow-on plan" policy.' 5 A follow-on plan is essentially
a plan developed by the employer, following plan termination,
which approximates the benefits paid under the original pension
plan.' 6
Although the PBGC has not enunciated an anti-follow-on plan
policy through formal rulemaking, it has clearly stated its position
in three opinion letters.'? Follow-on plans are abusive of the title
IV insurance program, according to the PBGC, because they allow
an employer to continue business as usual and provide the same
pension benefits to employees, while the PBGC subsidizes part of
the cost of these benefits."' Thus, in order to avoid paying pension
insurance to an employer who is not an intended beneficiary of the
ERISA insurance plan, the PBGC has adopted the position that the
existence of a follow-on plan is evidence of an employer's ability to
fund a plan fully.' 9 Also, according to the PBGC, follow-on plans
undermine employee resistance to plan termination. 2° Accordingly,
if follow-on plans exist, the PBGC will restore the pension plan.
Only one case, in the context of a voluntarily terminated pen-
sion plan, has addressed restoration of a pension plan by the PBGC,
based on the PBGC's anti-follow-on plan policy. 2 ' In the 1987 de-
" ER1SA § 4047, 29 U.S.C. 1347.
15 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1016, 10 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2425, 2433 (2d Cir. 1989).
16 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2673, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1597; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d at 1012, 10
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2429.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2674, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1597; see also Application for Certiorari at I65a, 110 S. Ct. 2668, 12 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1593 (1990); PBGC Pub, 81-11 (May 11, 1981); PBGC Pub. 86-27 (Dec.
17, 1986). For example, in one opinion letter, the PBGC stated: "IA] purported termination
of one plan, contrived in concert with the establishment of new retirement arrangements
which are designed to provide substantially the same benefits for the future, should not be
treated as a termination within the statutory contemplation so as to require the payment of
PBGC guarantees." PBGC Pub. 81-11 (May 11, 1981).
'" 110 S. Ct. at 2673-74, 12 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1597; see also In re
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 103 B.R. 672, 685, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1097,
1108-09 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
1" See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2673-74, 12 Employee
Benefits Gas. (BNA) at 1597.
2° Id. at 2678, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1601.
21 See In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 103 B.R. at 685-86, 11 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1108-09.
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cision of In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that the
PBGC could not order restoration of a voluntarily terminated pen-
sion plan based on the existence of a follow-on plan that was bar-
gained for by an employer and the union and implemented in
bankruptcy proceedings. 22 The district court upheld the employer's
follow-on plan and rejected the PBGC's restoration, stating that the
restoration contravened the purposes of ERISA, and was arbitrary
and capricious."
In its analysis, the court noted that the PBGC failed to recognize
that the bankruptcy process prevented the employer from continu-
ing business as before." The court also pointed out that, in rejecting
the follow-on plans, the PBGC was not carrying out its mandate
under ERISA to ensure the payment of pension benefits to retirees,
which the follow-on plans arguably accomplished. 25
 The court crit-
icized the PBGC, stating that the PBGC's mission under ERISA was
the payment of benefits in the event of insolvency, and that because
Wheeling-Pittsburgh was insolvent, such payment was necessary and
proper. 26 Finally, the court observed that restoration could result in
immediate retermination of the plans, causing uncertainty and
hardship on the part of retirees. 27 Thus, the court held that the
PBGC could not decide to restore a voluntarily terminated pension
plan based on the existence of follow-on plans, because the plans
were not abusive and to restore the plan would contravene the
purposes and policy of ERISA. 28 Until recently, the PBGC had never
exercised its authority under section 4047 of ERISA to restore an
22 Id. at 686, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1109. Wheeling-Pittsburgh involved an
employer who had filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy following a three month strike by its
United Steelworkers employees. Id. at 677, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1099-1100.
Seven pension plans were voluntarily terminated following the strike. Id. at 677, 11 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1099. As part of a strike settlement agreement, the employer imple-
mented a temporary plan and proposed a permanent follow-on plan which supplemented
certain pension benefits. Id. at 677, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1100. The PBGC
objected to the provision of the same pension benefits, with PBGC subsidization, as an abuse
of the ERISA insurance program, and threatened restoration. Id. at 678, 11 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1101.
23 Id. at 684, 686, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1107, 1108-09.
24 Id. at 685-86, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1108-09.
25 Id. at 686, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1108-09. The court noted that the
follow-on plan was a defined contribution plan, paid into by currently employed workers,
and not covered by PBGC insurance. Id. at 687, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1110.
28 In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Corp., 103 B.R. at 688, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
at 1111.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 686, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1108-09.
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involuntarily terminated pension plan, thus preventing the courts
from considering the scope and nature of the PBGC's authority to
do so.29
During the Survey year, in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV
Corp., the United States Supreme Court established the scope of the
PBGC's restoration power following involuntary termination, stat-
ing that the PBGC need not consider bankruptcy and labor law
policies in deciding to restore an involuntarily terminated pension
plan. 3° More importantly, the Court held that the PBGC could
properly restore plans based on follow-on plans that give employees
substantially the same benefits they enjoyed under pre-termination
pension plans. 3 ' The Court's decision sends a clear signal to em-
ployers that the PBGC has wide discretion in determining whether
an employer's post-termination arrangements for pension benefits
indicate that the employer is again capable of taking on the preex-
isting pension plan without assistance from the PBGC.
The dispute in LTV arose from a bankruptcy filing in July of
1986 by the LTV Corporation ("LTV") and its subsidiaries under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 32 At that time, three pension
plans administered by LTV were subject to title IV of ERISA,
including the minimum funding requirements of that provision."
LTV filed for bankruptcy partly in order to restructure the chron-
ically underfunded pension plans," Because two of the three pen-
sion plans had been established as a result of collective bargaining,
section 4041 of ERISA prevented LTV from voluntarily terminating
the plans. 35
Consequently, LTV made it clear to the PBGC that it was unable
to contribute further to the pension plans and that it desired that
29 See Pension Benefit Guar, Corp. v. LTV Corp., 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
2785, 2792 (S.D,N.Y. 1990) (on remand). The Wheeling-Pittsburgh court held that there was
no distinction between voluntary and involuntary termination in the context of restoration
decisions. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 103 B.R. at 685, 11 Employee Benefits Gas.
(BNA) at 1108.
" Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp:, 110 S. Ct. at 2676, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1599.
31 Id. at 2679, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1602.
32 Id. at 2672, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1596.
33 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1011, 10 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) 2425, 2428 (2d Cir. 1989).
34 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2672-73, 12 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1596. The Court noted that by late 1986, there was a total of almost
$2.3 billion in accrued pension benefits that were unfunded. Id.
35 Id.
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the PBGC seek an involuntary termination of the plans. 36 LTV
informed the PBGC that funding deficits could increase by as much
as $128 million in the next two years if the plans were not termi-
nated." LTV also suggested to the PBGC the possibility of plant
shutdowns, which would create additional liabilities.38 As a result,
the PBGC agreed to terminate the plans under section 4042(a)(4)
of ER1SA. 39
Following involuntary termination of the plans in January of
1987, the United Steelworkers of America (the "Union") filed suit
in bankruptcy court, claiming that LTV had violated the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement and section 1113 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.° Under threat of strike, LTV reached a settlement
with the Union in which retirees entitled to pension benefits would
receive substantially the same benefits they would have received
under the original LTV pension plans." The bankruptcy court
approved this new pension arrangement over the objections of the
PBGC. 42
The PBGC took the position that the new arrangements were
"follow-on plans" which, when added to the insurance benefits pro-
vided by the PBGC, would place pension participants in the same
position they would have been in under the original pension plans. 43
Because of the PBGC's anti-follow-on plan policy and as a result of
LTV's apparently improved financial circumstances, the PBGC is-
sued a Notice of Restoration of the pension plans on September
22, 1987.44 The PBGC noted that plant shutdowns were no longer
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2672-73, 12 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1596.
40 Id. Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code allows rejection of collective bargaining
agreements by debtors•in-possession in certain circumstances. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2425, 2429 (2d Cir.
1989); 11 U.S.C. 1113 (1988).
LTV Corp., 875 F.2d at 1012, 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2429; see also In re
Chateaugay Corp., 87 B.R. 779, 789, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2209, 2217 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
42 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2674, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1597.
43 Id. at 2673-74, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1597; see also Application for
Certiorari at 165a, 110 S. Ct. 2668, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1593 (1990); PBGC
Pub. 81-11 (May 11, 1981) (explaining anti-follow-on plan policy); PBGC Pub. 86-27 (Dec.
17, 1986) (same).
44 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2674, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1597.
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imminent and that LTV was again capable of funding the plans. 45
When LTV refused to restore the pension plans, claiming that the
PBGC's action violated the automatic stay provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the PBGC brought an enforcement action in federal
court. 46
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that the PBGC restoration decision was not based
on adequate grounds or a sufficient administrative record, and was
made without granting LTV adequate procedural opportunities. 47
The court held, however, that although the PBGC had acted within
the scope of its authority in restoring the plans without prior court
approval, it had exceeded its authority under section 4047 of ERISA
in claiming that the LTV follow-on plans were an abuse of the
statute."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that the PBGC's decision to restore the pension
plans was arbitrary and capricious under section 706 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act." The court stated that the PBGC failed to
give adequate weight to bankruptcy and labor law, and instead
"focused inordinately" on ERISA. 5° Further, the court observed that
the PBGC's conclusion that follow-on plans were abusive was insup-
portable under the administrative record and the legislative history
of section 4047 of ERISA. 5 ' The court also rejected the PBGC's
grounds for concluding that LTV was financially able to fund the
pension plans, charging that the PBGC failed to explain its eco-
nomic assumptions adequately. 52 In addition, the Second Circuit
noted that the PBGC had not provided adequate procedural safe-
guards to LTV in reaching its restoration decision, and thus its
decision was arbitrary and capricious. 53
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that the PBGC could properly consider the existence of
follow-on plans in deciding to restore an involuntarily terminated
15 Id.
46 Id. at 2674, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1598.
47 In re Chateaugay Corp., 87 B.R. at 828-30, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2258.
Id. at 815, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2244.
49 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1021, 10 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) 2425, 2438 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C, § 706
(1988).
9° LTV Corp., 875 F.2d at 1016, 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2433.
a' Id.
92 Id. at 1019, 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2435-36.
99 Id. at 1021, 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 2438.
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pension plan." The Court rejected the Second Circuit's determi-
nation that the PBGC must consider bankruptcy and labor laws in
deciding whether to restore a pension plan, noting that the appellate
court did not hold that the PBGC's decision actually conflicted with
these laws. 55 The Court also deferred to the PBGC's characterization
of follow-on plans as an abuse of title IV, and upheld the PBGC's
authority to restore a plan based solely on the existence of such
follow-on plans. 56
The Court first observed that the language of section 4047
allows the PBGC to make restoration decisions based on its respon-
sibilities under title IV of ERISA, not the general public interest."
If agency decisions were routinely invalidated because they failed'
to consider all relevant policies outside the agency's enabling act,
the Court pointed out, many agency decisions were likely to be
overturned.58 The Court also noted that the PBGC was not partic-
ularly equipped to consider questions of bankruptcy and labor law,
and at any rate, at least some of these areas had been considered
by Congress and incorporated into ERISA when it was written."
The Court next concluded that the court of appeals improperly
reviewed the PBGC's statutory interpretation of its enabling act."
In reviewing PBGC action, the Court stated that the proper stan-
dard had been set forth in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, which required courts to determine, in the absence of ex-
plicit direction from Congress, whether an agency's interpretation
is a permissible construction of a statutes' The Court observed that
54 110 S. CL at 268!, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1604. On remand, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that the Supreme
Court indicated that the PBGC could restore a plan based solely on the existence of follow-
on plans, without considering other factors such as the likelihood of retermination. PBGC v.
LTV Corp., 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2785, 2791 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). It therefore
found that the PBGC's exercise of restoration authority was valid. Id. at 2793.
53 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2675, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1598-99.
96 Id. at 2678-79, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1601-02.
57 Id. at 2675-76, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1599.
99 110 S. Ct. at 2676, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1599.
59 Id. at 2676 & n.7, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1599 & n.7.
46 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2676, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1599-1600.
61 Id. at 2676-77, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1600 (quoting Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). If Congress has spoken on the matter, the
court must give effect to Congress's unambiguous intent. If there is no clear expression of
congressional intent, the court must determine whether the agency's interpretation is a
permissible construction of the statute. 110 S. Ct. at 2676-77, 12 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) at 1600; see e.g., Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 722, 10 Employee Benefits Cas.
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. neither the text of section 4047 nor the statutory purposes in section
4002 of title IV of ERISA spoke specifically to the PBGC's ability
to base restoration of pension plans on follow-on plans. 62 The Court
concluded that a gap in the Act could not be construed as a pro-
hibition. 63
Moreover, in considering the legislative history of ERISA, the
Court disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion that the ab-
sence of any discussion regarding follow-on plans meant that Con-
gress intended that the PBGC should not consider follow-on plans
in restoring a terminated plan. 64 The Court noted that Congress's
example of financial recovery as a ground for restoration was not
meant to be exhaustive and did not preclude the PBGC's consid-
eration of other factors in making a restoration decision." In ad-
dition, the Court rejected any reliance on Congress's consideration
and rejection of a 1987 amendment to ERISA that would have
given the PBGC express authority to prohibit follow-on plans. 66
Rather, the Court suggested that Congress may have failed to enact
the amendment because it thought the PBGC was properly exercis-
ing its authority in the LTV litigation. 67
The Court also rejected LTV's position that the PBGC's deci-
sion to base restoration decisions on the existence of follow-on plans
was irrational." The Court stated that the PBGC's consideration of
follow-on plans was "eminently reasonable" because employees are
less likely to object to the termination of a pension plan if they
believe that a substantially similar follow-on plan will be created
following termination." Thus, follow-on plans remove the impor-
tant "check" of employee resistance from the termination proce-
dure, and undermine the maintenance of voluntary pension plans."
(BNA) 2569, 2572 (1988) (applying Chevron standard to determine meaning of § 4044(a) of
ERISA); In re Chateaugay Corp., 87 B.R. 779, 812, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2209,
2241 (S,D.N.Y. 1988) (applying Chevron standard in interpreting § 4047).
62 110 S. Ct. at 2677, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1600.
65 Id. at 2677, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1600.
" Id, at 2677, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1601.
65 Id. at 2677-78, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1600-01 (quoting H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 378 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5157).
69 Pension Benefit Guar, Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2678, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1601.
67 Id. at 2678, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1601.
" Id.
69 Id.
7° Id., 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (RNA) at 1601-02; see also ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
I302(a)(1).
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Consequently, the Court concluded that the PBGC's consideration
of follow-on plans was rational and permissible.' [
Finally, the Court considered the adequacy of the PBGC's pro-
cedures in deciding to restore the LTV pension plans. 72 The appli-
cable standard, set forth by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, provided
that courts cannot require agencies to undertake procedures not
required under the Administrative Procedures Act." The deter-
mination by the PBGC to restore LTV's pension plans was made
through informal adjudication that, according to the Court, fell
under section 555 of the Administrative Procedure Act and did not
require procedural elements such as notice or an opportunity to
submit proposed findings. 74
 Thus, the Court held that the PBGC's
action was sufficient under the law."
Justice White wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Justice O'Connor joined. While Justice
White agreed that the PBGC could restore LTV's pension plans
based on the follow-on plan, he contended that the Notice of Res-
toration did not rely solely on this ground, but relied on both the
anti-follow-on plan policy and the PBGC's assessment of financial
factors. 76
 Thus, Justice White suggested that if the PBGC's consid-
eration of LTV's financial position was inadequate, the case should
be remanded to determine whether the anti-follow-on plan policy
alone was sufficient to justify the PBGC's restoration action. 77
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the PBGC's anti-follow-
on plan policy conflicted with the PBGC's statutory role." Justice
Stevens stated that restoration could only be based on an improve-
ment in the financial condition of LTV." Justice Stevens further
argued that a company in bankruptcy should be able to use the
71 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2679, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1602.
72 Id.
Id. at 2680, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1603 (citing 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978)). The Court distinguished Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971), stating that Overton Park merely stood for the proposition that an agency must
provide an explanation of its action sufficient to allow judicial review. 110 S. Ct. at 2680, 12
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1603.
'4 Id. at 2680-81, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1604.
78 Id. at 2681, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1604.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 2682, 12 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) at 1605 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Id.
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PBGC insurance as a "financial cushion" to assist in reorganization. 8"
In addition, Justice Stevens noted that follow-on plans are actually
consistent with the stated objectives of ERISA because they are an
alternative which helps preserve continued pension payments to
employees.8 ' Finally, Justice Stevens argued that employee resis-
tance to pension plan termination is misplaced when termination is
involuntary and taken by the PBGC. 82
Hence, the LTV Court diverged from the lower courts by de-
termining that the text and legislative history of ERISA allowed the
PBGC to consider follow-on plans in deciding whether to restore a
terminated pension plan." The Court rejected the requirement that
the PBGC consider bankruptcy and labor law in its restoration
decisions.84 Finally, the Court deferred to the PBGC's characteri-
zation of follow-on plans as an abuse of the policy of title IV of
ERISA, and upheld the PBGC's discretionary power to restore a
plan based solely on this factor. 85
The Supreme Court decision in LTV is significant because, prior
to this decision, the PBGC's restoration authority under section
4047 of ERISA was untested." The Notice of Restoration issued by
the PBGC in LTV was the first to be issued under section 4047 of
ERISA following involuntary termination." Prior to LTV, courts
gave considerable deference to the PBGC's interpretation and ap-
plication of ERISA, and applied the Chevron standard of review."
In LTV, the Supreme Court adopted the same standard of review,
and arguably gave additional deference to the PBGC in the con-
struction and application of section 4047 of ERISA.
The most important implication of the LTV Court's deference
to the PBGC is the Court's implied holding that the PBGC has
a° Id.
SI Id.
82 hl. at 2682-83, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1605-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85 hi. at 2677-78, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1601.
84 Id. at 2676, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1599.
85 Id. at 2678-79, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1601-02.
a° Id. at 2682 n.2, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1606 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Lee A. Sheppard, Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Landmark PBGC v. LTV Case, 46 TAX
NOTES 1110, 1110 (1990).
87 110 S. Ct. at 2682 n.2, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1606 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Sheppard, supra note 86, at 1110.
" See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 722, 10 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
2569, 2572 (1988) (applying Chevron standard to determine meaning of § 4044(a) of ERISA);
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729, 730-31, 1 Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 1410, 1411-12 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979) (deferring to agency); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 87 B.R. 779, 812, 9 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2209, 2241 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
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discretion to restore a plan even if restoration will lead immediately
to retermination. 89 On remand, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York concluded that the Supreme
Court had stated that the PBGC could restore a plan based solely
on the existence of follow-on plans. 9° Thus, the PBGC could initiate
restoration without considering other factors such as the likelihood
of retermination. 9 '
The apparent effect of such broad discretion is that employers
with financial difficulties, even those in bankruptcy, may once again
find themselves responsible for terminated pension plans that they
are not capable of funding. 92 In addition, the Supreme Court's
decision is likely to discourage employers from post-termination
collective bargaining or other post-termination arrangements.95 The
Supreme Court was apparently not swayed by arguments such as
those adopted by the Wheeling-Pittsburgh court, which stated that
the PBGC should focus more on the protection of the retirees
covered under ER1SA and less on the PBGC's pecuniary interests
in potential liability for underfunded plans. 94 The Court appeared
to be similarly unimpressed with the Wheeling-Pittsburgh court's po-
sition that the PBGC's anti-follow-on plan policy failed to appreciate
the plight of a bankrupt employer. 95 Instead, the Supreme Court
upheld the PBGC's position that follow-on plans were an abuse of
the system because of their tendency to undermine employee resis-
tance to plan termination. 96
The Court's award of considerable discretion to the PBGC in
its restoration decisions has two major practical implications. First,
it may discourage unfair competition among ERISA-insured cor-
porations. If LTV had been allowed to continue to refuse restora-
" See PBGC v. LTV Corp., 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2785, 2791 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (on remand).
99 See id.
91
 See id.
92 See id.
95 As Justice Scalia pointed out in the oral argument before the Supreme Court, "it's
strange for the Federal government to allow your company to give the same benefits as
before with the taxpayers paying 85 percent of the cost while your competitors pay the full
cost of their pension benefits. Shouldn't you have said no to the union's demand for replace-
ment benefits?" Sheppard, supra note 86, at 1112.
" See In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 103 B.R. 672, 686, 11 Employee Benefits
Cas. (BNA) 1097, 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
95 See id. at 688, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1111.
96 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2668, 2678, 12 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1593, 1601 (1990).
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tion of its plans, it would have saved approximately two hundred
million dollars per year, which equals a twenty dollar per ton of
steel advantage over its competitors. 97 Thus, LTV would have been
able to provide substantially the same pension benefits, with the cost
subsidized by the PBGC and the premiums paid by LTV's compet-
itors.98 At oral argument, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia noted the
patent unfairness of such an arrangement. 99
In addition, restoration of the LTV pension plans will save the
PBGC approximately $2.5 billion and prevent the "downward spi-
ral" of the pension insurance program, which has been operating
at a net deficit for many years.'" By recognizing the PBGC's dis-
cretion to restore a plan based on the existence of follow-on plans,
the Supreme Court may help ensure the future solvency of the
federal pension insurance program, and the likelihood that federal
funds will be available when they are truly needed. Thus, while the
Supreme Court's grant of discretion to the PBGC in its restoration
decisions may have negative implications for employers, it may also
promote the long-term survival of the PBGC and the continued
protection of pension beneficiaries.
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., the United States
Supreme Court held that the PBGC could restore a terminated
pension plan under section 4047 of ERISA, based on the existence
of follow-on plans.'°' The Court further held that the PBGC's fail-
ure to consider all potentially relevant areas of law did not render
its decision arbitrary and capricious. 102 Moreover, the Pl3GC's res-
toration decision did not violate the procedural requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.'" Thus, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to the PBGC's interpretation of its restoration authority,
granting it broad discretion to make restoration decisions based on
the existence of follow-on plans. Such broad restoration authority
may concern financially burdened employers who fear restoration
of pension plans they can no longer afford, but this burden is
necessary to prevent abuse of ERISA's pension insurance program
and to ensure its long-term viability.
97 Sheppard, supra note 86, at 1111.
m See id,
" See id. at 1111-12.
100 Ellin Rosenthal, PBGC Breathes Sigh of Relief After LTV Victory: Pensions Targeted for
Simplification, 47 Tax No.rEs 1546, 1546 (1990); J. Robert Suffolettajr., supra note 8, at 314.
101 110 S. Ct. at 2681, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1604.
' 97 Id.
I97 Id.
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VII. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
A. * Exemption from Collective Bargaining Agreements in ICC-
Approved Rail Carrier Transactions: Norfolk & Western Railway
v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n'
Section 11341 of the Interstate Commerce Act (the "ICA")
grants to the Interstate Commerce Commission (the "ICC") exclu-
sive power to examine and approve transactions among rail carriers
within its jurisdiction. 2
 In 1948, the United States Supreme Court
held in Schwabacher v. United States that the ICA granted to the ICC
plenary jurisdiction when evaluating railroad mergers and that the
ICC must look only to the ICA for standards when passing on such
mergers. 3
 The Court held that Congress granted this broad au-
thority to enable the ICC to promote efficiency and profitability
within the troubled railroad industry by means of carrier consoli-
dations.4
Under section 11344(c) of the ICA, the ICC must approve any
proposed transaction that it finds is consistent with the public in-
terest. 5
 In such an evaluation the ICA requires the ICC to consider
the impact of a transaction on railway employees and to stipulate
labor-protective measures to be taken by the carrier.6
 Once the ICC
approves a transaction, section 11341(a) of the ICA exempts the
parties from the "antitrust laws and from all other law, including
By Kevin F. Slaync, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 I 1 S. Ct. 1156, 136 L.R.R.M. 2727 (1991).
2 49 U.S.C. § 11341 (1988). Section 11341 provides in part:
The authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission under this sub-
chapter is exclusive. A carrier or corporation participating in or resulting from
a transaction approved by or exempted by the Commission under this subchap-
ter may carry out the transaction, own and operate property, and exercise
control of franchises acquired through the transaction without the approval of
a State authority. A carrier, corporation, or person participating in that ap-
proved or exempted transaction is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all
other law, including State and municipal law, as necessary to let that person
carry out the transaction, hold, maintain, and operate property, and exercise
control of franchises acquired through the transaction.
Id.
3 Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 198 (1948).
Id. at 191-92.
5 49 U.S.C. § 11344(c) (1988).
6 Id. §§ 11344(b)(1)(D), 11347. Section 11344(b)(1)(D) states that the ICC must consider
at least "the interest of carrier employees affected by the proposed transaction." Id.
§ 11344(b)(1)(D). Section 11347 requires the ICC to impose certain labor-protective measures.
Id. § 11347.
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State and municipal law" as necessary to accomplish the transaction.?
Congress did not explicitly define a limit when it extended the*ICC's
exemption power to "all other law."'
In Schwabacher, the United States Supreme Court ruled against
minority stockholders of a rail carrier whose shares were diminished
in value by a merger that had received ICC approval. 9 The appel-
lants claimed that the transaction violated their contract rights un-
der Michigan law because the corporate charter had guaranteed
the value of their shares. 10 Relying in part upon the immunity
provision in section 5(11) of the Transportation Act of 1940 (later
codified with minimal change as section 11341(a) of the ICA)," the
Court held that contract rights protected by state law were
superseded by the merger agreement that the ICC had found to
be in the public interest. 12 The Court reasoned that the ICA re-
quired the ICC to consider such rights during its evaluation of the
proposed merger, and that state-protected rights did not survive
the merger once the ICC approved it."
In addition to stockholders, railroad mergers can also adversely
affect labor organizations who seek protection of their contract
rights under the Railway Labor Act (the "RLA")." The RLA dictates
the obligations of management and labor to make and maintain
collective bargaining agreements and lays out specific procedures
for the construction and enforcement of such agreements. 15 The
ICC has asserted that its power to exempt carriers from "all other
laws" under section 11341(a) of the ICA includes the power to
7 49 U.S.C. § 1134I(a) (1988); see also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatch-
ers Ass'n, 111  S. Ct. 1156, 1159, 136 L.R.R.M. 2727, 2728-29 (1991).
8 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a) (1988); see also Norfolk & W., 111 S. Ct. at 1163, 136 L.R.R.M. at
2732.
9 Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 201 (1948).
' 9 Id. at 184-85.
" 49 U.S.C. § 11341(a) (1988).
12 See Schwabacher, 334 U.S. at 194-95.
18 Id. at 201.
14 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-162 (1988). RLA section 152 provides:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to
exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements conicerning
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether
arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid
any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out
of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.
Id. § 152.
15 Id,; see also Norfolk & W., 111 S. Ct. at 1165, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2733.
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relieve carriers from the obligations of collective bargaining agree-
ments and the RLA. 16
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court in ICC v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers declined to address the merits of this claim,
holding that on the facts of the case the ICC's decision was non-
reviewable. 17
 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Stevens,
joined by justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, contended that
the reach of the exemption from "all other law" was determined by
the scope of the approved transaction. 18 Justice Stevens asserted
that once the ICC has approved a transaction, the exemption under
section 11341(a) automatically flows from the approval, suspending
other laws where necessary to carry out the transaction as ap-
proved.' 9
 The Court left undecided, however, the ICC's capacity to
immunize rail carriers from their RLA-protected collective bargain-
ing obligations to their employees. 20
During the Survey year, in Norfolk & Western Railway v. American
Train Dispatchers Ass'n, the United States Supreme Court held that
collective bargaining agreements are encompassed by the term "all
other law" in section 11341(a). 2 ' The Court held that where abro-
gation of collective bargaining agreements is necessary to accom-
plish an approved transaction, railroad carriers are not bound to
the terms of these agreements. 22 As a result of Norfolk & Western,
the ICC, in its determination of whether a proposed rail merger is
in the public interest, will be the sole arbiter of what is fair protec-
tion for employees affected by the transaction." Consequently, rail-
ie See ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 295-96, 125 L.R.R.M.
2526, 2536 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). The case involved a claim by the labor union
that the structure of an 1CC-approved transaction violated the RLA and existing collective
bargaining agreements that guaranteed protection to affected employees. Id. at 276, 125
L.R.R.M. at 2528. The ICC refused the union's appeal for a rehearing. Id. The Supreme
Court held that when the ICC refuses to reopen a proceeding, only the refusal is reviewable,
not the merits of the ICC's original order. /d. at 278, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2529. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the original ICC order was reviewable. Id. at 288-89,
125 L.R.R.M. at 2533. Furthermore, Justice Stevens contended that the ICC order was
properly issued and that the § 11341(a) exemption automatically flowed from the order, Id.
at 298-99, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2537.
17 Id. at SO, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2530.
fd. at 298, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2537.
' 9 Id. at 298-99, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2537.
" See id. at 280, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2530.
111 S. Ct. 1156, 1166, 136 L.R.R.M. 2727, 2734 (1991).
72 Id. at 1163, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2732.
" Id. at 1159, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2728-29.
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way labor unions may be left unprotected by their existing collective
bargaining agreements in the face of railroad consolidations. 24
The Norfolk & Western decision reversed the holding of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which had
combined two separate appeals from ICC cases with common is-
sues. 25 In both lower court decisions, the ICC held that it could
relieve rail carriers in approved transactions from collective bar-
gaining agreements that hindered completion of the merger. 26 In
the first case, Norfolk Southern Corp.-Control-Norfolk and Western Rail-
way and Southern Railway, NWS Enterprises, Inc. had sought ICC
approval of an application to acquire control of Norfolk and West-
ern Railway and Southern Railway. 27 In March of 1982, the ICC
approved the application, imposing the labor-protective measures,
required by ICA sections 11344(b)(4) and 11347, commonly re-
ferred to as the New York Dock procedures. 28 In September 1986,
the carriers proposed consolidating the assignment of locomotives
to particular trains and facilities by transferring this activity from
Roanoke, Virginia to Atlanta, Georgia. 29 Though the proposal in-
cluded concessions to the affected employees, the American Train
Dispatchers Association challenged the move as a change to the
existing collective bargaining agreements, subject to mandatory ne-
gotiations under the RLA. 3° The union also alleged that the rail-
24 See id. at 1163, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2732.
25 Id. at 1161-62, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2731.
96 Id. at 1159-61, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2729-3 I.
22 Norfolk S. Corp.-Control-Norfolk and W. Ry. and S. Ry., 366 I.C.C. 173, 175-76
(1982), rev'd sub nom. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. ICC, 880 F.2d 562, 131 L.R.R.M. 3228
(D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. 1156, 136 L.R.R.M. 2727 (1991).
2° Id. at 229-31. The ICC established a comprehensive set of measures to satisfy § 11347
of the ICA in New York Dock Ry-Control-Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 360 1.C.C. 60,
84-90, aff'd sub nom. New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83, 102 L.R.R.M. 2835
(2d Cir. 1979). Section 2 of the New York Dock procedures provides
the rates of pay, rules, working conditions and all collective bargaining and
other rights, privileges and benefits (including continuation of pension rights
and benefits) of the railroad's employees under applicable laws and/or existing
collective bargaining agreements or otherwise shall be preserved unless changed
by future collective bargaining agreements or applicable statutes.
Id. at 84. Section 4 requires ninety days written notice be given to employees of the contem-
plation of any transaction that may cause their dismissal or displacement, and provides
procedures for referral to arbitration of any dispute that cannot be resolved after 30 days.
Id. at 85. Section 11 provides for mandatory referral of a dispute to arbitration at the request
of either party. Id. at 87-88.
29 Norfolk & W., 111  S. Ct. at 1160, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2729.
3° Id.
388	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 33:305
roads were obligated to preserve the affected employees' collective
bargaining rights.3 ' After negotiations failed, the carriers invoked
the New York Dock binding arbitration procedures."
The arbitration committee found that the transfer of work to
Atlanta was a necessary step toward achieving the profitability goals
of the ICC." Furthermore, the committee held that it possessed the
authority to override the collective bargaining agreements and the
RLA where such an override was necessary to accomplish the
merger. 54
 Because the bargaining agreement would impede the
transfer, the committee concluded that the affected employees
should not retain their collective bargaining rights." The ICC heard
the union's appeal from the arbitration decision, and affirmed by a
divided vote." The ICC-mandated New York Dock procedures, it
held, would supersede collective bargaining agreements and RLA
provisions when necessary to implement an approved transaction."
In the second case before the Supreme Court, CSX Transpor-
tation, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, the ICC had approved
an application by CSX Corporation to acquire control of Chessie
System, Inc., and Seaboard Coastline Industries, lnc. 38 The ICC
imposed the New York Dock conditions to protect against employee
displacements it foresaw as a result of the acquisition." In August,
1986, the consolidated CSX notified the Brotherhood of Railway
Carmen that it planned to move a repair shop from Georgia to
Kentucky, and that it anticipated job reductions." The union ob-
jected on the grounds that the reductions violated its 1966 collective
bargaining agreement, known as the "Orange Book." 41 A New York
Dock arbitration panel ruled for the railroad.42 The panel held that
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1160, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2729-30.
" Id, at 1160, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2730.
34 Id.
53 Id,
56 Id.
57 Id.
32
 CSX Corp.-Control-Chessie Sys., Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line Indus., Inc., 363
I.C.C. 521, 530-31 (1980), rev'd sub nom. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. ICC, 880 F.2d 562,
131 L.R.R.M. 3228 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train
Dispatchers Ass'n, 111  S. Ct. 1156, 136 L.R.R.M. 2727 (1991).
59 Norfolk & W., 111 S. Ct. at 1161, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2730.
"
." Id. The Orange Book embodied an agreement between the carrier and the employees
that each employee's job, work conditions and benefits were guaranteed for the employee's
entire working life. Id.
42 Id.
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despite the contrary provisions of the Orange Book, any collective
bargaining agreement or RLA provision that impeded the changes
authorized by the ICC-approved merger could be overridden:* As
the Orange Book would only slightly limit the carrier's ability to
complete the change, however, the panel held that the railroad
could make the move but could not transfer employees protected
by the Orange Book.'" On appeal, the ICC refused to uphold the
Orange Book provisions:* The ICC asserted that the collective
bargaining agreement impeded the approved transaction, and that
neither the RLA requirements nor the Orange Book would be
allowed to undermine the acquisition.*
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit combined the two ICC cases. 47 The court reversed both
decisions and remanded to the ICC, holding that the exemption
from "all other law" granted in ICA section 11341(a) did not mean
"all legal obstacles."48 Furthermore, the court held that ICC ap-
proval of a transaction does not permit carriers to excuse themselves
from collective bargaining agreements that give rise to contractual
obligations. 4g Such an interpretation, the court feared, would lead
to "bizarre" results, potentially enabling carriers to flaunt obligations
to creditors. 5° The D.C. Circuit Court held that Congress had in-
tended to excuse parties only from laws that were positive enact-
ments, such as antitrust and state legislation, not from common law
rules of contract. 5 ' The court declined to decide whether section
11341(a) could operate to override provisions of the RLA, or
whether the New York Dock conditions could authorize an arbitration
committee to supersede collective bargaining provisions with its own
measures.52
In Norfolk & Western, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the circuit court's decision and held that the exemption from "all
45 Id.
11 Id.
45 Id. at'1161, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2730-31 (citing CSX Corp.-Control-Cliessie Sys., Inc.,
and Seaboard Coast Line Indus., Inc., 4 I.C.C.2d 641, 650 (1988)).
16 Id.
47 Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. ICC, 880 F.2d 562, 562, 131 L.R.R.M. 3228, 3228
(D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. 1156, 136 L.R.R.M. 2727 (1991).
49 Id. at 567, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3232.
49 Id.
59 Id.
51 Id. at 570, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3234.
52 Id. at 573, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3236-37.
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other law" in section 1134I (a) does include the contractual obliga-
tions of a collective bargaining agreement. 53
 The Supreme Court
reasoned that a simple reading of the term "all other law" revealed
an explicit, unambiguous intent to override all legal obstacles to the
completion of a transaction once the ICC had considered and ap-
proved the transaction." The Court stipulated that such an exemp-
tion existed only where the ICC had properly considered the public
interest factors of section 11343(b)(1). 55
 The Court also held that
the decision to override a carrier's obligations must satisfy the labor-
protective requirements of section 11347 and must be necessary to
the implementation of the transaction. 56
The Court in Norfolk & Western began its analysis with an ex-
amination of the language of the statute' It held that the language
in section 11341(a) exempting carriers from "the antitrust laws and
all other law, including State and municipal law" to be "clear, broad
and unqualified." 58
 The Court uncovered no basis for the distinction
the court of appeals had drawn between positively enacted law and
common law.59
 Rather, the Court held that section 11341(a) provides
an exemption from all law as necessary to carry out the transaction. 6°
The Court held that Congress intended an exemption this broad
to ensure that once the ICC approved a transaction, other laws
would not frustrate the economic results the ICA sought to
achieve. 6 '
The Court then turned to an analysis of the exemption's impact
upon the Railway Labor Act. 62
 The Court held that the section
1I341(a) exemption was broad enough to exempt carriers from
laws that controlled the enforcement of contracts.° The Supreme
Court reasoned that any contract depends upon the common and
statutory law that makes it effective and enforceable." It also noted
that the RLA is the authority for the creation and enforcement of
labor-management contracts, requiring both railroads and unions
55
 Norfolk & W., 111  S. Ct. 1156, 1166, 136 L.R.R.M. 2727, 2734 (1991).
54 Id. at 1163, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2732.
" Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
66 Id. at 1163-64, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2732.
M Id.
6 2 Id. at 1165, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2733.
63 Id. at 1164, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2732.
64 Id.
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to make and maintain collective bargaining agreements. 65 The
Court held, therefore, that where the RLA imposes upon a carrier
collective bargaining obligations that impede the accomplishment
of an approved transaction, the RLA is superseded by the ICA
exemption. 66
The Court wrote that this holding followed from its decision
in Schwabacher. 67 Just as the obligations of state contract law did not
survive the merger in Schwabacher, the Court held that the collective
bargaining agreements guaranteed by the RLA did not survive the
ICC-approved mergers in Norfolk & Western.68 In both cases, the
Court observed, the exemption afforded relief to carriers from a
law that gave force to contracts obstructing the accomplishment of
an approved transaction. 69
The Norfolk & Western Court reasoned that its interpretation of
section 11341(a) would be faithful to the ICA policy goal of pro-
moting economy and efficiency in interstate transportation by re-
lieving carriers of excessive cost burdens. 7° The Court noted that
the ICA anticipated the effects of mergers and acquisitions upon
rail labor, and imposed a number of labor-protective measures to
ensure that the interests of employees are considered to the greatest
extent possible. 7 ' To submit approved transactions to the "inter-
minable" procedures and protections under the RLA would be
redundant, the Court reasoned, and would reduce the efficiency
sought by the ICA. 72 Finally, the Court maintained that because the
operation of the exemption clause would only override collective
bargaining agreements where the ICC had fully considered and
approved the transaction and where the exemption was necessary
to accomplish the transaction, its holding would not lead to "bizarre"
results, as predicted by the D.C. Circuit Court. 73
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the
decision. 74 Justice Stevens rejected as overbroad the majority's in-
terpretation of the phrase "all other laws," stating that if Congress
63 Id. at 1165, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2733.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1164, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2733 (citing Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S, 182,
188 (1948)).
62 Norfolk & W., 111  S. Ct. at 1165, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2733.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1165, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2733-34.
71 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 11347, 11344(b)(1)(D) (1988)).
72 Id. at 1166, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2734.
73 Id. (citing Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. ICC, 880 F.2d at 567, 131 L.R.R.M. at 3232).
74 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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had intended theICC to possess the power to override the obliga-
tions of contracts, it would have stated so explicitly." Justice Stevens
argued that the original statute granting the exemption power to
the ICC, Section 407 of the Transportation Act of 1920, targeted
federal antitrust laws, not common law rules of contract. 76
Justice Stevens also rejected the majority's reading of the Schwa-
bacher case. 77 The emphasis in Schwabacher, he argued, was on the
importance of the ICC's ability to control the capital structure of a
merger, and the difficulty of having such control obstructed by
Michigan law. 78 According to Justice Stevens, Schwabacher did not
relieve carriers of private contracts that limit the achievable benefits
of rail consolidations. 79 Finally, Justice Stevens cited section 2 of the
New York Dock procedures, which states that "existing collective bar-
gaining agreements . . . shall be preserved unless changed by future
collective bargaining agreements."" This provision, Justice Stevens
argued, indicates that the drafters intended the collective bargain-
ing agreements to survive ICC-approved mergers. 81 Justice Stevens
asserted that extending the ICA exemption to include collective
bargaining agreements would therefore contradict the drafters' in-
tent."
The Supreme Court's opinion in Norfolk & Western resolves to
some degree the conflicting national policies embodied in the RLA
and the ICA. Historically, employees of railroad carriers have en-
joyed a unique degree of job protection in the face of consolida-
tions." In the more competitive transportation environment that
has existed since the early 1980s, however, the extensive protections
granted to rail labor under the RLA have enjoyed diminished public
and congressional support." The scope of discretion granted to the
ICC as a result of Nolfolk & Western gives the ICC more power to
75 Id. at 1167, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1169, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2736 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 1170, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2737 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Id.
"° Id. (citing New York Dock Ry.-Control-Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 360 I.C.C. 60, 84-90,
aff 'd sub nom. New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83, 102 L.R.R.M. 2835 (2d Cir.
1979)).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83
 William E. Thorns & Sonja Clapp, Labor Protection in the Transportation Industry, 64
N.D. L. REV. 379, 380 (1988).
84 Id.
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make carrier mergers economically feasible and efficient, potentially
at the expense of railroad employees.85
The Norfolk & Western decision affects labor-management dis-
putes in two ways. First, the holding serves notice to labor unions
confronted with carrier consolidations that collective bargaining
agreements will not necessarily provide the security they once did.
Railway union members may no longer enjoy the lob for life"
security guaranteed by the RLA, especially when employed by se-
verely strapped carriers who are able to make few concessions in
executing an economically feasible merger. 86 Unions will need to
seek other sources of relief to counterbalance the risk of relocation
or layoffs.
Second, New York Dock arbitration and ICC hearings will be far
more important to the unions as the only forums in which to "make
their case" and demonstrate the severity of hardship that will result
from a proposed merger. The ICC must still satisfy the labor-
protective conditions of section 11347, and must determine that the
merger and labor measures are in the public interest." The Norfolk
& Western decision leaves the evaluation of labor hardships that will
result from a railroad transaction exclusively within the purview of
the ICC. 88 No longer able to rely on the protections gained in
collective bargaining negotiations, railroad unions threatened by a
merger will only have recourse to arbitration under the New York
Dock procedures and to the conditions imposed by the ICC during
review and approval of merger applications under ICA sections
11347 and 11343(b). 89
as See Norfolk & W., 111  S. Ct. at 1165, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2733-34. The Court stated that
its holding will help achieve the goals of the ICA by ensuring that laws such as the RLA will
not prevent the ICC from accomplishing the efficiencies the ICA seeks through consolidation.
Id.
88 See Thorns & Clapp, supra note 83, at 392.
87 Norfolk & W., 111 S. Ct. at 1163, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2732.
88 See 49 U.S.C. § 11341 (1988); Schwabacher v. United States, 344 U.S. 182, 191-92
(1948). By eliminating collective bargaining agreements as a limitation on ICC approval of
transactions, Norfolk & Western effectively frees the ICC to determine for itself what is fair
treatment for labor. -
88 See Norfolk & W., I I l S. CL at 1163, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2732. The New York Dock
procedures must still be satisfied by the ICC according to § 11347 of the ICA, and the ICC
can impose further protections to satisfy § 11344(b)(1)(D). See id. Once the ICC, in its
judgment, has accomplished this, collective bargaining agreements and the RLA presumably
will provide no further protection against displacement or layoffs. See id. at 1166, 136
L.R.R.M. at 2734.
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Justice Stevens expressed concern over the implications of al-
lowing the section 11341(a) exemption to permit carriers to avoid
their obligations under contracts to other parties. 9° Disregarding
these obligations, he feared, could arguably be shown to be "nec-
essary" to the economic goals of a consolidation.9 ' The majority's
decision should not lead to this untoward result, however, because
the ICA relieves carriers not from the contract signed in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, but from the RLA, which governs the
construction and enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments.92
The Norfolk & Western decision failed to resolve several issues.
In Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Justice Stevens contended in
a concurring opinion that the exemption from "all other laws" is
self-executing." Once the ICC approves the transaction, according
to Justice Stevens, immunity from "other laws" automatically at-
taches without further action by the ICC." The Norfolk & Western
decision refused to express an opinion on this proposition. 95 Fur-
thermore, though the majority in Norfolk & Western emphasized that
an exemption must be necessary to the transaction, a determination
of necessity is a factual one. 96 The ICC in practice has not issued
orders as to which measures will be necessary to a particular trans-
action.97
Because the exemption may automatically attach without a find-
ing of necessity, carriers may unilaterally assume that a particular
measure is necessary to the approved transaction. Unions must then
make a claim before the ICC that a transaction will violate existing
law or that it is not necessary. Unions will have to monitor diligently
a carrier's moves and evaluate which actions are necessary for a
transaction to succeed. The union may then have to litigate each
9° See id. at 1167, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 See id.
92 See id. at 1165, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2733.
92 Id. at 1170, 136 L.R.R.M, at 2737 (Stevens, J., dissenting); ICC v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 299, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2526, 2537 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
" See Norfolk & W., 111 S. Ct. at 1170, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2737 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 299, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2537.
96 See Norfolk & W., 111 S. Ct. at 1166, 136 L.R.R.M. at 2734.
96 See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 883 F.2d 1079, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
amended, 929 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit Court refused to reverse an ICC
order relieving participating carriers in an ICC approved merger from obligations under the
RLA because the issue was not ripe. Id.
97 See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 300 n.14, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2537 n.14.
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factual challenge, rather than rely on the RLA collective bargaining
mechanisms.
In sum, the Supreme Court's decision in Norfolk & Western
enlarges the authority of the ICC to control the structure and
impact of proposed rail-carrier transactions. The Court's ruling,
that a carrier's ICA section 11341(a) exemption from "all other
laws" includes collective bargaining agreements, will permit the ICC
to make railroad consolidations more profitable by relieving carriers
of their RLA obligations. Railroad unions will need to persuade the
ICC that employee hardship will outweigh the economic benefits of
the merger, rather than rely upon adjudication of their collective
bargaining agreements. Furthermore, once a transaction has been
approved by the ICC, the carriers may act unilaterally in violation
of collective bargaining agreements unless and until challenged by
the union. The decision in Norfolk & Western should ease the con-
solidation of rail carriers, but it may also leave railroad unions with
no collective bargaining protections against relocation and layoffs.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. * Clarifying the Timing Requirements for Federal Employees' Age
Discrimination Claims: Stevens v. Department of the Treasury'
Section 633a of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA") mandates that all personnel decisions affecting fed-
eral employees be made free from discrimination based on age. 2
Aggrieved federal employees who believe they are victims of age
discrimination may pursue one of two alternative means of relief.
First, the employee may proceed in an administrative action via the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 3
 Alterna-
tively, the employee may file a civil action in federal district court. 4
If a federal employee chooses to file a civil action, the ADEA pro-
vides that "no civil action may be commenced . . . until the individual
has given the Commission not less than thirty days' notice of an
intent to file such action." 5
 In addition, the ADEA requires that
"such notice shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after
the alleged unlawful practice occurred." 6
Three issues arose in the lower courts concerning interpreta-
tion of the ADEA timing requirements that a federal employee who
chooses to pursue an age discrimination claim in court must meet.'
First, whether the individual must file notice of intent to sue within
180 days of the alleged discriminatory incident, or actually file suit
within 180 days. 8
 Second, whether the individual must file suit
* By Emily J. Lawrence, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 Ill S. Ct. 1562, 55 FEP Cases 845 (1991).
2
 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1988).
3 Id. 633a(b).
• Id. § 633a(c).
5 Id. § 633a(d).
8 Id.
McGinty v. United States Dept. of the Army, 900 F.2d 1114, 1117, 54 FEP Cases 867,
868 (7th Cir. 1990) (administrative exhaustion); Langford v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 839 F.2d 1192, 1193, 46 FEP Cases 121, 122 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); Castro v. United
States, 775 F.2d 399, 403, 39 FEP Cases 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1985) (administrative exhaustion
and timing requirements); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1140, 38 FEP Cases at 364,
372 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (administrative exhaustion and timing requirements); Purtilt v. Harris,
658 F.2d 134, 138, 26 FEP Cases 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983)
(administrative exhaustion).
* Langford, 839 F.2d at 1193, 46 FEP Cases at 122 (suit must be filed within 180 days of
discriminatory action (citing district court opinion)); Castro, 775 F.2d at 403, 39 FEP Cases
at 164 (suit filed within 180 days); McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1140, 38 FEP Cases at 372 (same).
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within 30 days of notifying the EEOC, or at least 30 days after
notifying the EEOC. 9 The third issue is whether an individual must
exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding to court.'°
During the Survey year, in Stevens v. Department of the Treasury,
the United States Supreme Court held that the ADEA requires a
federal employee filing an age discrimination suit to provide the
EEOC with notice of not less than thirty days before the suit is
actually filed of the individual's intent to sue." Such notice must be
filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
incident.' 2 The Court did not, however, rule on the exhaustion issue
because the government changed its position and no longer alleged
that a federally employed age discrimination plaintiff must first
exhaust all administrative remedies through the EEOC before seek-
ing relief through the courts.' 3 Thus, the Stevens decision establishes
that a federal employee pursuing an age discrimination claim
through the court need not exhaust administrative remedies, but
must notify the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory inci-
dent of his or her intent to file suit and at least 30 days before the
suit is actually filed."
The appellant in Stevens, Charles Z. Stevens III, was an em-
ployee of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). 19 In August 1986,
at the age of 63, Stevens was accepted into the IRS's Revenue Officer
Training Program and became a civil service employee with pro-
bationary status. 16 Stevens was advised on April 26, 1987, that his
performance in the training program was unsatisfactory.° Rather
than leaving the IRS, Stevens requested a demotion and a transfer
out of the training program,"
9 McGinty, 900 F.2d at 1116-17, 54 FE? Cases at 868; Langford, 839 F.2d at 1193, 46
FE? Cases at 122 {thing district court opinion); Castro, 775 F.2d at 403, 39 FE? Cases at 164;
McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1140, 38 FE? Cases at 372.
10 E.g., McGinty, 900 F.2d at 1117, 54 FEP Cases at 868 (administrative exhaustion
required); White v. Frank, 895 F.2d 243, 244, 55 FEP Cases 915, 915 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 232 (1990) (same); Castro, 775 F.2d at 404, 39 FE? Cases at 165 (same); Pura'',
658 F.2d at 136, 26 FEY Cases at 941 (same). But see, e.g,, Langford, 839 F.2d at 1194, 46 FE?
Cases at 123 (no exhaustion required).
" I 1 1 S. Ct. 1562, 1566, 55 FE? Cases 845, 847 (1991).
12 Id.
15 Id, at 1568, 55 FE? Cases at 848.
" See id. at 1566, 55 FEP Cases at 847.
15 Id. at 1565, 55 FEP Cases at 846.
16 Id.
Id.
19 Id.
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In September 1987, Stevens tried to utilize the IRS's adminis-
trative procedure for resolving age discrimination disputes by meet-
ing with an Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor. t9
 Stevens
had requested the meeting, however, long after the agency's period
for complaint had expired. 2° Stevens then filed a formal adminis-
trative complaint with the Department of the Treasury on October
19, 1987. 21
 The complaint not only alleged age discrimination by
the IRS but also gave notice of Stevens's intent to sue if the matter
were not resolved to his satisfaction. 22
 This complaint was rejected
on the grounds that Stevens had missed the deadline for consulting
with an Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor." Stevens ap-
pealed the rejection for untimeliness to the EEOC, which affirmed
the decision on March 30, 1988.24
Stevens next sought relief through civil suit, filing a complaint
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
in 1988. 25
 The district court dismissed the suit on grounds that
Stevens had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and had
failed to request a hearing within the required time period.26 The
district court also interpreted the ADEA's timing provisions as re-
quiring that an individual who chooses court adjudication must file
suit in federal court no later than 180 days after the alleged dis-
criminatory event and must notify the EEOC within 30 days before
bringing suit. 27
 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disa-
greed, holding that Stevens did not actually have to file suit, but
had only to file notice with the EEOC within 180 days of the dis-
criminatory act of his intent to sue." The court of appeals, however,
affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the grounds that Stevens's
' 8 Id.
26 Id. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.511, 1613.512, and 1613.214(a)(1)(i) (1990) prescribed a 30-day
period. Stevens had written his congressman for assistance on May 21, 1987, but that inquiry
was unproductive. No reason was given for Stevens' having waited until September to meet
with an Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor. Stevens, III S. Ct. at 1565, 55 FEP Cases
at 846.
2L Stevens, 111 S. Ct. at 1565, 55 FEP Cases at 846.
22 Id. The EEOC considers notice to an individual's employing agency as complying with
the statutory requirement of notice to the EEOC. Id. at 1566, 55 FEP Cases at 847.
23 Id. at 1565, 55 FEP Cases at 846.
24 Id.
25
 Id.
28 Id. The court held that Stevens had not properly invoked the administrative remedy
and therefore had not exhausted that remedy because he failed to make his complaint to an
Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor within 30 days of the incident.
27 Id. Stevens brought suit 206 days after giving the EEOC notice of intent to file suit
and over one year after the discriminatory incident. Id.
48
 Id. at 1566, 55 FEP Cases at 847.
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notice to the EEOC was ineffective because his suit was not filed
within 30 days of giving notice to the EEOC. 29
In 1991, in Stevens v. Department of the Treasury, the United States
Supreme Court stated that the district court and court of appeals
erred in interpreting the timing and notice requirements of the
ADEA in a federal employee's age discrimination suit." The Court
held that under the ADEA a plaintiff must provide the EEOC with
at least 30 days notice of intent to sue.3 ' Only the notice of intent
to sue, and not the actual suit itself, must be filed within 180 days
of the alleged discriminatory practice, in order to comply with the
ADEA's requirements. 32 Thus, contrary to the lower courts' deci-
sions, wrote Justice Blackmun, Stevens had fulfilled both timing
requirements of the ADEA by filing notice within 180 days of the
alleged discriminatory incident of his intent to sue, and at least 30
days before the suit was actually filed. 35
The issue of Stevens's failure to exhaust the administrative
procedure before filing suit was moot, the Court held, because the
government changed its position and no longer asserted that a
federal employee who seeks relief for age discrimination must ex-
haust the administrative process before bringing a civil action."
The Court reasoned that because both the government and Stevens
agreed that there is no exhaustion requirement in the ADEA, no
party stood adverse to Stevens." The Court assumed the govern-
ment would no longer defend its earlier position supporting an
exhaustion requirement in either the instant case on remand, or in
subsequent age discrimination suits brought by federal employees."
Therefore, in light of the government's change of position, the
ADEA should no longer be read as requiring administrative ex-
" Id.
30 Id. at 1567, 55 FEP Cases at 847.
53 Id. at 1566, 55 FEP Cases at 847.
52 Id.
" Id. Stevens notified the EEOC on October 19, 1987, the 176th day after the allegedly
discriminatory demotion and transfer of April 27, 1987, and thus was within the ADEA's
180-day time limit for giving notice to the EEOC of intent to sue. In addition, Stevens filed
suit on May 3, 1988, thereby giving the EEOC at least 30 days notice (206 days notice to be
exact) as required by the ADEA. Id.
" Id. at 1568, 55 FEP Cases at 848-49.
35 Id. The Court suggests that if future litigation does not lead to a definitive resolution,
the importance of the exhaustion dispute may fade with time because the government will
no longer be defending an exhaustion requirement. Id. at 1569, 55 FEP Cases at 849.
Id Id. The Court noted that previous circuit court opinions holding that exhaustion is
required will remain in conflict with the one circuit court opinion that held otherwise. The
Court indicated there is nothing it should do in the Stevens case vis-à-vis those decisions. Id.
at 1568, 55 FEP Cases at 849.
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haustion before proceeding to court. 37 Justice Stevens dissented
from the majority's view that the exhaustion issue is moot. 38
The Stevens decision has lengthened the time in which federal
employees may file suit alleging age discrimination. An individual
has up to 180 days after the discriminatory incident to file notice
of intent to sue and need only provide the EEOC with at least 30
days notice before actually filing suit. 39 The only projected time
limitation after giving proper notice would be the statute of limi-
tations. 4°
In addition, because of the government's change of position
regarding exhaustion, a federal employee alleging age discrimina-
tion should now have greater flexibility in seeking relief. A plaintiff
who, like Stevens, fails to meet the prescribed administrative re-
quirements would not be foreclosed from relief but would still have
a second means with which to pursue his or her claim. 4 ' Similarly,
a plaintiff who abandons the administrative remedy before final
resolution, perhaps out of frustration or dissatisfaction with the
process, may proceed to court instead. Such an option may in turn
prompt the employing agency to respond more quickly than it
might otherwise have done, knowing that federal employees are
free to pursue their age discrimination claims in court.
B.* Filing Federal ADEA Claims After State Administrative Decisions:
Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Soliminol
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"
or the "Act") prohibits discrimination by public and private ern-
37 See id. at 1568, 55 FEP Cases at 848.
'" Id. at 1569, 55 FEP Cases at 849 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that
there is an adversarial posture, which the majority finds lacking, because of the government's
status as the petitioner's former employer. Id. Justice Stevens urges resolution of the question
in favor of petitioner Stevens's (and the government's new-found) position; to wit, that the
ADEA does not require exhaustion of the administrative remedies before court action may
commence. Id.
59 Id. at 1566, 55 FEP Cases at 847.
" The Supreme Court, while noting that Stevens had filed suit within an applicable
statutory period of limitations, did not decide which period of limitations—from either an
analogous federal statute or from a state age discrimination statute—is applicable to a section
633a(c) civil suit. Id. at 1567, 55 FEP Cases at 848.
41 See id. at 1565, 55 FEP Cases at 846. Stevens had initiated a meeting with an Equal
Employment Opportunity Counselor after the agency-prescribed 30-day period had expired.
Thus, his administrative complaint was rejected as untimely. Id.
* By Brigida Benitez, Staff Member, BosroN COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' Astoria Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111  S. Ct. 2166, 55 FEP Cases 1503
(1991).
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ployers on the basis of age. 2 Section 14(b) of the ADEA requires
that in circumstances where a state has its own age discrimination
law, complainants must first file a claim with state authorities before
filing in federal court.' The circuit courts have reached differing
results, however, when faced with the question of whether judicially
unreviewed state administrative decisions have preclusive effect in
federal court. 4
In the 1986 case of University of Tennessee v. Elliott, the United .
States Supreme Court stated that in the closely parallel context of
title VII claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress did
not intend administrative decisions to have preclusive effect in fed-
eral court.' The Court explained that title VII's language, which
requires the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") to give "substantial weight" to the findings of state or
local authorities, shows that Congress did not intend these admin-
istrative proceedings to have preclusive effect in subsequent federal
litigation. 6 Moreover, the Elliott Court concluded that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, which ensures that state court judgments receive the same
full faith and credit in all courts as they would in that state's own
courts, does not require preclusion for judicially unreviewed find-
ings of administrative agencies.'
Although the Elliott Court decided that Congress did not intend
state administrative decisions in title VII actions to have preclusive
effect, it came to the opposite result with respect to claims of civil
rights violations under section 1983. 8 The Elliott Court held that
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
3 Id. § 633(b).
' Compare Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 282-83, 46 FEP Cases 645, 650 (8th Cir, 1988)
(judicially unreviewed state administrative decisions have preclusive effect under the ADEA)
and Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib,, 798 F.2d 1279, 1283, 41 FEP Cases 1224, 1226 (9th
Cir. 1986) (judicially unreviewed state administrative decisions may have preclusive effect
under the ADEA) with Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1297, 43 FEP Cases 1025,
1030 (7th Cir. 1987) (judicially unreviewed state administrative decisions not given preclusive
effect under the ADEA) and Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237, 240, 38
FEP Cases 1150, 1153 (4th Cir. 1985) (same).
5 478 U,S. 788, 796, 41 FEP Cases 177, 180 (1986).
6 Id. at 795.
7 Id. at 795, 41 FEP Cases at 179. 28 U.S.C. 1738 provides that state judicial proceedings
in subsequent federal litigation "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such state from which
they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
" 478 U.S. at 797, 41 FEP Cases at 180. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to he subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
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there was no congressional intent in section 1983 to contravene the
rules of preclusion. 9 Since Elliott, the circuit courts have split over
the question of state administrative preclusion for federal ADEA
claims.°
A few months after the Supreme Court's decision in Elliott, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in
Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors that state administrative decisions
involving ADEA claims may have preclusive effect." The Mack
court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.,' 2
 where the Court held that
when an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and
the parties before it have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,
courts must apply res judicata to enforce repose.' 5 Although Mack
was decided after Elliott, the Mack court made no mention as to why
the ADEA should be treated differently than title VII."
By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit relied on Elliott in the 1987 case of Duggan v. Board of
Education. 15 The Duggan court reasoned that the ADEA and title
VII contained sufficient parallels so that for purposes of adminis-
trative res judicata, courts should construe them similarly.' 6
 The
Duggan court also referred to a case, decided prior to Elliott, in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that unreviewed administrative findings in ADEA cases are
not entitled to preclusion in federal court."
Contrary to the position taken by the Duggan court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed administra-
tive estoppel in the 1988 case of Stillians v. Iowa.' 8
 The Stillians court
explained that there was no congressional intent evident in the
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
9
 478 U.S. at 797, 41 FEP Cases at 180.
10 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
" 798 F.2d 1279, 1283, 41 FEP Cases 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 1986).
12
 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).
15 Mack, 798 F.2d at 1283, 41 FEP Cases at 1226.
14 See Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1294, 43 FEP Cases 1025, 1027 (7th
Cir. 1987).
° Id. at 1294, 43 FEP Cases at 1027-28.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1294, 43 FEP Cases at 1027 (citing Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 769
F.2d 237, 240, 241, 38 FEP Cases 1150, 1152-53 (4th Cir. 1985)).
18
 843 F.2d 276, 282-83, 46 FEP Cases 645, 649 (8th Cir. 1988).
March 1992]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 403
ADEA to abrogate preclusion and, as such, administrative decisions
should follow the common law rules of preclusion in subsequent
federal litigation.' 9 The court reasoned that the parallels between
title VII and the ADEA are immaterial if Congress did not intend
to invalidate preclusion with the ADEA's enactment. 2° Moreover,
the Stillians court emphasized that while preclusion is inconsistent
with title VII, it is consistent with the ADEA. 2 ' The court further
noted that under section 633(a) of the ADEA, claimants may
supersede state proceedings after sixty days by filing suit in federal
court. 22 The Stillians court explained that if preclusion were not
allowed, administrative proceedings would serve as opportunities
for claimants to test their cases."
During the Survey year, in Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n
v. Solimino, the United States Supreme Court settled the conflict
among these circuit court decisions by ruling that state administra-
tive findings are not entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent
federal ADEA litigation." The Astoria Court recognized the impor-
tance of administrative estoppel both to enforce repose and to
prevent the draining of resources. 25 Nevertheless, the Court held
that the ADEA carries the same implication as title VII; namely,
that Congress did not intend the rules of preclusion to apply when
it enacted the statute. 26
In Astoria, Angelo Solimino filed a charge of age discrimination
with the EEOC on March 18, 1982 against his former employer,
Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Astoria"). 27 Soli-
mino had worked for Astoria for almost forty years before he was
terminated at the age of sixty-three from his position as a vice
president in the mortgage department. 28 The EEOC referred Soli-
mino's claim to the New York State Division of Human Rights,
which is responsible for the initial investigation of age discrimina-
tion claims under New York's Human Rights Law.29 After a hearing,
the state agency concluded on January 25, 1983 that there was no
' 9 See id. at 281, 46 FEP Cases at 649.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 282, 46 FEP Cases at 650.
22 Id,
23 Id.
24 111  S. Ct. 2166, 2172, 55 FEP Cases 1503, 1507 (1991).
25 Id. at 2169, 55 FEP Cases at 1505.
25 See id, at 2171, 55 FEP Cases at 1507.
22 Id. at 2168, 55 FEP Cases at 1505.
26 Id.
" Id,
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probable cause to believe that Solimino had been terminated be-
cause of his age. 3° On May 30, 1984 the State Human Rights Appeal
Board affirmed that decision. 3 '
Instead of seeking review of the board's decision in state court,
Solimino filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York under section 626 of the ADEA." The district
court, following Stillians, granted Astoria's motion for summary
judgment, and held that the presumption in favor of administrative
estoppel was applicable because neither the language nor legislative
history of the ADEA showed that Congress had addressed the
issue." Thus, the district court concluded that the decision of the
state's Human Rights Division had preclusive effect in federal
court. 34
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's finding, holding that the ADEA's struc-
ture showed congressional intent to deny preclusion to state admin-
istrative agency decisions. 35
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order
to resolve the conflict between the circuits as to whether final state
agency determinations in ADEA claims have preclusive effect in
subsequent federal litigation." Writing for a unanimous Court, Jus-
tice Souter reiterated the Court's commitment to its rationale in
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co. that federal courts
should allow preclusion only in situations where an administrative
agency acts in a judicial capacity and where the parties have had
adequate opportunity to litigate. 37 The Astoria Court reasoned that
this principle of preclusion was applicable to state court decisions
as well as to the findings of both state and federal agencies."
The Astoria Court explained, however, that when a case involves
statutory interpretation, courts must decide whether the legislature
intended to apply administrative estoppel." The Court reasoned
that where a well-established common law doctrine such as preclu-
sion is involved, courts must presume that Congress intended the
.stn Id. at 2169, 55 FEP Cases at 1505.
3L Id.
44 Id. 29 U.S.C. 626 governs the filing of civil suits under the ADEA.
43 111 8. Ct. at 2169, 55 FEP Cases at 1505.
" Id.
43 See id.
MI Id.
34 It
5 Id,
39 Id.
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rule to apply unless a contrary statutory purpose is evident. 4" The
Court noted that such a clear statement by Congress is only required
to protect "weighty and constant values," thereby assuring that the
legislature has dealt with the issue in traditionally sensitive areas.'"
The Astoria Court found that administrative preclusion did not
represent such a weighty value as to justify the protection of the
clear statement rule. 42 Instead, the Court explained that the appli-
cation of administrative preclusion depends on the context of the
rights, the power of the agency and the adequacy of procedures."
Consequently, the Astoria Court concluded that the presumption of
administrative estoppel applies where Congress has not shown any
intention on the issue."
The Astoria Court emphasized that the full faith and credit
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires state court judgments in title VII
claims to enjoy preclusive effect in federal court. 45 The Court as-
serted, however, that section 1738 is inapplicable to judicially un-
reviewed findings of state administrative agencies." Following in-
stead the rule of Elliott, the Court stated that the test for applying
the presumption of administrative estoppel is to determine if the
legislature's intent in enacting the statute is consistent with preclu-
sion.'"
Accordingly, the Court turned to its analysis in Elliott, noting
that in section 1983 discrimination claims, it had found no congres-
sional intent to undermine the common law rules of preclusion."
The Court stated that in contrast to section 1983, title VII by
implication intends such a purpose by directing the EEOC to give
"substantial weight" to findings made by state or local authorities. 49
The Astoria Court reasoned that if there is no preclusion for a
federal agency, there can be none for a federal court. 50 The Court
concluded that under the "substantial weight" standard, preclusion
is not mandated. 5 '
4° Id. at 2170, 55 FEP Cases at 1505-06.
4 ' Id. at 2170, 55 FEP Cases at 1506.
42 Id.
45 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
44 Id.
47 Id, at 2170-71, 55 FEP Cases at 1506.
48 Id. at 2171, 55 FEP Cases at 1506.
49 Id.
3o Id.
51 Id.
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The Astoria Court found that the same implication existed in
the ADEA. 52
 The Court explained that although the ADEA does
not contain express language to evince this intention, its filing re-
quirements clearly show that preclusion is inappropriate." The As-
toria Court specifically pointed to section 14(b)'s requirement that a
complainant first file a claim with state authorities before filing in
federal court." Likewise, the Court noted that the deadline for
filing with the EEOC also makes reference to the termination of
state proceedings. 55
 In addition, the Court explained that section
7(d)(2) of the ADEA provides that a section 14(b) claim must be
filed with the EEOC within three hundred days after the alleged
discrimination or within thirty days after the claimant receives no-
tice of the termination of state proceedings, whichever occurs first."
Thus, the Astoria Court concluded that the language of these pro-
visions assumes federal litigation involving the same claims after
state agencies have terminated their proceedings. 57
The Astoria Court further acknowledged that these federal pro-
ceedings would be devoid of meaning if federal courts allowed state
administrative findings to have preclusive effect. The Court re-
peated its holding that the section 14(b) filing requirement was
intended to screen from federal courts those complaints that could
be adequately settled in state proceedings. 59 The Astoria Court rea-
soned that complainants filing in federal court would likely do so
only when the state has not held in their favor." In addition, the
Court recognized that allowing state administrative decisions to have
preclusive effect would always provide employers with a successful
defense of collateral estoppe1. 61 Moreover, the Court stated that
applying rules of preclusion would make these cases insignificant,
leaving section 14(b)'s filing requirements without effect. 62
52 Id.
55 Id.
54 Id. at 2171, 55 FEP Cases at 1506-07. As the Astoria Court indicated, § 14(b) further
provides that "no suit may be brought under [the ADEA] before the expiration of sixty days
after proceedings have been commenced under the state law, unless such proceedings have
been earlier terminated." Id. at 2171, 55 FEP Cases at 1507.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
56 Id.
59 Id.
6° Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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The Astoria Court also emphasized that it was not necessary to
the Court's holding that the ADEA contain title VII's language
requiring courts to give "substantial weight" to state administrative
decisions.° The Court acknowledged that the "substantial weight"
provision was "simply the most obvious piece of evidence" that res
judicata does not apply in title VII cases.° The Astoria Court ex-
plained that Congress added this language because the EEOC was
giving too little weight to administrative decisions, and not because
it was applying preclusion or giving these decisions too much de-
ference.65 The'Astoria Court further stated that similar language in
the ADEA has been unnecessary because the EEOC has shown
adequate deference to state determinations. 66 Thus, the Astoria
Court concluded that similar language in the ADEA was not re-
quired in order to determine legislative intent. 67
The Astoria Court asserted that even without the "substantial
weight" language, the Elliott Court would have arrived at the same
conclusion. 68 According to the Astoria Court, title VII's section
706(c), which provides for federal court action after state proceed-
ings have ended, is almost identical to section 14(b) of the ADEA. 69
The Astoria Court recognized that section 706(c) would have been
sufficient grounds on which to justify the Elliott Court's decision
because it assumes federal intervention after state proceedings. 7°
Accordingly, the Astoria Court concluded that the language of sec-
tion 14(b) in the ADEA is enough to counter the "lenient presump-
tion" towards administrative preclusion. 7 ' Moreover, the Court re-
jected the notion of using preclusion to give agencies more
deference because the administrative findings in age discrimination
claims of federal employees have been found not to have preclusive
effect. 72
The Astoria Court also found support in several policy consid-
erations." The Court first explained that a complainant had no
6' Id. at 2172, 55 FEP Cases at 1507.
64 Id. (quoting Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1297, 43 FEP Cases 1025,
1030 (7th Cir. 1987)).
65 111 S. Ct. at '2172, 55 FEP Cases at 1507.
66 Id.
" See id.
60 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
-72 Id.
75 See id. at 2172-73, 55 FEP Cases at 1508.
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control over who conducts the initial investigation of an ADEA
claim, as the investigating agency may be the EEOC or an analogous
state agency." Accordingly, the Court -acknowledged that it would
be unfair to subject the complainant's ability to obtain a court hear-
ing to "bureaucratic chance." 75 Second, the Court explained that
following Astoria's reading of section 14(b) of the ADEA would
produce disparities among states, as some states may have their own
age discrimination statutes while others do not. 78 The Court rea-
soned that because section 14(a) provides that state proceedings are
superseded by federal action, administrative estoppel would en-.
courage forum-shopping by leading complainants to file in federal
court immediately after filing with the state. 77 Finally, the Court
noted that claim preclusion by a federal court would impede the
deferral system whereby complaints are resolved without entering
federal court. 78
The Astoria Court concluded that its decision would provide
claimants with another opportunity to present their claims, and that
state determinations could still be used as evidence in the federal
proceeding. 79 According to the Court, Congress's intent in denying
preclusion also eliminated case by case determinations over whether
a state agency "acted in a judicial capacity" and provided the parties
with "an adequate opportunity to litigate" in order to apply admin-
istrative estoppel. 80
In sum, the Astoria Court stressed the importance of preclusion
in subsequent federal litigation of both state and federal adminis-
trative agency determinations. 8 ' The Court asserted, however, that
in cases of statutory interpretation, congressional intent governed
the application of administrative estoppel. 82 The Court explained
that preclusion had to be consistent with the statute's intent. 85 The
Astoria Court concluded that because the language of the ADEA's
filing requirements in section 14(b) assumes federal litigation of
claims after the termination of state agency proceedings, preclusion
is therefore inapplicable."
" Id. at 2172-73, 55 FEP Cases at 1507-08.
75 Id.
m Id. at 2172-73, 55 FEP Cases at 1508.
" Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
84 Id. at 2173, 55 FEP Cases at 1508.
m , Id. at 2169, 55 FEP Cases at 1505.
"2 Id. at 2170, 55 FEP Cases at 1506.
as Id. at 2171, 55 FEP Cases at 1506.
'' Id.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Astoria represents the Court's
view that Congress intended to treat the ADEA and title VII alike. 85
With so many similarities between the two statutes, it would be
inconsistent for courts to interpret them differently. 86 Both statutes
share the common goal of eliminating discrimination, and the leg-
islative history of section 14(b) of the ADEA shows its source was
section 706(c) of title VII. 87 As such, it is fair to conclude that
Congress intended them to have the same construction. 88
Furthermore, the deferral mechanisms give state administrative
agencies the opportunity to resolve these claims before the federal
system is implicated. 89 Because Congress provided for consideration
of ADEA claims in several forums, it is unreasonable to assume that
the resolution of a claim ends with the decision of a state agency.
The more plausible argument lies in the Astoria Court's conclusion
that Congress did not intend the ADEA to preclude federal judicial
action in situations where a state administrative agency has already
acted. 9° Moreover, as the Duggan court recognized, the state agency
and the EEOC are "informal agents of reconciliation," and it is
doubtful that Congress intended the process to stop with state agen-
cies without any court ever considering the claim. 91 Thus, allowing
claimants to file suit in federal court after state administrative pro-
ceedings have ended is consistent with both the language and the
legislative history of the ADEA.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that title VII indicates
congressional intent to allow federal courts to act as the ultimate
arbiters of title VII claims. 92 The Supreme Court followed this line
of reasoning in Astoria so as to provide the same protection for
ADEA claimants. 93 Thus, the Astoria Court reinforced the power of
the federal judiciary to determine discrimination cases.
After Astoria, plaintiffs may be inclined to file ADEA suits in
federal court instead of seeking state review of administrative de-
cisions. The Court allows this type of forum shopping because it
85 See id. at 2170-71, 55 FEP Cases at 1506.
9° See Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237, 240, 38 FE? Cases 1150,
1153 (4th Cir. 1985); Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d 657, 659, 16 FEP Cases 948, 949
(9th Cir. 1978).
87 See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756, 19 FEP Cases 1167, 1169 (1979).
88 See id.
89 See Duggan v, Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1295, 43 FEP Cases 1025, 1028 (7th
Cir. 1987).
9° See id.; Astoria, l I I S. Ct. at 2172, 55 FEP Cases at 1507.
91 See 818 F.2d at 1295, 43 FE? Cases at 1028.
99 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56, 7 FEP Cases 81, 84 (1974).
98 See 111 S. Ct. at 2171, 55 FEP Cases at 1506.07.
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reflects a congressional choice. Although the Supreme Court has
allowed preclusion when an administrative agency acts in a judicial
capacity and the•parties have had adequate opportunity to litigate,
administrative estoppel is inapplicable where the legislature shows
a preference for an independent evaluation of the issue. 94 Although
the Astoria Court gives ADEA claimants greater leniency, these
plaintiffs do not enter federal court with a clean slate. Defendants
have the opportunity to introduce the findings of the state admin-
istrative agency as evidence, 95 as well as to emphasize the factors
which that agency found particularly persuasive. Thus, the state
agency determination continues to carry some weight in the sub-
sequent federal proceeding.
In sum, the Supreme Court's ruling in Astoria that state admin-
istrative findings are not entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent
federal ADEA litigation has resolved the split among the circuits. 96
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has maintained consistency in
analyzing both the ADEA and title VII." The Astoria Court has
thus protected the rights of ADEA claimants to take their cases to
federal court.
C.* Concurrent State Court Jurisdiction in Title VII Claims: Yellow
Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly'
Under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("title VII") it
is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. 2 Title VII provides that fed-
" Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237, 240, 38 FEP Cases 1150, 1153
(4th Cir. 1985).
96 See Astoria, 1 11 S. Ct. at 2172-73, 55 FEP Cases at 1508.
96 See id. at 2172, 55 FEP Cases at 1507.
97 See id.
* By Elizabeth Moshang, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
110 S. Ct. 1566, 52 FEP Cases 875 (1990). 	 .
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . .
Id.
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eral courts have jurisdiction to hear title VII claims,' The text of
the statute is silent, however, regarding whether state courts can
hear title VII claims. 4 Concurrent state court jurisdiction over a
federal claim is presumed unless Congress affirmatively acts to re-
move state court jurisdiction. 5 In the 1981 case of Gulf Offshore Co.
v. Mobil Oil Corp., the United States Supreme Court stated that this
presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction may be rebutted
by "explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from
legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state court
jurisdiction and federal interests." 6
A conflict has existed between and among state courts and
federal district courts over the question of whether state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over title VII claims.' In the 1984 case of
Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over title VII claims!' The court determined that although the
statute did not expressly remove concurrent state court jurisdiction,
title VII contained an "unmistakable implication" of exclusive fed-
eral court jurisdiction. 9 The court noted that various sections of
title VII provided for the use of federal procedures, and that the
statute contemplated appeals to the United States courts of ap-
peals." Because it believed that Congress could not have intended
to mandate that state courts use federal rules of procedure or be
reviewed by federal circuit courts, the Valenzuela court found an
"unmistakable implication" that Congress intended exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction."
The Valenzuela court also determined that the legislative history
of title VII supported exclusive federal jurisdiction.' 2 The court
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982). The statute states that "relach United States district
court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter." Id.
Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 435, 35 FEP Cases 782, 782 (9th Cir. 1984) '
("The provision in 'Title VII which grants federal courts jurisdiction does not expressly state
that federal jurisdiction shall be exclusive.").
5 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876).
6 Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478. This analysis was mentioned by the Supreme Court as
early as 1876. Claflin, 93 U.S. at 138 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton)).
7 Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 435, 35 FEP Cases at 782.
" Id. at 436, 35 FEP Cases at 783.
9 Id, at 435, 35 FEP Cases at 783.
'° Id. at 435-36, 35 FEP Cases at 783.
" Id.
12 Id. at 436, 35 FEP Cases at 783.
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determined that the legislative history's affirmative references to
federal courts, as well as the lack of mention of state courts, implied
that Congress intended exclusive federal jurisdiction.' 3 Finally, the
court determined that Supreme Court precedent supported exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction." The court cited a Supreme Court decision
that did not mention state courts when listing the forums available
to victims of title VII violations.' 5 The court also cited a Supreme
Court decision where, in determining that there was exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
the Court likened jurisdictional references in title VII to those in
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 16 Thus, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that title VII actions must be brought exclusively in federal
courts.' 7
Although the Third, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits adopted the
Valenzuela position that title VII cases can only be heard in federal
courts, 18 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
in the 1989 case of Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., held that
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over title VII claims.' 9
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit was not persuaded by
the legislative history of title VII that Congress intended federal
jurisdiction over title VII claims to be exclusive. 20 Nor did the
Seventh Circuit find that a "disabling incompatibility" would arise
from state court jurisdiction of title VII claims, which would require
exclusive federal jurisdiction over title VII claims. 2 '
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court in
Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly resolved this conflict between
the circuit courts, 22 holding that state courts have concurrent juris-
15 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.. 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)).
16 Id. (citing Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 n.12 (1981)).
17 Id.
18
 Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d 1542, 1546, 42 FEP Cases 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding res judicata did not bar plaintiff's claim because plaintiff could not have brought
the title VII claim in state court); Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 110, 112, 45
FEP Cases 849, 850 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that title VII vests exclusive jurisdiction
in federal courts); Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 553, 41 FE? Cases
1, 5 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that title VII claims can only be filed in federal courts).
15 Donnelly v. Yellow Freight Sys., 874 F.2d 402, 410, 49 FEP Cases 1253, 1258 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that jurisdiction over title VII's vested in both state and federal courts),
aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 52 FEP Cases 875 (1990).
20 Id. at 406, 49 FEP Cases at 1255.
21 Id. at 407, 49 FEP Cases at 1256.
22
 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1568, 52 FEP Cases 875, 876 (1990). The Yellow Freight Court indicated
that it granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits. Id.
March 1992]
	
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 413
diction over title VII claims. 23 In Yellow Freight, Colleen Donnelly, a
qualified dock worker, applied for work at Yellow Freight System's
facility. 24 The company informed Donnelly that no positions existed,
but assured her that she would be the first person hired when a
position became available." For one and one-half years, Donnelly
continued to make inquiries about job openings with Yellow
Freight. 26 Even though the company was hiring men during that
period, it asserted that there were no positions available. 27 In 1984,
Donnelly filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"). 28 She was subsequently hired by the corn-
pany.29
In March of 1985, the EEOC issued Donnelly a right to sue
notice." The notice informed Donnelly that she must file a com-
plaint within ninety days or she would lose the right to sue. 3 ' The
notice, however, did not identify the forum in which she might
sue." Subsequently, Donnelly filed a timely complaint against Yel-
low Freight System in Illinois state court, alleging that the company's
actions constituted a violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act."
Yellow Freight System filed •a motion to dismiss, claiming that
Donnelly had not exhausted her state administrative remedies." In
response, Donnelly filed a motion to amend her complaint alleging
that Yellow Freight's actions also constituted a violation of title VII."
Yellow Freight removed the case to federal court and filed a motion
to dismiss the amended complaint because it had not been filed
within the ninety-day period." Yellow Freight argued that the filing
in state court could not toll the limitation period because title VII
jurisdiction was exclusively federal." The district court denied Yel-
" Id. at 1567, 52 FEP Cases at 875.
Id. at 1567, 52 FEP Cases at 87576.
" Id. at 1567, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
28 Id.
s7 Id.
28 Id. at 1567-68, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
29 Id. at 1567, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
31' Id. at 1568, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
si Id.
52 Id.
35 Id.
34 Id.
55 Id.
58 Id.
37 Donnelly v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 405, 49 FEP Cases 1253, 1254-
55 (7th Cir, 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 52 FEP Cases 875 (1990).
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low Freight's motion to dismiss." The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over title VII claims." On review, the
United States Supreme Court held that Congress did not divest
state courts of concurrent jurisdiction over title VII claims." The
Court emphasized that because states are presumptively competent
to adjudicate the laws of the United States, Congress must affir-
matively remove concurrent jurisdiction from state courts in order
to grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts. 4 '
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the lan-
guage of title VII.42 The Court stated that the text of title VII did
not grant exclusive federal court jurisdiction expressly or take away
state court jurisdiction." The Court observed that the language of
the statute merely stated that "[e]ach United States district court
and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under
this subchapter."44 Thus, the Court determined that the language
did not divest state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction."
Although title VII does not limit jurisdiction expressly, Yellow
Freight argued that federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction
over title VII cases because the legislative history shows that many
members of Congress expected title VII cases to be tried solely in
federal courts." Yellow Freight cited a Congressman's comment
that "raj substantial number of committee members . . . preferred
that the ultimate determination of discrimination rest with the Fed-
eral judiciary" as opposed to the EEOC. 47 Yellow Freight also cited
an EEOC Interpretive Memorandum which explained that "the
party allegedly discriminated against may, with the written permis-
sion of one member of the Commission, bring his own suit in
Federal court."'"
so Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1567, 52 FEP Cases 875, 875
(1990).
39
 Donnelly v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d at 404, 49 FEP Cases at 1253.
4° Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. at 1567, 52 FEP Cases at 875.
41 Id. at 1568, 52 FEP Cases at 876 (quoting Tallinn v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795 (1990)).
Id. at 1568, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
43 Id. at 1569, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
44 Id. at 1568, 52 FEP Cases at 876 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) ( 1982)).
45 Id. at 1569, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
4° Id. at 1569, 52 FEP Cases at 877.
47 Id. at 1569 n.4, 52 FEP Cases at 877 n.4.
49 Id.
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In response to Yellow Freight's argument, the Court acknowl-
edged that the cited references indicated that certain members of
Congress expected title VII claims to be adjudicated in federal
courts." The Court, however, indicated that concurrent state court
jurisdiction could not be ousted merely because the legislative his-
tory expressly described the federal court jurisdiction without men-
tioning state court jurisdiction." Moreover, the court stated that
even if the entire Congress had envisioned an exclusively federal
forum, such an expectation would not be sufficient to overcome the
presumption of concurrent state jurisdiction without an affirmative
legislative decision as to that effect."
Finally, the Court rejected Yellow Freight's argument that there
was a "clear incompatibility" between state court jurisdiction and
the procedures provided in title VII. 52 The Court agreed with Yel-
low Freight that section 706(c) of title VII required that state and
local agencies be allowed at least sixty days to remedy the alleged
discriminatory practices before the EEOC could commence any
federal action. 53 The Court disagreed, however, with Yellow
Freight's contention that to require state agency action, followed by
federal agency action, as a prerequisite to state litigation resulted
in an irregular procedure and, thus, that only a federal court should
have jurisdiction." The Court determined that the dual-agency
procedure was not irregular because it was created merely to allow
state administrative agencies an opportunity to employ state law. 55
The Court further explained that the EEOC's action was merely a
prerequisite to any litigation under title VII. 56 Thus, the Court
concluded that the fact that both state and federal agencies are
given the opportunity to resolve discrimination complaints before
litigation may occur under title VII does not have any affect on
where such litigation must occur. 57
The Court also stated that the title VII references to other
federal procedures did not preclude concurrent state court juris-
49 Id. at 1569, 52 FEP Cases at 877.
55 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
55 Id.
m Id.
55 Id.
55 Id. at 1569-70, 52 FEP Cases at 877.
57 Id. at 1570, 52 FEP Cases at 877.
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diction." The Court cited to earlier decisions where it found con-
current state jurisdiction over violations of the Labor Management
Relations Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zation Act, even though those Acts referred to certain rules of
federal procedure." Finally, the Court stated that although federal
judges may have more experience with title VII claims, there is a
presumption that state court judges are sufficiently capable of ad-
judicating title VII claims."
In conclusion, the Supreme Court emphasized that Congress,
using its powers under the Supremacy Clause, must affirmatively
act to remove state court jurisdiction in order to overcome the
strong presumption of concurrent state jurisdiction. 61 The Court
determined that the language of title VII did not expressly divest
the state courts of jurisdiction. 62
 The Court further held that leg-
islative history suggesting that certain legislators expected that title
VII claims would be resolved by federal courts was not enough to
divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction. 63 Finally, the Court
asserted that none of the procedures provided in title VII were
"clearly incompatible" with concurrent state court jurisdiction over
title VII claims.64 Thus, the Court concluded that even if there were
a universal expectation among the legislators, judges and adminis-
trators that title VII claims would be litigated exclusively in federal
courts, this expectation was not enough to overcome the strong
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. 65
The Court's decision in Yellow Freight that federal courts do not
have exclusive jurisdiction over title VII claims significantly narrows
the test stated in Gulf Offshore. In Gulf Offshore, the Supreme Court
stated that "the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be re-
butted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication
from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-
court jurisdiction and federal interests."66 Subsequent courts such
50 Id. Moreover, the Court stated "[neither] does the Act's provision for appeals pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1982 ed.) and references to injunctive relief and appointment
of masters pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65 and 53, preclude concurrent
state court jurisdiction." Id,
59 Id. at 1570, 52 FEP Cases at 877 (citing Tafilin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990); Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962)).
6° Id. at 1570, 52 FEP Cases at 877.
61 Id. at 1568, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
62 Id. at 1568-69, 52 FEP Cases at 876.
63 Id. at 1569, 52 FEP Cases at 877.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1570, 52 FEP Cases at 877-78.
66 Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 973, 478 (1981).
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as Valenzuela found an "unmistakable implication" in legislative his-
tory and the procedures of title VII that Congress intended federal
courts to have exclusive jurisdiction.67 The Supreme Court in Yellow
Freight also purported to use the Gulf Offshore analysis; in actuality,
however, it severely limited it. In Yellow Freight, the Court deter-
mined that even a "universally" shared expectation by legislators,
judges and administrators who were involved with the "enactment,
amendment, enforcement, and interpretation of title VII" would
not be enough to overcome the strong presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction.6° Thus, it is unlikely that the Court will ever exclude
state court jurisdiction using only the second prong of the Gulf
Offshore test, because it seems that exclusion by implication cannot
be achieved even by universal intent.
Yellow Freight properly narrows the Gulf Offshore standard be-
cause a strong presumption of concurrent jurisdiction "lies at the
core of our federal system." 69 This strong presumption of concur-
rent jurisdiction has existed since Alexander Hamilton's time, and
the Court expressly reiterated its importance under law in 1876. 7°
Congress knew of this presumption" and merely had to state in the
text of the statute that there was exclusive federal jurisdiction if
that was its intent. Thus, if Congress really intended to exclude
state court jurisdiction, it is fair for the Court to presume that
Congress would have done so expressly, especially given the impor-
tance of the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. Moreover, the
Court was equitable in holding that title VII permits concurrent
jurisdiction, because to rule otherwise would allow some title VII
6' Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 435-36, 35 FEP Cases 782, 783 (9th Cir.
1984).
'4 I 10 S. Ct. at 1569, 1570, 52 FEP Cases at 877, 878. Moreover, in the 1990 case of
Tafilin v. Levitt, Justices Scalia and Kennedy stated in a concurring opinion that if exclusion
by implication were to be allowed, it should be by implication in the text of the statute, not
through "unmistakable implication from legislative history." 110 S. Ct. 792, 802 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring). The justices also pointed out that, realistically, such an implication could not
be "unmistakable" because legislative history merely shows congressional debate and discus-
sion, unlike the legislative action that shows the final congressional agreement. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
69 See Yellow Freight, 110 S. Ct. at 1570, 52 FEP Cases at 878.
" Mifflin, 110 S. Ct. at 801 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 132 (Alexander Hamilton)
(E. Bourne ed., 1947)); see also Clain v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 138 (1876) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton)).
7L See Yellow Freight, 110 S. Ct. at 1568-69, 1569 n.3, 52 FEP Cases at 876, 876 n.3. The
Court cited the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, where Congress
expressly mandated exclusive federal jurisdiction, to indicate Congress's awareness of the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. Id.
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violators to escape liability on a mere technicality. Thus, it was
reasonable for the Supreme Court to conclude that requiring con-
current jurisdiction, where it had not been expressly prohibited,
best furthered the intent of title VII.
Given the Supreme Court's holding in Yellow Freight, state
courts will have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over title
VII claims unless Congress amends title VII. Thus, title VII cases
can now be heard when filed in state courts, in federal courts or
when removed from state court to federal court. Given the well-
deserved importance of a strong presumption of concurrent juris-
diction, and given that concurrent jurisdiction furthers the purpose
of title VII, the Supreme Court's decision was sound.
D.* Collateral Estoppel and the Right to Jury Trial for Civil Rights
Claims: Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("title VII") makes it
unlawful to discriminate in employment on the basis of race. 2 Sim-
ilarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("section 1981") makes it unlawful to dis-
criminate on the basis of race in the making and enforcement of
contracts, 3 including contracts in private employment settings. 4 In
* By Patricia A. Albright, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I 110 S. Ct. 1331, 52 FEP Cases 423 (1990).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
5 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1988). Section 1981 provides in pertinent part that, "[all! persons
. . . shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ...
as is enjoyed by white citizens." Id.
4 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 10 FEP Cases
817, 819 (1975). The Court recently restricted the scope of section 1981, however, holding
that section 1981 only prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts and
does not extend to conduct of an employer after the contract relationship has been estab-
lished. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179-80, 49 FEP Cases 1814,
1820-21 (1989). Since this decision, a number of federal circuit courts have held that section
1981 no longer provides remedies for discriminatory and retaliatory discharges. See Trujillo
v. Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973, 975, 55 FEP Cases 780, 781-82 (10th Cir.
1991); Carter v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 839, 54 FEP Cases 1110, 1114-15 (5th Cir.
1990), cm. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2916, 56 FEP Cases 576 (1991); Prather v. Dayton Power &
Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1256-58, 54 FEP Cases 644, 645-46 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S..Ct. 2889, 56 FEP Cases 576 (1991); Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716, 722,
53 FEP Cases 862, 867 (2d Cir. 1990); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104,
108-12, 53 FEP Cases 505, 507-11 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111  S. Ct. 1306, 55 FE? Cases
352 (1991); Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849, 52
FEP Cases 779, 781-82 (9th Cir. 1990). But see Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630,
656, 52 FEP Cases 1027, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that discriminatory and retaliatory
discharges continue to be actionable under section 1981), vacated, 111  S. Ct. 1299, 55 FEP
Cases 352 (1991).
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1974, the United States Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc. that a plaintiff alleging employment discrimi-
nation can pursue title VII and section 1981 claims concurrently. 5
The Court stated that, although the two claims are similar, the
remedies are "separate, distinct and independent" and, therefore,
both claims are permissible.° The elements of the title VII and
section 1981 claims, however, are identical and thereby may lead to
a problem of collateral estoppe1. 7 For example, the determination
of the issues of the title VII claim may collaterally estop a subsequent
determination of the identical issues under a section 1981 claim. 8
Although section 1981 and title VII claims may involve identical
elements, there is an important distinction between the nature of
the two claims. Section 1981 claims are legal claims and therefore
entitle a litigant to a jury trial. 9 Conversely, title VII claims are
generally considered equitable claims and thus do not entitle a
litigant to a jury trial.'° In 1959, in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
the Supreme Court established that when both legal and equitable
claims are joined in one action, the trial court has the responsibility
to protect the plaintiff's right to a jury trial on the legal claims
against the court's prior determination of the equitable issues." In
furtherance of this doctrine, the Court ruled in the 1962 case of
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood that where joint legal and equitable claims
involve common issues, the resolution of the legal claims, including
all common issues, is required prior to any court determination of
the equitable claims.' 2 The order of determination of claims is im-
portant because under the Court's ruling in the 1979 case of Park-
5 See 421 U.S. at 461, 10 FEP Cases at 820.
Id.
7 Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d 348, 353, 43 FEP Cases 857, 860 (7th
Cir. 1987).
8 See id. at 353, 43 FEP Cases at 860-61.
9 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 211, 49 FEP Cases at 1834 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan noted that one of the differences between the two statutes was "the right to a jury
trial under § 1981, but not title VIE . ." Id. Section 1981 provides both equitable and legal
relief, Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460, 10 FEP Cases at 819, and the Court has expanded the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial to include statutory causes of action providing legal remedies.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974).
1 ° See Great American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366. 375 (1979)
(noting that courts have consistently denied jury trials to title VII parties because title VII
expressly authorizes only equitable remedies). Recently, however, the Court has stated that
it has yet to decide whether a title VII plaintiff has a right to a trial by jury. See Chauffeurs,
Local 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1348, 133 L.R.R.M. 2793, 2798 (1990). For further
discussion of this issue see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
11 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
12 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962).
420	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:305
lane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, an equitable determination may col-
laterally estop subsequent legal determinations without violating the
litigant's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial's
Following Parklane Hosiery, a split developed among the federal
courts of appeals regarding whether a court's resolution of equitable
claims in an employment discrimination case collaterally estops re-
litigation of the litigant's identical legal claims. This issue has arisen
in cases where a trial court has improperly dismissed a plaintiff's
legal claims and has proceeded to resolve the plaintiff's equitable
issues entirely by bench trial." Specifically, once the trial court's
dismissal of the legal claims is determined on appeal to be erro-
neous, the question arises whether the trial court's resolution of the
equitable claims collaterally estops litigation of the legal claims on
remand.' 5 If the appellate court finds collateral estoppel applicable,
the plaintiff will not receive a jury trial on the legal issues, thus
possibly violating the plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right. 16
One view, adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in the 1987 case of Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's
College, holds that, notwithstanding the error in dismissing the legal
claim, equitable determinations by the court collaterally estop reli-
tigation of the legal claims before a jury.° In support of this view,
the Ritter court cited Parklane Hosiery for the proposition that the
application of collateral estoppel does not violate a plaintiff's Sev-
enth Amendment right to a jury trial."' The Fourth Circuit, in
interpreting Parklane Hosiery, reasoned that interests in judicial
economy overrode the litigant's right to a jury trial.' 9 Furthermore,
the court noted that the plaintiff was given a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the case at the bench trial on all of the issues which
would be relitigated at the jury tria1. 2° Hence, the court stated, the
trial court's findings would collaterally estop relitigation of the same
' 5
 439 U.S. 322, 335 (1979).
" See Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 988, 43 FEP Cases 654, 654-55
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987); Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F.2d
348, 353, 43 FEP Cases 857, 860 (7th Cir. 1987).
15 See, e.g., Ritter, 814 F.2d at 988, 43 FEP Cases at 654-55; Hussein, 816 F.2d at 353,
43 FEP Cases at 860-61.
16 See Ritter, 814 F.2d at 988, 43 FEP Cases at 655; Hussein, 816 F.2d at 350, 353, 43
FEP Cases at 858, 861.
17 814 F.2d at 988, 43 FEP Cases at 655.
" Id. at 990-91, 43 FEP Cases at 657.
' 9 Id. at 991, 43 FEP Cases at 657.
40 Id. at 994, 43 FEP Cases at 659-60.
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issues unless the trial court's findings were found clearly erro-
neous.2 '
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in the 1987 case of Hussein v.
Oshkosh Motor Truck Co. that where a section 1981 legal claim is
erroneously dismissed, collateral estoppel does not prevent reliti-
gation of the legal claims even if the trial court has ruled against
the plaintiff on identical title VII equitable claims. 22 The Seventh
Circuit noted that, had the district court in Hussein not erroneously
dismissed the plaintiff's legal claims, the plaintiff would have re-
ceived a jury trial on all issues common to both the legal and
equitable claims." The court distinguished Parklane Hosiery on the
basis that Hussein involved a single action in which the plaintiff was
required to join the equitable and legal claims whereas Parklane
Hosiery involved two separate lawsuits. 24 Furthermore, the court
stated that simple judicial error should not deprive a litigant of his
or her right to have facts determined by a jury and not a judge. 25
Also, the court reasoned that the theory underlying collateral es-
toppel, to prevent "needless litigation," was inapplicable in Hussein
because correction of judicial error through retrial was "hardly
'needless litigation.'" 26 The court therefore remanded the section
1981 legal claim for a full jury trial, despite upholding the trial
court's ruling on the title VII claim. 27
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the collateral estoppel issue in Lytle v. Household Manufac-
turing, Inc., which involved a claim for discriminatory discharge and
retaliation. 28 The Court in Lytle unanimously held that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel cannot be invoked to deny a plaintiff the right
to a jury trial where a district court erroneously dismisses a plain-
tiff's section 1981 legal claim and, at a bench trial on the title VII
claim, resolves issues common to both claims.29
In Lytle, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and
held that a plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to jury trial on
21 See id. at 992-93, 43 FE? Cases at 658-59.
n 816 F.2d 348, 349-50, 43 FEP Cases 857, 858 (7th Cir. 1987).
25 Hussein, 816 F.2d at 354-55, 43 FEP Cases at 861-62.
24 See id. at 356, 43 FEP Cases at 862-63.
25 Id. at 356-57, 43 FE? Cases at 863.
26 Id. at 356, 43 FEP Cases at 863.
27 See id. at 357, 43 FE? Cases at 863.
28 Ito S. Ct. 1331, 1334-35, 52 FEP Cases 423, 427 (1990).
29 Id. at 1338, 52 HP Cases at 427.
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section 1981 claims outweighs the interests in judicial economy
promoted by the collateral estoppel doctrine. 30 The Court vacated
the district court's title VII decision, reasoning that jury findings
would have bound the district court if the jury trial had been
properly held in the first place and that the vacate order would
avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions. 3 ' The Court in Lytle,
therefore, rejected the Fourth Circuit's application of collateral es-
toppel and adopted instead an approach similar to that of the
Seventh Circuit. The Court, however, even went further than the
Seventh Circuit, vacating the title VII decision.
In Lytle, an African-American employee sought monetary and
injunctive relief under title VII and section 1981 against his former
employer for discriminatory discharge and retaliation. 32 During his
employment with a subsidiary of the defendant, Schwitzer Turbo-
chargers ("Schwitzer"), Lytle requested a vacation day to see a doc-
tor on a particular Friday.33 The supervisor approved Lytle's request
but told Lytle that he would have to work on the Saturday after his
vacation day instead." Lytle objected to working on Saturday, claim-
ing he would be too ill, and in fact did not report to work on either
day." Schwitzer classified Lytle's absences as unexcused and fired
him under a company discharge policy that stated that eight hours
of unexcused absences within a twelve-month period was grounds
for discharge. 36 Lytle filed a charge of racial discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and began
seeking new employment. 37 Lytle also asserted that he was unable
to find a new job because Schwitzer would not provide references
to prospective employers but would provide only Lytle's dates of
employment and job title." Upon receiving a right to sue notice
from the EEOC, Lytle brought concurrent title VII and section
1981 actions against Schwitzer. 39 Both Lytle's title VII and section
1981 actions alleged discriminatory discharge on the basis of his
race and retaliation for his filing charges with the EEOC. 4°
5° See id. at 1337, 52 FEP Cases at 426.
s' Id. at 1338 & n.4, 52 FEP Cases at 427 & n.4.
52 Id. at 1334-35, 52 FEP Cases at 424.
55 Id. at 1334, 52 FEP Cases at 424.
34 Id.
35 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
56 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1334-35, 52 FEP Cases at 424.
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The district court dismissed Lytle's section 1981 claims on the
grounds that title VII was Lytle's exclusive remedy. 4 ' Because only
Lytle's title VII claims remained, the court denied Lytle's request
for a jury trial and proceeded to hold a bench trial. 42 At the close
of Lytle's case-in-chief, the district court dismissed Lytle's discrimi-
natory discharge claim and, after both parties presented all their
evidence, it ruled in favor of Schwitzer on the retaliation claim."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's rulings on Lytle's title VII claims." The Fourth Circuit de-
termined, however, that the district court had erred in dismissing
the section 1981 action because the title VII remedy is not the
exclusive remedy for employment discrimination cases. 45 Rather,
the court noted, title VII and section 1981 provide separate and
independent remedies.45 Nevertheless, the court declined to re-
mand the section 1981 claims for a jury trial. 47 The court stated
that because the elements of the section 1981 action were identical
to the elements involved in the title VII action, the district court's
title VII findings collaterally estopped the relitigation of the section
1981 action." The court reasoned that the purpose of collateral
estoppel, preserving judicial resources, overrode Lytle's Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. 49
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's
decision, vacated the district court's title VII decision and remanded
Lytle's case in its entirety. 5° The Court held that the judicial deter-
mination of the equitable issues—the result of judicial error—could
not abrogate Lytle's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on
the legal issues." In its analysis, the Court noted that Lytle would
have been entitled to a jury trial on the section 1981 claims had the
district court not erroneously dismissed those claims. 52 The Court
41 Id. at 1335, 52 FEP Cases at 424. The dismissal was erroneous because the remedies
under title VII and section 1981 are independent of each other. Id.
42 Id.
45 Id.
44 Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 51 PEP Cases 277, 279 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 110 S.
Ct. 1331, 52 FE? Cases 423 (1990).
45 Lytle, 51 FE? Cases at 278 n.2.
46 Id.
" See id. at 278-79.
45 Id. at 279.
41' Id. at 278.
55 Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc.
" Id. at 1335-37, 52 PEP Cases
52 Id. at 1335, 52 FEP Cases at
that Lytle had no right to a jury trial
, 110 S. Ct. 1331, 1338, 52 FE? Cases 423, 427 (1990).
at 425-26.
425. The Court assumed for the purposes of the case
on his title VII claim because Lytle failed to argue that
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further noted that under Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen the jury
would have determined the section 1981 claims, including those
issues common to both claims, before the district court could have
considered the title VII claims. 53 The order of the claims was critical,
the Court stated, because under the principles of collateral estoppel
set forth in Parklane Hosiery, prior judicial determinations of equi-
table claims may foreclose relitigation of identical legal claims before
a jury without violating the Seventh Amendment. 54
The Court rejected Schwitzer's argument that Parklane Hosiery
controlled in this case. 55 The Court held that Parklane Hosiery was
not applicable because in Parklane Hosiery the legal actions were
brought subsequent to and separate from the prior equitable de-
termination that collaterally estopped them. 56 In contrast, the Court
noted, Lytle brought the legal and equitable actions in one suit. 57
The Court declined to view the relitigation of Lytle's section 1981
legal claims as a separate action because Lytle had properly joined
his legal and equitable claims in a single action and would have
received a jury trial but for the district court's erroneous dismissa1. 58
The Court further noted that it would be "anomalous" to permit a
district court to foreclose the litigant's right to a jury trial simply by
erroneously dismissing the litigant's legal claims. 59 The Court noted
that such a result would be extremely unfair to Lytle because, in
order to avoid the bar of res judicata, he had to join all possible
legal and equitable claims arising out of the same incident. 6°
The Lytle Court further stated that its refusal to invoke collat-
eral estoppel was consistent with the Court's prior rulings in similar
cases." For example, the Court noted that when a trial court
wrongly denies a litigant's request for a jury trial on legal issues,
the trial court's factual determinations do not collaterally estop full
relitigation of the legal issues before a jury. 62 In addition, the Court
determined that the purposes underlying collateral estoppel—to
he had such a right. Id. at 1335 n.l, 52 FEP Cases at 424 n.l. The Court, however; noted
that it had yet to rule whether title VII relief warranted a jury trial. Id.
55 Id. at 1335, 52 FEP Cases at 425.
m Id. at 1335-36, 52 FEP Cases at 425.
55 Id. at 1336, 52 FEP Cases at 425.
56 See id.
57 Id.
55 Id. at 1336-37, 52 FEP Cases at 425-26.
59 Id. at 1336-37, 52 FEP Cases at 426.
69 Id. at 1337, 52 FEP Cases at 426.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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avoid multiple lawsuits and inconsistent decisions while conserving
judicial resources—were inapplicable."' The Court stated that Lytle
involved a single suit and, therefore, avoidance of multiple lawsuits
was not at issue." Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the reliti-
gation was not a needless waste of judicial resources because it was
the "only mechanism" available to correct the district court's error
and vindicate Lytle's Seventh Amendment rights." 5
Finally, the Court rejected Schwitzer's argument that relitiga-
tion of section 1981 was unnecessary notwithstanding collateral es-
toppel."6 Schwitzer had argued that, had the district court not dis-
missed the section 1981 claims, the district court would have
directed a verdict in Schwitzer's favor on the section 1981 claims
anyway.67 Schwitzer asserted that because the issues involved in the
section 1981 action were identical to those in the title VII action
and because the district court had ruled in favor of Schwitzer on
the title VII claims, the district court would have ruled in favor of
Schwitzer on the section 1981 claims.°
The Supreme Court found these arguments to be incorrect.°
For example, with regard to the district court's dismissal of the
discriminatory discharge claim under title VII, the Court stated that
the procedural standards for ordering a dismissal were different
from those governing a directed verdict." Hence, the Court noted,
the district court would not necessarily have granted a directed
verdict on Lytle's section 1981 claims because it might have believed
that the jury could have reasonably found for Lytle. 7 ' Also, the
63 Id.
" Id.
63 Id. The Court emphasized that 'judicial economy . . . remains an insufficient basis
for departing from our longstanding commitment to preserving a litigant's right to a jury
trial." Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
66 Id, at 1337-38, 52 FEP Cases at 426.
al, Id .
76 Id. at 1338, 52 FEP Cases at 426-27. The Court stated that,
Rule 41(b) allows the court ''as trier of the facts" to determine the facts and the
law "and render judgment against the plaintiff or . . . decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence." In contrast, in considering a motion
for a directed verdict, the court does not, weigh the evidence, but draws all
factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party ... .
Id.
71 Id. at 1338, 52 FEN Cases at 427. The Court explained that "although a court might,
after reviewing the evidence, decide in favor of the party moving for a dismissal under Rule
41(b), that court might not take the same case away from the jury because it might believe
that the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party." Id.
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Court noted that merely because the district court had decided in
favor of Schwitzer on the retaliation claim did not mean that a jury
could not reasonably have found otherwise. 72 The Court therefore
rejected Schwitzer's argument that the Fourth Circuit's judgment
should be affirmed notwithstanding the applicability of collateral
estoppe1. 73
In addition to granting Lytle a jury trial on his section 1981
claim, the Court also vacated the district court's decision on the title
VII claim to "afford Lytle complete and consistent relief." 74 The
Court explained that absent the erroneous dismissal, the jury's de-
termination of the same issues under the section 1981 claim would
have governed the district court's determination of the title VII
claim. 75 The Court also stated that it was necessary to vacate the
trial court's decision to avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions
between the judge and jury. 76
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Scalia, observed that the Court, quite properly, had not ruled on
whether Lytle stated a valid cause of action under section 1981. 77
Schwitzer had argued that even though the trial court's reason for
dismissal was erroneous, Lytle's section 1981 claim would be dis-
missed under the Court's recent ruling in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, which held that section 1981 relates only to the formation
or enforcement of contracts and not to post-formation conduct. 78
The Lytle Court had declined to consider this argument because the
issue was not raised below nor was it included in the question on
which certiorari was granted. 79 Justice O'Connor noted that the
issue was not raised previously because Patterson was not decided
until after the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Lytle. 8° According to Justice
O'Connor, however, Schwitzer could properly raise this issue on
remand.81
72 Id. The Court stated, "we have long recognized [that' a jury and a judge can draw
different conclusions from the same evidence." Id.
73 Id. at 1337-38, 52 FEP Cases at 426-27.
74 Id. at 1338 n.4, 52 FEP Cases at 427 n.4.
73 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1338-39, 52 FEP Cases at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78 See id. at 1336 n.3, 52 FEP Cases at 425 n.3 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 49 FEP Cases 1814 (1989)).
79 Id.
Bo Id. at 1339, 52 FEP Cases at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1,1 Id. at 1338, 52 FEP Cases at 427-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The Court's decision in Lytle effectively resolved the split be-
tween the Fourth and Seventh Circuits over the application of col-
lateral estoppel. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's expansion
of Parklane Hosiery in favor of protecting the litigant's Seventh
Amendment rights.82 By granting a jury trial, for Lytle's section
1981 action, that is unencumbered by the prior equitable determi-
nation, the Court correctly reaffirmed the policy underlying Beacon
Theatres and Dairy Queen that the right to jury trial should not be
forfeited when a plaintiff joins equitable and legal claims in one
suit." This outcome is particularly compelling because Lytle had
taken all of the appropriate steps to secure a jury trial and yet was
foiled by judicial error. 84 Furthermore, to permit the interest in
judicial economy to preclude the correction of judicial error would
only compound the injustice." Lytle promotes the Court's "long-
standing commitment to preserving a litigant's right to a jury trial." 86
Although the primary import of the Lytle decision stems from
the Court's collateral estoppel ruling, the Court also briefly ad-
dressed an area of law of particular importance to employment
discrimination practitioners: the availability of jury trials to title VII
plaintiffs. 87 The Court assumed for the sake of argument that Lytle
had• no right to a jury trial on his title VII claims. 88 The Court,
however, emphasized in a footnote that it had not ruled on whether
all title VII plaintiffs were foreclosed from jury trials. 89 This foot-
note is significant because earlier Supreme Court opinions have
implied that there is no right to a jury trial' in title VII actions. 9°
62 See id. at 1338, 52 FEP Cases at 427.
8' See id. at 1336-37, 52 FEP Cases at 425-26.
" See id.
65 See id. at 1337, 52 FEP Cases at 426.
" See id. The Court's decision, however, arguably may not be that helpful to Lytle and
other similarly situated plaintiffs claiming discriminatory discharge and retaliation under
both section 1981 and title VII. As Justice O'Connor emphasized in her concurring opinion,
the district court on remand will most likely address the effect of Patterson's restrictive
interpretation of section 1981 on Lytle's section 1981 claims. If the district court finds that
the discriminatory discharge and retaliation claims involve post-contract-formation events,
now interpreted as being beyond the scope of section 1981 under Patterson, Lytle's section
1981 claims will once again be dismissed along with his right to a jury trial.
" See id. at 1335 n.1, 52 FEP Cases at 424 n.l.
88 Id.
89 Id.
" See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 211, 49 FEP Cases 1814,
1834 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that section 1981 grants a jury trial but that
title VII does not); Great American Fed. Saw. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375
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Thus, Lytle may be signaling the Court's openness to a challenge of
the general presumption that title VII claimants are not entitled to
jury trials. 9 ' Perhaps the Court is calling attention to the possibility
of jury trials for title VII actions because these plaintiffs will most
likely lose their right to jury trial under the restrictive interpretation
of section 1981 set forth in Patterson.92
At a minimum, Lytle stands for the proposition that in a case
involving both legal and equitable civil rights claims, judicial error
and collateral estoppel may not combine to abrogate a litigant's right
to a jury trial. The Court thereby continues its longstanding practice
of preserving the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. Lytle,
however, also suggests the possibility that the Court may be willing
to extend the right to jury trials to title VII actions.
II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
A. * Section 1981 and Termination of Contracts Due to Racial
Discrimination: Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n.'
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 guarantees certain enumerated
rights to all people within the jurisdiction of the United States. 2
First among these is "the same right . . . to make and enforce
contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 3 Thus, this provision,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibits discriminatory conduct in
contract affairs between private parties, an area that enjoys no direct
protection under the Constitution. 4
(1979) (noting that courts have consistently denied jury trials to title Vii plaintiffs because
title VII expressly authorizes only equitable remedies).
91 For a compelling article arguing for the rights of title VII claimants to jury trials, see
Matthew F. Davis, Beyond the Dicta: The Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by Jury Under Title
VII, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1003 (1990).
" See infra note 86 for a discussion of the effects of the Court's restrictive interpretation
of title VII in Patterson.
* By Michael J. Gayer, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I 931 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
2
 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to . the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and properly as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
3 Id.
4 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 188, 49 FEP Cases 1814, 1825
(1989).
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In the 1989 case Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the United
States Supreme Court held that section 1981 prohibits discrimina-
tory practices in private conduct." The Court limited such protec-
tion, however, to those rights specifically enumerated in section
1981." With respect to racial harassment in employment contracts,
the Court noted that the language of section 1981 restricted the
scope of the statute to the making and enforcement of such con-
tracts. 7
According to the Patterson Court, the first of these rights, the
right to make contracts, applies solely to conduct that relates to the
contract formation process." Thus, section 1981 does not address
any discriminatory practices that occur during employment. 9 The
second right enumerated in section 1981 is the right to enforce
contracts.'" This right prohibits employer conduct that might impair
the employee's use of the legal process to enforce legitimate contract
rights."
The Patterson Court held that racial harassment breaching the
employment contract is clearly postformation conduct and there-
fore not protected under the making contracts clause of section
1981.' 2 Similarly, the Court determined that racial harassment that
rises to the extreme of an obvious breach of contract does not impair
the legal process of contract enforcement.'" The Court concluded
that such harassment does not infringe upon the rights protected
by section 1981.' 4 Furthermore, the majority in Patterson noted its
refusal to use section 1981 to federalize the traditional state com-
mon law claim for breach of contract even when the claim alleges
discrimination.'" Therefore, an employee may only bring a claim
Id. at 172, 49 FEP Cases at 1818. In Patterson, the petitioner, Brenda Patterson, a black
woman, was employed by the respondent, McLean Credit Union, as a teller and file coor-
dinator. Id. at 169, 49 FEP Cases at 1817. She claimed that the respondent had "harassed
her, failed to promote her ... and then discharged her, alt because of her race" in violation
of section 1981. Id.
6 Id. at 175-76, 49 FEP Cases at 1820.
7 Id. at 176, 49 FEP Cases at 1820.
8 Id.
9 Id.
1" Id. at 177, 49 FEP Cases at 1820.
" Id. at 177-78, 49 FEP Cases at 1821.
38 Id. at 179, 49 FEP Cases at 1821.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 179-80, 49 FEP Cases at 1821.
16 Id, at 183, 49 FEP Cases at 1823.
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for harassment to the federal courts under a title VII employment
discrimination action.' 6
During the Survey year, in Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the
issue of whether section 1981 prohibits discriminatory termination
of a contract outside the scope of employment." The Gersman court
held that Patterson applies to all private contractual relationships
including those outside the confines of the employment context."'
Furthermore, the Gersman court determined that contract termi-
nation due to racial discrimination is postformation conduct that in
no way impairs a person's right to make contracts or enforce legit-
imate contract rights.' 9 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that section 1981 does not protect persons from contract
termination due to racial discrimination.2° After Gersman, plaintiffs
may only bring their contract claims in state court in order to seek
remedies for such conduct. 2 '
In 1983, Gersman, President of Computer Security Interna-
tional ("CSI"), entered into a contract to provide software services
to Group Health Association, Inc. ("GHA"), a health maintenance
organization, for a one year period. 22 Due to an automatic renewal
provision within the contract, the original terms governed the con-
tractual relationship for the four years during which the contract
was in force. 23 The contractual relationship appeared healthy to
Gersman for over three of those years. 24 In late 1986, however,
Mohammed Ghafori, the new manager for GHA's Management
Information System, had an assistant ask Gersman whether or not
he was Jewish." Upon learning that Gersman was indeed Jewish,
16 Id. at 180, 49 FEP Cases at 1821.
' 7 931 F.2d 1565, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
In Id.
1 1 Id.
'' Id.
21 See id.
22 Id. at 1567. The original contract terms provided :
The initial term of this agreement shall be for 1 year. After expiration of the
initial term, this agreement shall automatically renew for successive one month
periods until terminated by either party upon receipt of written notice thirty
days before the end of any of these successive periods. For renewal terms, notice
of adjustment in the fixed charges shall be supplied in writing not less than
forty-five (45) days prior to the renewal date at which the changes will take
effect.
Id.
23 Id,
24 Id.
25 Id.
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Ghafori allegedly sought to end the contractual relationship on the
basis of Gersman's race."
After hearing rumors that GHA was dissatisfied with CSI, Gers-
man approached GHA management with his concerns about Gha-
fori's possible racial motivation. 27 GHA's management, while ac-
knowledging awareness of Ghafori's racial inquiry, denied that race
had anything to do with GHA's dissatisfaction with CSI's work."
Attempting to save the contractual relationship, Gersman proposed
a change in contract terms more favorable to GHA. 29 Despite these
efforts, GHA terminated the contractual relationship with CSI, pur-
suant to the contract terms, in October 1987. 30
Gersman and CSI brought suit against GHA in the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia, under both section 1981
and section 1-2511 of the D.C. Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"),
alleging that racial discrimination motivated the contract termina-
tion. 3 ' On GHA's motion, the district court dismissed the claims on
two grounds." First, the court found that neither Gersman nor CSI
had standing to bring such an action. 33 In addition, the court de-
termined that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted." Gersman and CSI subsequently appealed the
dismissal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals."
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that while Gersman
had no standing in district court, CSI, as the contracting party and
the party allegedly harmed by racial discrimination, had standing
to bring suit under either of the two statutes." The court also held,
however, that section 1-2511 of the DCHRA protects only those
°° Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
33 Id.
3° Id.
Id. Section 1-2511 of the DCHRA provides:
Every individual shall have an equal opportunity to participate fully in the
economic, cultural and intellectual life of the District and to have an equal
opportunity to participate in all aspects of life, including, but not limited to, in
employment, in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, in ed-
ucational institutions, in public service, and in housing and commercial space
accommodations.
D.C. CODE ANN. 1-251 1 (1981).
22 931 F.2d at 1567.
35 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
56 Id. The court found no need to determine whether a corporation must have a "racial
identity" in order to have standing but only that discrimination due to race harmed the
corporate entity in some way. Id. at 1569.
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rights enumerated in the statute." Because contract terminations
are not specifically mentioned in the DCHRA, the court of appeals
dismissed the section 1-2511 claim for failing to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted."
With respect to the contract claim under section 1981, the
Gersman court recognized that Patterson was controlling law. 59 The
appeals court noted that the plain language and meaning of both
section 1981 and the Patterson decision demonstrated that each
controlled outside the employment context.° The Gersman court
observed that under Patterson, section 1981 applied not only to
employment contracts, but to any contract formed by private par-
ties.'" Thus, section 1981 prohibits racially motivated contract ter-
mination only if that termination infringed upon the rights of one
party in making or enforcing its contract with another. 42
In Gersman, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that racially
motivated contract terminations do not infringe upon the rights of
a party to make and enforce contracts, which section 1981 protects. 43
The majority reasoned that because termination is postformation
conduct, much like the breach in Patterson, it is not making or
enforcing contracts under Patterson." The court therefore con-
cluded that racially motivated termination is left unprotected by
section 1981. 45
Having held that racially motivated contract terminations are
not protected under section 1981, the Gersman court next consid-
ered whether GHA's actions did indeed terminate the contract.46
CSI contended that, because the contract renewed monthly, the
parties created a new contract each month, and that GHA's failure
37 Id. at 1574. See supra note 31 for the text of section 1-2511 of the DCHRA.
3" 931 F.2d at 1574.
3" Id. at 1570.
▪ Id. at 1570-7L
• Id. at 1571.
42 491 U.S. at 171, 49 FEP Cases at 1818.
43 Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1571.
94 Id,
45 Id. The court termed Gersman a case of first impression for the D.C. Circuit and
determined that holding racially motivated contract terminations unprotected by section 1981
was consistent with the holdings of a majority of other circuits. Id. (citing Williams v. First
Union Nat'l Bank, 920 F.2d 232, 234, 55 FEP Cases 799, 801 (4th Cir. 1990); Prather v.
Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1258, 54 FEP Cases 639, 646 (6th Cir. 1990);
Gonzales v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716, 722, 53 FEP Cases 862, 867 (2d Cir. 1990);
McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 108-09, 53 FEP Cases 505, 508 (7th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1306 (1991); Walker v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d
275, 276-77, 53 FEP Cases 433, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1990); Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884
F.2d 470, 473, 50 FEP Cases 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989)).
46 Id. at 1572.
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to renew was racially discriminatory preformation conduct in vio-
lation of section 1981. 47 The Gersman court rejected CS1's argument
and held that each monthly renewal was not a new contract but
conduct controlled by the original contract terms. 48 Furthermore,
the court held that GHA terminated the contract in accordance with
those original contract terms. 49
In holding that GHA's action terminated the contract, the court
reasoned that the automatic monthly renewal of the contract con-
tinued until one party took some action to terminate the relation-
ship." The court determined that such an arrangement closely
resembled an employment-at-will contract.' Analogizing to the em-
ployment-at-will context, the court held that the terms of the rela-
tionship at any time were governed by the original contract.52 As
such, the contractual arrangement between CSI and GHA never
changed to such a degree that the parties formed a new contract. 53
The court determined that even when CSI offered new contract
terms, such actions were postformation because they were governed
by the original contract and did not change the responsibilities of
the parties. 54
The dissent, written by Judge Wald, observed that the majori-
ty's scheme of labeling conduct as either postformation or prefor-
mation was too formal to be relevant in the real world. 55 The dissent
noted a Third Circuit decision, Perry v. Command Performance,  which
demonstrated the problems created by such formalism. 56 In Perry,
a black woman's husband made an appointment for the woman to
get her hair cut. 57 When her usual hair stylist became ill, however,
another stylist refused to cut her hair because she was black." The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied a preformation-postfor-
mation analysis of section 1981 and remanded the case to the district
47 Id. at 1572-73.
Id. at 1572.
" Id. at 1573.
50 Id. at 1572.
51 Id.
52 Id,
55 Id. at 1573. The court held in the employment-at-will context that only when the
opportunity arises for a new and distinct relationship between the employer and employee,
such as a promotion or demotion with new responsibilities, do the parties implicitly make a
new contract. Id. (citing Nelson v. School Bd.. 738 F. Supp. 478, 480, 53 FEP Cases 255, 257
(S.D. Fla. 1990)).
51 Id.
55 Id. at 1576 (Wald, J., dissenting).
M' Id. (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing Perry, 913 F.2d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 1990)).
57 913 F.2d at 100.
55 Id.
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court to determine when the parties made the contract. 59 According
to Judge Wald's interpretation of Perry, if the contract was formed
when the husband telephoned, the stylist's refusal constituted a
contract termination outside the scope of section 1981. 60 If, how-
ever, the contract was formed when the stylist's performance began,
the conduct was a refusal to contract forbidden by section 1981. 61
The Gersman dissent considered the outcome in Perry to be a ridic-
ulous consequence of the majority's reasoning and asserted that
"[t]he real world of contract belies such stark formalism. "62
Furthermore, the dissent argued that termination of a contract
is not analogous to breach of contract because termination does not
merely infringe on contract rights but strips them away completely. 63
Therefore, while breach is actionable under state contract law, ter-
mination is not, leaving victims of discriminatory termination without
redress for their injuries. 64 The Gersman dissent further observed that
the majority's reasoning "prohibits an employer from refusing to
hire an applicant because of her race, yet allows the employer to
fire that person the next day because of her race."65 According to
the dissent, such an outcome negates section 1981's promise that
all parties will have the same rights in private contract affairs. 66
In Gersman, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated
that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Patterson may be applied to
broaden the scope of the restrictions imposed by section 1981 on
contract cases. The Gersman court logically extended the Patterson
holding to all contractual relationships. 67 The designation of racially
motivated contract termination as postformation conduct, however,
is a significant step beyond the Patterson decision.
In Patterson, the Supreme Court refused to extend section 1981
to cover breach of contract due to racial discrimination because it
would federalize a traditional state law claim." As the Gersman
dissent noted, however, unlike the situation where a person
breaches a contract, no state law claim exists once a person termi-
59 Id. at 102.
Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1576 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing Perry, 913 F.2d at 101-02).
61 Id, (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing Perry, 913 F.2d at 101-02).
"2 Id. at 1576 (Wald, J., dissenting).
6' Id. at 1577 (Wald, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 1576-77 (Wald, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 1578 (Wald, J., dissenting). The majority counters that this is not a fair analysis
of their view because such a hypothetical involves a contract formed under discriminatory
terms prohibited by section 1981. Id. at 1572.
66 Id. at 1578 (Wald, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 1571.
6" 491 U.S. at 183,49 FEP Cases at 1823.
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nates a contract in accordance with the specific contract terms. 69
Thus, the Supreme Court's policy rationale for eliminating postfor-
mation conduct from section 1981 claims no longer applies.
Outside the employment contract context, a party whose con-
tract was terminated due to racial discrimination does not enjoy the
right to bring an action under title VII." Similarly, a party whose
contract was terminated due to racial discrimination does not enjoy
the right to bring an action under state law claims. 71 And after
Gersman, a party whose contract was terminated due to racial dis-
crimination does not enjoy the right to bring an action under section
1981. 72 Thus, such a party, who is undeniably wronged by racial
discrimination, is left with no remedy, unless the party is able to
prove that such discriminatory conduct actually occurred at the time
of the contract formation,"
In Gersman, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that Patter-
son applies outside. the employment context to all contractual rela-
tionships between private parties. 74 More importantly, however, the
court held that termination , of a contract on discriminatory grounds
does not impair a person's right to make or enforce contracts. 75
The decision thus eliminates the wronged party's claim under sec-
tion 1981 and, with it, any chance for remedy at all.
III. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. * Enforcing Arbitration Agreements in Age Discrimination Suits:
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'
On February 12, 1925 President Coolidge signed the United
States Arbitration Act. 2 Reenacted and codified in 1947 as the Fed-
66 931 F.2d at 1576-77 (Wald, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 1570. The applicable section of title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--i) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
7 ' German, 931 F.2d at 1577 n.3 (Wald, J., dissenting).
/ 2 Id. at 1571.
" Id. at 1572.
" Id, at 1571.
" Id.
* Jennifer R. Dowd, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.E ,
111 S. Ct. 1647, 55 FEE' Cases 1116 (1991).
2 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. § 1-15 (1988)).
436	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:305
eral Arbitration Acts ("FAA" or the "Act"), the legislation was de-
signed to reverse the judiciary's longstanding disfavor of arbitration
agreements by giving such agreements the same protection as other
contracts.' Accordingly, the primary substantive provision of the
Act, section 2, renders written arbitration agreements "valid, irrev-
ocable, and enforceable" within the confines of traditional contract
principles. 5
The Act provides two devices for enforcing a written arbitration
agreement. First, it requires United States courts to stay their pro-
ceedings on any issue raising a dispute referable to arbitration
under the Act. 6 Second, it empowers federal district courts to com-
pel a non-cooperative party to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate
arbitrable issues.'
The United States Supreme Court has adopted an aggressive
posture in support of the FAA, 8 interpreting the Act as declarative
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.° Conse-
quently, the Court has extended the scope of the Act to encompass
claims founded on statutory as well as contractual rights.'° Thus, in
Federal Arbitration Act of 1947, 9 U.S.C. H 1-15 (1988).
4 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111  S. Ct. at 1651, 55 FEP Cases at 1119.
Judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements in the United States has its origins in the
English court system. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974). English
courts "considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the courts of jurisdiction
and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by American
courts as part of the common law up to the time of the adoption of the Arbitration Act." Id.
(citing H.R. REP. No, 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)). See also Dean Witter-Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 & n.6 (1985); Michael Lieberman, Note, Overcoming the
Presumption of Arbitrability of ADEA Claims: The Triumph of Substantive Over Procedural Values in
Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1823 & n.36 (1990).
3 9 U.S.C. § 2.
6 Id. § 3.
7 Id. § 4.
" Beginning in the mid-1970s, the United States Supreme Court abandoned its reluct-
ance to enforce arbitration agreements under the FAA and embraced a presumption in favor
of enforcing arbitration agreements. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974);
Dean Witter-Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Shearson/American Express, Inc., 482 U.S.
220 (1987); Rodriquez de•Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
In the immediate wake of the Act, however, the federal judiciary devised exceptions to the
FAA's policy in favor of arbitration. See Susan C. Davis, Note, Bird v. Shearson Lehman/
American Express, Inc.: Upholding Compulsory Arbitration of ERISA Claims Properly Treats All
Investors Equally, 75 MINN. L. REV. 123, 129 (1990). In particular, courts exempted the areas
of secuilies, antitrust, bankruptcy and RICO. Id.
9
 Gilmer, III S. Ct. at 1651, 55 FEP Cases at 1119; Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24 (1983).
10 See, e.g., Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484—
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two recent cases, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. ("Mitsubishi")" and ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon
("McMahon" ),' 2 the Court established the current framework for
evaluating whether a statutory claim is arbitrable under the FAA.
The framework for determining the arbitrability of statutory
claims consists of a three prong test examining the statute's text,
legislative history," and underlying policies and purposes for evi-
dence of a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements for the resolution of statutory disputes." The test
is grounded on the premise that the FAA, taken alone, mandates
enforcement, of agreements to arbitrate, regardless of whether the
claim is statutorily or contractually based." Accordingly, the test
establishes a presumption of enforceability of agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims, which can only be overcome by a contrary
congressional command." Thus, the burden falls on the party op-
posing arbitration to prove congressional intent to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies for the statutory claim." Such a limitation
would surface in either the text or legislative history, or result from
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purposes.' 8
The Court has applied the Mitsubishi/McMahon test to enforce
arbitration agreements with respect to a number of statutory claims.
These include claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 1 • the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
86 (1989) (pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 held
enforceable and resolution of claims in a judicial forum not required); McMahon, 482 U.S.
at 238, 242 (Exchange Act claims and RICO claims arbitrable under the FAA); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler•Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614. 640 (1985) (antitrust claims
arbitrable pursuant to the FAA); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217
(1985) (FAA requires courts to compel arbitration of arbitrable state law claims even when
such claims arise from the same transaction and are "intertwined" with non-arbitrable federal
claims); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (claims under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 involving international business transactions subject to arbitration
under the FAA).
" 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
12 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
" Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
14 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632-37; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
" See McMahon, 473 U.S. at '226.
12 Id.
" Id. at 227; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
McMahon, 482 U.S at 227.
10 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
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" See id, at 292.
21 Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-86
(1989).
n See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292, 115 L.R.R.M. 3646,
3649 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981).
23
 See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3649; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745.
24 Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745.
22 McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292, 115 L.R.R.M. at 3649.
	 •
'6 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60, 7 FEP Cases 81, 90 (1974).
" Compare Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 52 FEP Cases 26,
(4th Cir. 1990) with Nicholson v. CPC Intl Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 230, 49 FEP Cases 1678, 1685
(3d Cir. 1989).
The ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §$ 621-624 (1988). Congress enacted the ADEA in
1967 to prohibit arbitrary discrimination against older employees and to promote employ.
ment of older persons based on their ability. Id. § 621(b). The ADEA states that lit) shall be
unlawful for an employer .. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age ." Id. § 623(a).
In the 1989 case of Nicholson v. CPC International Inc., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit refused to compel arbitration under the FAA with respect to an ADEA
claim. 877 F.2d at 230, 49 FEP Cases at 1685 (3rd Cir. 1989). In applying the Mitsubishi}
McMahon test, the court noted that the language of the statute and the legislative history,
while suggestive, were not conclusive of congressional intent regarding arbitration of ADEA
claims. Id. at 225-227, 49 FEP Cases at 1681-82. Application of the third prong of the
arbitrability test, however, revealed an inherent conflict between the objectives of the ADEA
and displacement by arbitration of a judicial forum for claimants alleging age discrimination.
Id. at 227-30, 49 FEP Cases at 1682-85. Consequently, the court refused to enforce an
arbitration agreement that encompassed an ADEA dispute between a corporate officer and
his employer. Id. at 231, 49 FEP Cases at 1686.
I" 111  S. Ct. 41 (1990).
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Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and granted the motion
to compel arbitration." In applying the Mitsubishi/McMahon test, the
Court of Appeals based its decision on the plaintiff's failure to
demonstrate anything in the statutory language, legislative history
or underlying goals of the ADEA that indicated a congressional
intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements.'"
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Fourth Circuit and held that an ADEA claim can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration. 42 In an opinion by Justice White, the Court
rejected all of Gilmer's arguments for denying the motion to compel
arbitration. First, the Court rejected Gilmer's argument that the
social policies furthered by the ADEA conflicted with arbitration. 43
Second, the Court rejected Gilmer's challenges to the adequacy of
arbitration.'" Third, the Court rejected Gilmer's argument that the
unequal bargaining power between employers and employees war-
rants the decision to hold arbitration agreements unenforceable in
the employment context.45 Finally, the Court dismissed as "mis-
placed" Gilmer's reliance on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. and its
progeny. 46
In its analysis, the Court first noted its recent willingness to
enforce arbitration of statutory claims pursuant to the FAA. 47 In
reiterating the MitsubishilMcMahon test of arbitrability for statutory
claims, the Court noted that Gilmer had the burden of showing that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for
ADEA claims. 48 According to the Court, Gilmer failed to meet this
burden.49
In rejecting Gilmer's "inherent conflict" argument, the Court
reviewed the purposes of the ADEA, as embodied in its text. 50 The
Court conceded, as Gilmer argued, that the ADEA is designed not
de novo under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not foreclosed by prior submission
of the claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining
agreement. 415 U.S. 36,59-60,7 FEP Cases 81,90 (1974).
4° Gilmer, 895 F.2d at 203.
41 Id. at 197.
42 Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657,55 FEP Cases at 1123.
is Id. at 1652-54,55 FEP Cases at 1120-21.
44 Id. at 1654-55,55 FEP Cases at 1121-22.
" Id. at 1655-56,55 FEP Cases at 1122.
46 Id, at 1656-57,55 FEP Cases at 1122-23.
47 Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651,55 FEP Cases at 1119.
48 Id. at 1652,55 FEP Cases at 1122.
4° Id. at 1657,55 FEP Cases at 1123.
5° Id. at 1652-53,55 FEP Cases at 1120-21.
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only to address individual grievances, but also to further important
social policies. 5 ' Nonetheless, the Court asserted that arbitration
could implement such policies as effectively as could judicial reso-
lution of claims. 52
The Court was also unconvinced by Gilmer's contention that
arbitration would undermine the role of the EEOC in enforcing
the ADEA." The Court reasoned that individual ADEA claimants
are still free to file charges with the EEOC irrespective of their
ability to institute private judicial action." Additionally, the Court
found nothing in the text of the ADEA to indicate a congressional
intent to involve the EEOC in all employment disputes." Moreover,
the Court remarked that the participation of an administrative
agency in the enforcement of a statute does not by itself preclude
arbitration. 56 Finally, the Court concluded that the ADEA's statutory
scheme was consistent with arbitration. 57
The Court also rejected Gilmer's attacks on the adequacy of
arbitration procedures." Gilmer pointed to the dangers of biased
panels and to the limited discovery and review opportunities in
arbitration proceedings." The Court dismissed Gilmer's bias argu-
ment as too speculative, and noted furthermore that the NYSE
arbitration rules applicable to Gilmer provided sufficient protection
against biased panels." •
The Court had several responses to Gilmer's arguments per-
taining to the limits on discovery. First, the Court asserted that
M Id. at 1653, 55 FEP Cases at 1120. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983)
(enactment of ADEA marked effort to prohibit age limitations in hiring practies, to dispel
unfounded stereotypes and unfavorable myths with respect to elderly workers, and to ame-
liorate age discrimination's adverse effects on both the national economy and the psycholog-
ical well-being of elderly workers).
" Id.
" Id. at 1653-54, 55 FEP Cases at 1120-21.
m Id. at 1653, 55 FEP Cases at 1120.
" Id.
" Id. at 1653, 55 FEP Cases at 1121 In particular, the Court cited to McMahon and
Rodriquez de Qui* Id.
57 Id, at 1654, 55 FEP Cases at 1121. The Court noted that the EEOC is directed to
pursue "informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b)). The Court interpreted this language as indicative of a "flexible approach to
resolution of claims" and supportive of out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration.
Id, at 1654, 55 FEP Cases at 1121.
58 Id. at 1654-55, 55 FEP Cases at 1121-22. Mindful that recent arbitration cases had
already rejected Gilmer's complaints, the Court devoted little time to addressing these ar-
guments. Id. at 1654, 55 FEP Cases at 1121.
" Id. at 1654-55, 55 FEP Cases at 1121-22.
60 See id. at 1654, 55 FEP Cases at 1121.
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ADEA claims required no more discovery than other statutory
claims held arbitrable in the past. 6 ' Second, the Court observed that
the NYSE rules afforded adequate protection to Gilmer by requir-
ing that all arbitration awards be in writing, setting forth the facts
and the basis for award. 62 The Court further reasoned that any
differences between judicial proceedings and arbitration merely
derive from the nature of an arbitration agreement; a party to an
arbitration agreement purposefully exchanges the procedures of
the courtroom for the alternative benefits of arbitration—i.e., sim-
plicity, informality and speed.63
The Court dismissed Gilmer's argument pertaining to the un-
equal bargaining power often existing between employers and em-
ployees. 64 The Court observed that under the FAA, arbitration
agreements are only enforceable to the limits of any other contract. 65
Accordingly, while any evidence of fraud, coercion or inequalities
in bargaining position would warrant a revocation of an agreement,
none existed in Gilmer's case.66
Lastly, Gilmer argued that the Court's prior treatment of ADEA
claims in the Gardner-Denver line of cases precluded arbitration of
employment discrimination claims. 67 Characterizing Gilmer's reli-
ance on these cases as being "misplaced," the Court pointed out
several distinctions between the Gardner-Denver line of cases and
Gilmer.68 First, the Court noted that in the Gardner-Denver cases the
issue was whether arbitration of contract-based claims prevented
later adjudication of statutory claims, not whether arbitration of
statutory claims could be compelled. 69
 Second, the Court observed
that an important issue in the Gardner-Denver cases was the tension
between collective bargaining and individual statutory rights, a con-
cern that this case did not present." Third, the Court noted that
the Gardner-Denver cases were not decided under the FAA. 7 '
The Court concluded that Gilmer failed to meet his burden of
showing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of claims
" Id.
62 Id. at 1655, 55 FEP Cases at 1122.
6] Id. at 1655-56, 55 FEP Cases at 1122.
" Id.
65 Id, at 1656, 55 FEP Cases at 1122.
66 Id.
67 Gilmer, 111 U.S. at 1656, 55 FEP Cases at 1122-23.
" Id. at 1656, 55 FEP Cases at 1123.
69 Id. at 1657, 55 FEP Cases at 1123.
76 Id.
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under the ADEA.72 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment
of the court of appeals granting Interstate's motion to compel ar-
bitration of Gilmer's ADEA claim pursuant to the arbitration agree-
ment in Gilmer's application for registration with the NYSE."
In the sole dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Marshall, argued that the arbitration clause contained in Gilmer's
agreement with the NYSE was exempt from FAA coverage. 74 Con-
sequently, Interstate should not be able to compel arbitration of
Gilmer's ADEA claim. 75 Stevens's argument stemmed from his in-
terpretation of section 1 of the Act. 76 The correct interpretation,
according to Stevens, exempts all contracts between employers and
employees from coverage under the FAA. 77 Thus, argued Stevens,
the exclusion in section 1 of the Act should be interpreted broadly
to cover any agreements by the employee to arbitrate disputes with
the employer arising out of the employment relationship. 78 Because
the registration application with NYSE was a condition of Gilmer's
employment, Stevens concluded that the application was part of the
employment relationship and thus exempted by section 1. 79 That
Is Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1657, 55 FEP Cases at 1123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Section 1 of the FAA
states, in pertinent part, that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The majority opinion declined to consider the
scope of this clause because Gilmer neither raised the issue in the lower courts nor in his
petition for certiorari. Gilmer, 1 1 1 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2, 55 FEP Cases at 1119 n.2. Additionally,
the majority stated that it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1 exclusion
because the arbitration clause at issue was not contained in a contract of employment, but
rather in a contract with the NYSE, a third party. Id. The Court further relied on lower
court holdings that the FAA 1 exclusion clause is inapplicable to arbitration clauses con-
tained in such registration applications. Id. Consequently, the Court held that l's exclusion
clause did not apply to Gilmer's arbitration agreement. Id.
Stevens conced&I that it was amid curiae in support of Gilmer who first raised the issue
of coverage prior to oral argument, while Gilmer never raised the issue himself. Id. at 1657,
55 FEP Cases at 1124 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, Stevens observed that the Court
amply raised the issue with both parties at oral argument. Id. at 1658, 55 FEP Cases at 1124-
25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, Stevens noted that on past occassions the Court had
considered "antecedent" and "dispositive" issues waived by the parties. Id. at 1658, 55 FE?
Cases at 1125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Stevens, the waived issue of coverage in
Gilmer was even more compelling than the issues waived in those prior cases. Id. at 1658, 55
FEP Cases at 1124 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71' See id. at 1659, 55 FEP Cases at 1125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "In my opinion the
Court too narrowly construes the scope of the exclusion contained in § 1 of the FAA." Id.
77 Gilmer, 111  S. Ct. at 1659, 55 FEP Cases at 1125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 Id.
79 Id.
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Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate with Interstate was contained in his
application for registration before the NYSE, rather than in a spe-
cific employment contract made directly with Interstate, was irrel-
evant to Stevens. 80
Before Gilmer, the Court had already suggested that virtually
all federal statutory claims arising in commercial contexts are subject
to arbitration under the FAA. With Gilmer, the Court seems to have
validated an expansive reading of section 1 of the Act, broadly
encompassing disputes arising out of employment relationships as
well. Viewed against the backdrop of an aging society and the
increasing popularity of arbitration agreements, Gilmer will un-
doubtedly have significant and varied impacts on the nature of
employment relations for both employees and employers.
The Gilmer decision is likely to trigger the proliferation of
employment arbitration clauses encompassing ADEA claims. Even
prior to Gilmer, increasingly large numbers of age discrimination
suits have been instituted pursuant to the ADEA. The number of
workers covered by the ADEA is increasing as the "baby boom"
generation reaches middle age. Consequently, under Gilmer, arbi-
tration could become a common dispute mechanism for older em-
ployees and their employers. Such a development could produce
both benefits and dangers for parties involved in an ADEA dispute.
Arbitration of ADEA claims offers possible advantages to
ADEA plaintiffs and defendants. First, arbitration of ADEA claims
has several potential cost advantages for both employers and em-
ployees, which, in turn, may afford elderly workers greater access
to the legal system. In contrast to the cost of litigation, the savings
associated with arbitration may provide low income plaintiffs with
the opportunity to resolve a claim at relatively small cost. Addition-
ally, quicker resolution of claims through arbitration may help older
workers who are often unable to find other employment in the
event of a drawn-out lawsuit. Although employers are usually more
capable than employees of absorbing the costs of litigation, the same
advantages flowing from arbitration nonetheless apply to employers
as well.
Employers and employees may also benefit from the applica-
bility of arbitration to ongoing employment relationships. Unlike
litigation, arbitration seeks compromise and a solution agreeable to
both parties. Ideally, arbitration results in less tension and hostility
8° Id. "I see no reason to limit this exclusion from coverage to arbitration clauses
contained in agreements entitled 'Contract of Employment:" Id.
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and generates more cooperation among the individuals involved.
Thus, for those employees seeking to preserve their jobs, arbitration
may help salvage a congenial employment relationship—a worthy
goal from both the perspective of employer and employee. Finally,
both employees and employers may benefit from the confidential
nature of arbitration proceedings. Neither employers nor employ-
ees stand to gain from the negative publicity and bothersome intru-
sions associated with litigation.
On the other hand, the Court's extension of the FAA to ADEA
claims within the context of employment relationships may have
several negative implications for employees. The extension of sec-
tion 1 FAA coverage to employment relationships in certain circum-
stances may result in less protection for employee rights. First, as
argued in Gilmer, minimal discovery in arbitration may make it more
difficult for ADEA plaintiffs to prove discrimination in an arbitral
forum as opposed to a judicial proceeding. Second, arbitration of
ADEA claims may frustrate the development of the exact social
policies the statute was designed to implement. It is clearly against
the congressional objectives of the Act to permit an employer prac-
ticing age discrimination to contract away an elderly employee's
right to waive arbitration; to the contrary, it is the exact goal of the
ADEA to protect the waiver of such rights. Moreover, because
arbitrable decisions bypass the court system, arbitration of ADEA
claims will not only remove ADEA law from public scrutiny, but
will also impede the growth of case law interpreting and applying
the statute.
In addition to the disadvantages of arbitration, the Court's
holding in Gilmer presents other problems. First, Gilmer threatens
to undermine the ADEA's attempt to protect workers from the
waiver of civil rights. If employees like Gilmer can now inadver-
tently and unwittingly waive their rights to bring charges of em-
ployment discrimination by signing indirect contracts made with
non-employers, then Gilmer raises cause for even greater concern.
After Gilmer, employees must be acutely aware of what they are
signing and with whom, lest they be held to have agreed to have
waived their rights to a judicial proceeding pursuant to an arbitra-
tion agreement contained in some remote employment contract,
application or agreement. Finally, that the Court is willing to extend
the FAA to ancillary agreements upon which employment is con-
ditional may signal the Court's willingness to extend the FAA to the
entire arena of the employment relationship. It remains an open
question whether the Court will extend its decision in Gilmer to hold
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new employees, the fining of any vacancy, the creation of any neW
pOsitiOn,. Or the taking of any sit -1'1par action withOut the approval of
his Office.° The five petitiOnetS in ktitan argued that the governor
used the freete to engage in a political patronage system that limited
State einployinent and conferred employment-related benefiti to
individuals supported by the Republican party." Specifically, the
petitioners efairneti that the government's failure to prornote; trans-
fer, recall, arid hire gaVerninerit employees for patronage reasons
violated the First Atnendtnent. i2 The petitioners filed snit in United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois alleging that
such discrimination was a violation of their First Amendment rights
of political assoCiation.' 3
The district court dismisSed the complaint for failure to state a
elairn." The district court stated that the 1976 United States Su-
preme Court case of Elrod v. Biers" and the 1980 United States
Supreme Court case of B ranti v. Finkel,l6 upon which the petitioners
relied, limited First Amendment protection against political patron-
age actions only to employee firings and that the reasoning of these
cases did not extend to decisions to hire, promote, transfer or recall
after lavilff. 17
In Elrod the Court, in a four to three plurality decision, held
that patronage dismissals of non-policy-making public employees
1 ° Id.
" Id. The Court stated that in reviewing a particular request for a position, the gover-
nor's office evaluated whether the applicant voted in Republican primaries, whether the
applicant had given monetary or other support to the Republican party, whether the applicant
pledged support for the Republican party, and whether the applicant was supported by state
or local Republican officials. Id.
12 Id. at 2732-33.
13 Id. Cynthia Rutan worked for the State of Illinois beginning in 1974 as a rehabilitation
counselor and claimed that, beginning in 1981, she was repeatedly denied promotions to
supervisory positions for which she was qualified because she did not work for or support
the Republicans. Id. at 2733. Franklin Taylor operated road equipment for the Illinois
Department of Transportation and claimed that in 1983 he was denied a promotion due to
lack of Republican support. Id. Taylor also claims that he was denied a transfer to an office
nearer to his home. Id. James Moore claimed that he was repeatedly denied state employment
as a prison guard due to lack of Republican support. Id. Rickey Standefer, a state garage
worker, claimed that he was not recalled after layoff because he had voted in a Democratic
primary. Id. And Dan O'Brien, who worked as a dietary manager in the mental health
department, claimed that he was not recalled after layoff because he was not a Republican
and that he later obtained a lower paying post with the state only after receiving the support
of the local Republican party. Id.
" Rutan v. Republican Party, 641 F. Supp. 249, 251, 259 (C.D. Ill. 1986).
15 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
11 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
17 641 F. Supp. at 252-53.
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unconstitutionally infringe upon the protected First Amendment
rights of political belief and association.'s The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Elrod ordered that a prelim-
inary injunction issue on behalf of the fired workers, and the state
then appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court.' 9 Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, stated that the political beliefs
and associations involved in Elrod are fundamental core activities
protected by the First Amendment. 2° The Court noted that tying
job security for a public position to a required pledge of allegiance
or affiliation for a political party amounted to coercion of public
employees and infringed on First Amendment rights. 21 The Elrod
Court stated that government restraints on First Amendment rights
are only permitted where a vital governmental end is furthered and
the means employed is the least restrictive of freedom of belief and
association, such that the benefit gained by the governmental prac-
tice outweighs the loss of constitutional privileges. 22 Because the
Court decided that patronage dismissals severely restricted political
belief and association without conferring sufficiently important ben-
efits to the government, the Court held the practice of political
patronage firings to be unconstitutional. 23
Although Elrod severely limited the ability of a government
official to resort to patronage dismissals, the Court's decision did
not entirely ban the practice. 24 In the end, the Court upheld the
Seventh Circuit's order requiring a preliminary injunction barring
the dismissal of the Elrod employees. 25 The important distinction
for determining when patronage dismissals were permissible in El-
427 U.S. at 373. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, announced
the judgment of the Court. Id. at 349. Justice Stewart issued a separate concurrence. Id. at
374 (Stewart, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist dis-
sented. Id. at 375,376 (Burger, Powell, J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens did
not participate in the decision. Id. at 374.
The Republican Elrod plaintiffs sued a newly-elected Democratic sheriff, claiming that
they were fired from their government jobs solely because of their political affiliations. Id. at
349-50 (plurality opinion). Plaintiffs were employed as a process division deputy, a bailiff
and security guard, a process server, and a sheriff's office employee. Id. at 350-51.
L° Id. at 349; see Elrod v. Burns, 509 F.2d 1133,1135 (1975).
2° Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356.
2 ' See id. at 355-56.
22 Id. at 363.
22 Id. at 372-73.
24 See id. at 372. The Court reasoned that patronage dismissals were appropriate in the
case of an employee who performs policy-making functions and his or her dismissal was
necessary to ensure the efficacy of an incoming political administration. Id. at 367.
25 Id. at 373.
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rod, was the definition of whether a state employee was in a policy-
making or non-policy-making position because after Elrod, only
public employees in non-policy-making positions were protected by
the First Amendment from patronage dismissals. 26
The next Supreme Court political patronage case was the 1980
case of Branti v. Finkel, in which the Court refined the policy-maker
versus non-policy-maker distinction articulated in Elrod by granting
protection from patronage dismissals to some employees who were
policy-makers under Elrod." To determine whether the dismissals
escaped First Amendment protection under Elrod, the Branti Court
looked to whether the government employer could demonstrate
that party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the posi-
tion of assistant public defender.28 The Court in Branti noted that
this approach was different from the Elrod policy-maker/non-policy-
maker test inasmuch as there are some policy-making positions for
which party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement (such as a
state university football coach) and some non-policy-maker positions
for which party affiliation is an appropriate requirement (such as a
gubernatorial speech writer). 29 After Branti, the test to determine
whether a public employee may constitutionally be dismissed no
longer depended solely on the policy-maker/non-policy-maker dis-
tinction recognized in Elrod, but also included the question of
whether party affiliation is an acceptable condition for government
employment, even if a policy-making position is at issue. 3°
Following Branti, a vast number of cases were brought by for-
mer public employees who claimed that their First Amendment
rights were violated by dismissals based on their political party
affiliation." In fact, each of the circuits has created its own test and
26 Id. at 567. The plurality opinion noted three characteristics generally associated with
policy-makers. Id. at 567-68. First, policy-makers usually have responsibilities broad in scope
that are ill-defined while non-policy-makers have limited, specific duties. Id. at 568. Second,
one who acts as an advisor may be considered a policy-maker. Id. Third, one whose position
involves implementation of broad goals may be a policy-maker. Id. For a discussion of this
test, see Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade of Brand Decisions: A Government Official's Guide to
Patronage DismissaLs, 39 Am. U. L. REV. 11, 20 (1989).
" See 445 U.S. 507,518 (1980). Brand involved the patronage dismissals of two Repub-
lican assistant public defenders by a newly-appointed Democratic public defender. Id. at 509.
26 See id. at 518.
2° Id. Because the Court determined that an assistant public defender must represent
the interests of individual clients rather than the government, the Court held that partisan
political interests are irrelevant to his or her job performance. Id. at 519.
3° Id. at 518; see also Martin, supra note 26, at 22.
" See generally Martin, supra note 26, for a comprehensive compilation of these cases.
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method of applying the Elrod/Branti doctrine." Courts have had
little trouble determining the ends of the spectrum of jobs for which
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement and those for which
the requirement is inappropriate." The jobs in between posed the
greatest problem for courts and lead to conflicting results for similar
cases. 34
Thus, when the Rutan district court dismissed the complaint of
the Rutan petitioners, the court relied on conflicting interpretations
of the ElrodlBranti doctrine. The Rutan district court reached its
decision in part by relying on the case of LaFalce v. Houston35 in
which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to extend Elrod
and Branti to protect against patronage practices in the awarding
of public contracts and the hiring of public employees." In LaFalce,
the court noted that First Amendment concerns were not implicated
because government contractors were not sufficiently pressured to
change their beliefs or associations due to governmental patronage
practices. 37 The Rutan district court also noted that in Elrod and
Branti the petitioners were fired in retaliation for the exercise of
First Amendment rights while the Rutan petitioners did not allege
that the state acted in a retaliatory fashion."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Rutan affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's
dismissal of the Rutan claims. 39 Relying on the Supreme Court's
earlier holdings in Elrod and Branti that patronage dismissals violate
the First Amendment, the Seventh Circuit held that other patronage
practices also violate First Amendment rights of public employees
when the patronage practice is the substantial equivalent of dis-
" See generally Martin supra note 26, an in-depth discussion of each circuit's approach
to the Elrod1Branti test.
]9 See e.g., Vazquez Rios v. Hernandez Colon, 891 F.2d 319, 324 (1st Cir. 1987) (Elrod/
Branti protection for governor's cleaning woman); Bauer v. Bosley, 802 F.2d 1058, 1064 (8th
Cir. 1986) (Elrod/Branti protection denied for government lawyers); see also Martin, supra note
26, at 23; Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 170 (3d Cir. 1986) (Elrod/Branti protection denied
for county assistant director of public information).
34 See e.g., Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329, 1338 (4th Cir. 1984) (Elrod/Branti protection ,
extended for city deputy sheriff); McBee v. Jim Hogg County, Tex., 730 F.2d 1009, 1015
(5th Cir. 1984) (Elrod/Branti protection denied for city deputy sheriff); see also Martin, supra
note 26, at 23.
" 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
Rutan, 641 F. Supp. at 253 (citing LaFalce, 712 F.2d at 294).
" LaFalce, 712 F.2d at 294.
" Rutan, 641 F. Supp. at 255-56.
39 868 F.2d 943, 958 (7th Cir. 1989).
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missal.° The court stated that an employment decision is equivalent
to a dismissal when it is one that would cause a reasonable person
to resign.'" The court, therefore, dismissed the cause of action for
failure to hire, stating that such a practice does not violate the First
Amendment. 42 The court remanded the matters of failure to pro-
mote, transfer and recall after layoff to the district court for further
proceedings in line with its newly articulated standard.°
The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court for a review
of the Seventh Circuit's holding and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari." In a five to four decision by Justice Brennan, the Su-
preme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's analysis and held that
First Amendment protection from patronage practices extends to
hirings, transfers, promotions and failure to recall after layoff.45
The Court addressed the matters of failure to promote, failure to
transfer, and failure to recall after layoff separately from the claim
of failure to hire.°
The state had argued that because the petitioners had no right
to promotion, transfer or rehire, they could not sue for a violation
of the First Amendment based on a denial of promotion, transfer
or rehiring. 47 The Court rejected this argument, relying on its 1972
case of Perry v. Sindermann. 48 In Perry, the Court held that a state-
employed teacher's lack of contractual or tenurial right to govern-
ment employment was immaterial to a First Amendment claim."
I" Id. at 956.
41 See id. at 955.
42 Id.
45 See id. at 958.
" Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 48 (1989).
45 Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729,2739 (1990).
45 Id. at 2735,2738.
47 Id. at 2735.
48 Id. at 2735-36 (citing Perry, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). In Perry, a professor in the state
college system of Texas sued the regents of the state college system after the regents failed
to renew his contract as a professor. 408 U.S. at 594-95. Just prior to the expiration of his
contract, the plaintiff served as the president of the Texas Junior College Teacher's Associ-
ation, and, as the president, had many public disagreements with the state board of regents.
See id. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that his contract was not renewed in .retaliation for
his exercise of constitutionally-guaranteed free speech rights. Id. at 595. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff's lack of tenure or right to re-employment precluded his resort to
First Amendment protection. See id. at 596. The Court, however, disagreed. Id. The Court
stated that the government is precluded from controlling protected speech and association
by denying a job to a person who engages in non-sanctioned speech. Id. at 597. Therefore,
the Court stated the lack of a "right" to re-employment was irrelevant to the plaintiff's free
speech claim. Id. at 597-98, The Court, having determined that the plaintiff stated a cause
of action, remanded the matter to the district court for a hearing on the merits. Id. at 598.
'a Perry, 408 U.S. at 596-98.
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The Rutan Court cited the portion of Perry that stated that although
a person has no right to a governmental benefit and thus, the
government may deny a person such benefit for a number of rea-
sons, there are reasons upon which the government may not rely
in denying a benefit. 5° The Perry Court stated that one such imper-
missible basis is one that infringes upon freedom of speech. 5 ' Thus,
the Rutan petitioners' lack of right to governmental benefits was no
bar to their suit. 52
The Rutan Court then rejected the state's argument that be-
cause the employment decisions at issue were not retaliatory, there
was no adverse impact on the petitioners' protected First Amend-
ment rights. 53 The Court noted that the penalties imposed by a
refusal to promote, transfer or rehire, while not as significant as
those imposed by an outright dismissal, are significant enough to
impair the exercise of First Amendment . rights.54 Such penalties
imposed by the state for the exercise of the First Amendment
freedoms of political belief and association, the Rutan Court stated,
are the same concerns that motivated the Court's Elrod and Branti
decisions. 55
The Rutan Court noted that for the state to impair such pro-
tected First Amendment rights, the patronage practices had to be
narrowly tailored and had to further vital government interests. 56
The Court reiterated its position in Elrod and Branti that the gov-
ernment's interest in ensuring effective employees can be met by
less restrictive means than resorting to political patronage. 57 At this
point, the Court explicitly rejected the Seventh Circuit's standard
that would have found a First Amendment violation for a patronage
practice only where such practice was the equivalent of a dismissal."
Thus, political patronage practices short of outright dismissals could
violate the Elrod and Branti principles. 5g
" Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2736 (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 597).
31 Id.
" Id. at 2735-36.
38 Id.
4 Id.
83 Id.
88 Id,
87 See id. at 2736-37 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 365-68 (1976); Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 520 n.14 (1980)). The Rutan Court stated that governmental
employers were able to resort to discharging, demoting or transferring deficient employees
in order to ensure high quality of work. Id, at 2737.
Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2737.
59 Id.
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Finally, the Court addressed the issue of whether failure to hire
for political patronage reasons violates the First Amendment.° The
Court noted that patronage hiring places burdens on free speech
similar to those imposed by the other patronage practices. 6 ' Because
a public job provides work when work is scarce in the private sector
and because the government may be the only or the major source
of employment for some jobs, the Court stated that denial of a state
job is a serious deprivation. 62 The Court, therefore, reasoned that
the government may only condition hiring decisions on political
beliefs and associations when a vital interest is at issue. 65 For the
same reason that the Court found no vital interest to be at stake
regarding promotions, transfers and failures to rehire—namely,
that patronage furthers no job performance ends—the Court stated
that there is no governmental justification to base hiring on patron-
age considerations. 64 Thus, the Rutan Court held that the rule of
Elrod and Branti extends to promotion, transfer, recall and hiring
decisions based on political patronage considerations. 65 Although
the Court held that the petitioners in Rutan stated valid claims for
violations of the First Amendment, it remanded the case to the
district court for a factual determination of whether the State of
Illinois violated the constitutional rights of the petitioners. 66
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, maintained that Elrod, Branti and
Rutan were all improperly decided and should be overturned. 67
Justice Scalia stated that employment decisions based on political
patronage were not unconstitutional. 68 Because patronage practices
are not expressly prohibited by the Bill of Rights and because
patronage was long tolerated, Justice Scalia stated that the legiti-
macy of patronage is a matter most properly addressed by state
legislatures and not by the Court. 69 Under such an approach, Justice
00 Id. at 2738.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2739.
6*
	
id.
65 Id,
66 See id.
13 ' See Milan, 110 S. Ct. at 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote, "When it appears that the
latest 'rule,' or 'three-part test,' or 'balancing test' devised by the Court has placed us on a
collision course with such a landmark practice, it is the former that must be recalculated by
us, and not the latter that must be abandoned by our citizens." Id. ( Justice O'Connor did
not join in this portion of the dissent).
69 Id. at 2748, 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia wrote, legislatures may decide to enact civil service legislation
that will determine which government jobs are open to patronage
practices and which jobs are closed to such practices."
Justice Scalia further attacked the constitutional test applied by
the majority." Justice Scalia stated that the majority's approach,
which required the state to show a narrowly-tailored practice which
furthers vital government interests, was an inappropriate standard
to be applied when evaluating patronage. 72 Justice Scalia stated that
when the government acts in its capacity as an employer, as in Rutan,
the Court has consistently evaluated the government's conduct un-
der a less strict constitutional test than when the government en-
gages in its lawmaking capacities." Justice Scalia argued that so long
as the government does not act in a patently arbitrary or discrimi-
natory manner when dealing with its employees, the government's
regulations must merely bear a rational relationship to the end
desired to be attained. 74 Justice Scalia also maintained that the Su-
preme Court has generally evaluated First Amendment restraints
on governmental employees under a less stringent test than that
applied to First Amendment restrictions on non-employees. 75
Justice Scalia contended, moreover, that the vital governmental
interest served by political patronage practices enables the practice
to pass constitutional muster." In support of this proposition, Jus-
tice Scalia analyzed the important function of political patronage,
stating that patronage promotes political stability and facilitates in-
tegration of politically powerless groups. 77 By rewarding political
loyalists, Justice Scalia argued, political parties will remain stable,
ensuring vigorous multi-party debate. 78 Thus, Justice Scalia stated,
patronage practices limiting First Amendment rights are constitu-
tional. 79 Finally, Justice Scalia stated that because Elrod, Branti and
Rutan were wrongly decided, recently decided and unworkable, the
Court should not be reluctant to overturn this line of cases." Justice
ro See id. at 2758 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
/d. at 2749 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74
 Rutan, 110 S. Ct. at 2749.
" See id. at 2750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 2752-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79 See id. at 2755-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the current line of cases
makes employees unsure of whether or not their jobs are protected and that such uncertainty
will cause all government employees to refrain from political activity. Id. at 2757 (Scalia, J.,
March 1992]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 455
Scalia argued that because the Court could draw no clear line to
determine when a patronage consideration is permissible, the Court
should leave the matter to the state legislatures.81
Rutan appears to strike the final blow against the remaining
political patronage practices in the United States by extending the
Elrod/Branti doctrine's First Amendment employment protection to
decisions to hire, promote, transfer and recall low-level public em-
ployees." In so doing, Rutan opens a vast new area of labor cases
to the already muddled policy-maker/non-policy-maker test first
articulated in Elrod. Rutan does nothing to clarify the confusion
over just which employees are policy-makers and which are not.
Prior to Rutan, government employers were urged to document
carefully job-related reasons for any discharge to guard against
possible claims of patronage dismissal." Given Rutan's expanded
scope for possible constitutional violations against employees, gov-
ernment officials will likely feel pressure to fully document even
more personnel decisions in order to protect against scores of future
employment claims.
It is possible, however, that some of the pre-Rutan cases that
limited the scope of Elrod and Branti may still apply to actions
brought regarding claims other than wrongful discharge and failure
to hire, promote, transfer or recall after layoff. The district court's
reference in Rutan to LaFalce v. Houston,'" in which the Seventh
Circuit permitted patronage practices in the awarding of govern-
ment contracts, is one area that could still remain free from this
line of cases because in reaching its holding, the LaFalce court
utilized reasoning similar to that of the Supreme Court in Rutan. 85
LaFalce noted that contractors would feel little pressure to alter
their beliefs or associations due to patronage considerations and
therefore the First Amendment was not implicated. 86
dissenting). On the other side, Justice Scalia wrote, the government will be unsure of its
ability to implement its electoral mandate because it will be afraid of dismissing any employee
under the uncertain ElrodiBrantilRulan line of cases. Id. Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that
"[w]hen the courts are flooded with litigation under that most unmanageable of standards
(Brand) brought by 'that most persistent and tenacious of suitors (the disappointed office-
seeker) we may be moved to reconsider our intrusion into this entire field." Id. at 2758-59
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
gi Id. at 2757-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens filed an extensive concurrence
in Rutan which attacked Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 2740 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82 See id. at 2739; see also, Ruth Marcus, Job Patronage Barred by High Court Ruling,
Washington Post, June 22,1990, at A1.
85 See Martin, supra note 26, at 57.
" 712 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984).
85 See id. at 294.
Id.
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Even in those cases that will be brought after Rutan, it will be
difficult to predict whether a plaintiff will succeed because the Court
did not determine the standards necessary to prevail on a Rutan
wrongful-patronage claim. It will, therefore, be up to the lower
courts to set the parameters of this cause of action. As such, it is
still unclear how easy or hard it will be for potential plaintiffs to
win such a patronage claim against the government.
While the doctrinal expansion in Rutan puts an end to most
political patronage, there is considerable doubt as to the staying
power of the entire ElrodIBrantilRutan doctrine. Justice Scalia's dis-
sent, joined by three other members of the Court, explicitly calls
for the overturning of the entire line of cases." Justices Brennan
and Marshall have retired since the decision was handed down.
Marshall also voted with the Rutan majority. This leaves on the
court a solid block of justices committed to overturning the case. 88
Because Rutan creates so many potential plaintiffs, it is certain that
Justice Scalia will have the opportunity to see the matter of political
patronage before the Court again in the near future. When such a
case gets to the Supreme Court, the court should follow Justice
Scalia's arguments and overrule the line of cases that began with
Elrod. As Justice Scalia maintained in his Rutan dissent, legislatures
are the best places for patronage issues to be resolved. Statutes
enacted by these legislatures protect certain jobs from patronage.
Thus, other jobs are explicitly left open to political patronage. Given
that the Constitution is silent on this matter and that legislatures
are acting to protect those jobs that they deem need protection from
patronage, the Court should defer to the decisions of lawmakers in
this area.
B.* Pre-Employment Payments To Individuals Who Enter Government
Service: An Approval in Crandon v. United States'
Under 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) it is a criminal violation for a person
to receive any salary, or contribution to or supplementation of
salary, as compensation for services as an officer or employee of the
°7 Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2756 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined in the majority opinion. rd. at
2731. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and O'Connor joined in the
dissent. Id. Justice Souter's and Justice Thomas' positions on this matter remain unknown.
Thus, the entire field of law remains undecided and is ripe to be overturned.
* By Thomas E. Kenney, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 9 75795, at 83542
(1990).
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United States from any source other than the government of the
United States. 2 This law also makes the payor of such salary, or
contribution or supplementation of salary, criminally liable. 3 Section
209(a) is one of a series of statutory provisions aimed at graft,
bribery and conflicts of interest in government jobs. 4 Other conflicts
statutes include section 201, which prohibits payments made in an
attempt to corrupt or bribe government officials, and section 203,
which'prohibits payments made to government officials in exchange
for specific services that the officials perform for the payors' bene-
fit. 3 Section 209(a), in contrast, focuses on the payment of a gov-
ernment official's compensation, rather than any illicit relationship
that such a payment establishes. 8 The statute does not state whether
a single or "lump-sum" payment constitutes "salary, or contribution
to or supplementation of salary" within the meaning of section
209(a). 7
There has been limited judicial interpretation of the reach of
section 209(a). 8 During the first half of the twentieth century, the
United States Supreme Court decided two cases under the prede-
cessor to section 209(a). 9 In the 1922 case of International Ry. Co. v.
Davidson, the Court determined that the predecessor to section
2 The first clause of section 209(a) states:
Whoever receives any salary, or any contribution to or supplementation of
salary, as compensation for his services as an officer or employee of the executive
branch of the United States Government, of any independent agency of the
United States, or of the District of Columbia, from any source other than the
Government of the United States, except as may he contributed out of the
treasury of any State, county, or municipality ... (shall he subject to the penalties
set forth in section 216 of this title).
18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (Supp. 1991).
' The second clause of section 209(a) states:
Whoever, whether an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other
organization pays, or makes any contribution to, or in any way supplements the
salary of, any such officer or employee under circumstances which would make
its receipt a violation of this subsection—Shall be subject to the penalties set
forth in section 216 of this title.
18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (Supp. 1991).
' See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1988).
5 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203 (1988).
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 209 (Supp. 1991).
Id.
8 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 176, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 11 75795, at
83552 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 67-68
(1944); International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1922); United States v.
Obcrhardt, 887 F.2d 790, 793-94 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Muntain, 610 F.2d 964,
969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
9 Muschany, 324 U.S. at 67-68; Davidson, 257 U.S. at 514-15.
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209(a) prevented the Secretary of the Treasury from passing a
regulation requiring private import companies to pay the overtime
wages of customs officials who cleared the companies' cargo for
importation into the United States on Sundays and holidays.° The
Davidson Court stated that the statute prevented outside sources
from paying government officials for the performance of govern-
ment duties." In contrast, in the 1944 case of Muschany v. United
States, the Court decided that the statute did not apply to the pay-
ment of government officials' salaries from income that the govern-
ment had received from selling federal land to private parties.' 2
The Muschany Court reasoned that this payment system did not
violate the statute because the government, and not the private
parties, was the actual payor of the officials' salaries, even though
the salaries depended on payments that private sources made to
the government in exchange for land.' 5 Although both of these
cases concerned lump-sum payments, the Court decided the cases
differently, distinguishing between payments that private sources
made to government officials and payments originating from pri-
vate sources that the government paid to the officials."
Congress enacted the predecessor to section 209(a) in 1917 as
an amendment to the Bureau of Education's legislative appropria-
tion.° The statute provided that "no Government official or em-
ployee shall receive any salary in connection with his services" from
a private source.' 6 In 1948, Congress amended the law, transferring
it from 5 U.S.C. § 66 to 18 U.S.C. § 1914 and adding the phrase
"being a Government official or employee." 7 The United States
Supreme Court has noted, however, that Congress did not alter the
'" 257 U.S. at 509.
" Id. at 515.
17 324 U.S. at 52-53,67-68.
1' Id. at 67-68.
" See id.; Davidson, 257 U.S. at 515.
15 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152,160,36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 4 75795, at
83545 (1990).
15 Id. The original statute stated:
(Nlo Government official or employee shall receive any salary in connection
with his services as such an official or employee from any source other than the
Government of the United States, except as may be contributed out of the
treasury of any State, county, or municipality, and no person, association, or
corporation shall make any contribution to, or in any way supplement the salary
of, any Government official or employee for the services performed by him for
the Government of the United States
Id. at 160-61 n.12, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83546 n.12.
17 Id. at 160-61,36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83545-46.
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scope of the law by adding this phrase." Finally, in 1962, Congress
revised the statute, moving it to 18 U.S.C. § 209.' 9 Although Con-
gress deleted the phrase "being a government official or employee"
from the law in 1962, the Court again stated that Congress intended
no substantive change in the statute's proscription. 29 Thus, section
209(a) is very similar in scope and reach to the law's two prior
versions."
Two recent circuit court cases have considered the applicability
of section 209(a) to single, lump-sum payments. 22 In the 1979 case
of United States v. Muntain, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that section 209(a) did not apply to a
private source's payment of travel reimbursements to a government
official." The Muntain court declared that, because the official's
speech at the private source's meeting was beyond the scope of the
official's government duties, the payments did not amount to com-
pensation as defined in the statute." In the 1989 case of United
States .v. Oberhardt, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a single two hundred dollar payment from a
private source to a government official for the purchase of an
official document did violate the statute. 25 The Oberhardt court stated
that section 209(a) applied because the parties knew that the gov-
ernment official was performing government service at the time he
accepted payrnent. 26 Under these two cases, a government official
cannot receive , from a private source, and a private source cannot
provide, any compensation, including lump-sum payments, for ser-
vices that are part of the official's governmental duties."
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court held
in Crandon v. United States that lump-sum payments made by a
former employer to a former employee before the employee took
a governmental office did not violate section 209(a). 28 In Crandon,
to Id. at 161-62, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83546.
12 Id. at 162-63 & n.16, 36 Cont. Cas, Fed. (CCH) at 83546 & n.16.
2° Crandon, 494 U.S, at 162-63, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83546.
21 See id. at 162-63 & n.16, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83546 & n.16.
22 See United States v. Oberhardt, 887 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1989): United States v.
Muntain, 610 F.2d 964, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
25 610 F.2d at 969-70.
24 Id.
25 887 F.2d at 793-94.
v6 Id.
27 See id.; Muntain, 610 F.2d at 969-70.
25 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 11 75795, at
83548-49 (1990).
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the federal government filed a civil suit against the Boeing Corpo-
ration ("Boeing") and five of its former employees under section
209(a) for paying and receiving lump-sum severance payments fol-
lowing the employees' departure from Boeing and acceptance of
federal government positions. 29 The Court determined that section
209(a)'s legislative history shows that the statute was not intended
to prevent severance payments made to employees who had ter-
minated employment with a company before those employees as-
sumed their government positions. 3° Consequently, after Crandon,
a private corporation may make severance payments to employees
who leave the company to enter the public sector, as long as such
payments are made before the employees actually become govern-
ment officers. 3 '
In 1981 and 1982, five executives of Boeing left the company
to accept positions in the executive branch of the United States
government. 32 Following each executive's resignation, but before
each former employee officially entered government service,
Boeing made a single severance payment to each former executive
to alleviate the financial loss that each former employee was ex-
pected to suffer because of the change of position." Although the
lump-sum payments were made unconditionally and there was no
evidence of favorable treatment either sought by Boeing or offered
by the five former employees, the United States filed a civil com-
plaint in 1986 against Boeing and each of the five former execu-
tives." The government claimed that these payments violated both
the fiduciary duty, established in section 209(a), that the individual
employees owed to the federal government and the standards of
conduct created by the common law principle of agency."
In the 1987 case of United States v. Boeing, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that Boeing's
severance payments did not violate section 209(a). 36 First, the court
determined that the five individual employees did not owe the
federal government a fiduciary duty at the time of the payments
29 Id. at 154-56, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83542-44.
3° Id. at 160-64, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83545-47.
31
 See id.
52 Id. at 154, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83542.
33 Id. at 154, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83542-43.
34 Crandon, 499 U.S. at 156, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83543-49.
35 Id.; United States v. Hoeing Co., 653 F. Supp. 1381, 1387, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH)
11 75239, at 80316-17 (E.D.Va. 1987).
" Boeing, 653 F. Supp. at 1387, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 80316.
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because they were not government employees at that time." Second,
the court ruled that because the five individuals were not yet gov-
ernment officials when they accepted the payments, and because
Boeing intended the payments to be severance pay and not com-
pensation for government service, the payments did not violate
section 209(a) even if the individual defendants did owe the federal
government a fiduciary duty at that time." Third, the court found
that the defendants did not violate the common law principle of
agency because they told government officials of the payments and
there was no actual or apparent conflict of interest." Finally, the
court reasoned that because there was no evidence of any injury to
the United States, the government was not entitled to any relief.°
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that the pay-
ments in question violated section 209(a).4 ' The court determined
that the language and history of section 209(a) showed that the
statute did not require payments to occur while an individual was
a government officer. 42 Next, the court rejected the district court's
finding that Boeing did not intend, and the individual defendants'
did not understand, the payments to be compensation for govern-
ment service." The court of appeals stated that the fact that Boeing
calculated the payments based on the expected monetary loss of
each employee contradicted the lower court's conclusion." The
court further declared that the government was not required to
show any injury because section 209(a) was a prophylactic statute
and the defendants' admission of receipt of the payments was not
a defense under section 209(a). 45 After finding a violation of section
209(a), the court concluded that the United States could recover
against either Boeing or the individual defendants, but was not
entitled to double recovery."
The case reached the United States Supreme Court under the
name Crandon v. United States, and, in 1990, the Court reversed the
37 Id. at 1386, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 80316.
38 Id. at 1386-87, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 80316.
" Id. at 1387, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 80317.
40 14,
4 ' United States v. Boeing Co., 845 F.2d 476, 481, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 11 75498,
at 81691 (4th Cir. 1988).
42 Id. at 479-80, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 81690.
" Id. at 480, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 81690.
" Id. at 481, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 81690.
as Id.
16 Id. at 481, 482, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 81691, 81692.
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that section 209(a) does
not apply to severance payments made before the recipient becomes
a federal officer.47 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, began by
noting that Congress did not create an express civil remedy for
violations of section 209(a), which establishes criminal punishment
for violations." The Court reserved comment on the government's
attempt to combine the common law rule of fiduciary duty with the
prohibitions included in section 209(a), stating that the government
clearly could not rely solely on the fiduciary duty theory but had to
prove a violation of section 209(a) in order to prevail."
The Court then examined the two clauses that make up section
209(a).5° The Court noted that while the first clause of the section
prohibits "any person" from receiving salary as compensation for
his or her services, the second clause prohibits any person from
making such payments to "any such officer or employee."" The
Court stated that the literal reading of "any such officer or em-
ployee" from the second clause supports the conclusion that the
recipient of the payment must be a government employee at the
time the payment is made.52 The Court declared that, although
Congress worded the statute awkwardly, the legislature intended
the provision's two clauses to be coextensive; therefore, the text of
section 209(a) dictates that status as a federal employee at the time
of receipt of payment is an element of the offense."
Next, The Court explained that the legislative history of section
209(a) indicates that a violation of the statute occurs only when a
current federal employee is the recipient of a private donation."
The Court stated that the predecessor to section 209(a), enacted in
1917, declared that "no government official or employee" could
accept salary payments from private sources. 55 The Court also stated
that in 1948 Congress added the phrase "being a government of-
ficial or employee" to the law, language which the Court claimed
unquestionably required the recipient of a payment to be a govern-
42 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) 4 75795, at
83548-49 (1990).
45 Id. at 157-58, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83544.
49 Id. at 158, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83544.
" Id. at 159, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83545.
51 Id.
52 Crandon, 494 U.S. at 159, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed (CCH) at 83545.
55 Id.
54 Id. at 160-64, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83545-47.
55 Id. at 160, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83545.
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ment employee at the time of payment. 56 The Court noted that,
although the phrase "being a government official or employee" was
eliminated from the statute in its most recent modification in 1962,
Congress stated that the change was not intended to alter the stat-
ute's meaning but only to assist in its clarity. 57
The Court further stated that the language of other congres-
sional enactments showed that the 1962 amendment did not extend
section 209(a) to cover pre-government employment payments. 58
The Court noted that sections 201 and 203 of title eighteen ex-
plicitly cover payments made before the officer assumes duties, but
section 209(a) does not mention such payments." The Court
claimed that because Congress explicitly included pre-government
payments in two statutes, it did not intend such payments to be
covered in statutes in which it was silent on the issue, such as section
209(a). 6° Also, the Court noted that Congress added two subsections
to section 209 in the 1962 amendment that focus on payments made
during government service. 6 ' The Court declared that these legis-
lative enactments indicate that Congress did not intend the 1962
amendment to change the meaning of section 209(a). 62
The Court also referred to the policies expressed in statements
by then President John Kennedy and then Attorney General Robert
Kennedy as evidence that the 1962 amendment did not extend the
reach of section 209(a). 63 In a 1961 speech, President Kennedy said
that conflict-of-interest laws must not impair the government's abil-
ity to recruit qualified employees." One year later, Attorney General
Kennedy issued a memorandum that claimed that the new legisla-
tion (of which section 209(a) was a part) would lead to a significant
expansion of the available pool of talent for government service. 65
The Court declared that the policies expressed in these official
statements are consistent with the view that the 1962 changes to
section 209(a) did not extend the statute's coverage to pre-govern-
ment employment payments. 66
" Id. at 160-61, 36 Cont. Gas, Fed. (CCH) at 83545-46.
57 Crandon, 494 U,S. at 162-63, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83546.
58 Id. at 163-64, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed, (CCH) at 83546-47.
59 Id.
66 Id.
61 Id. at 164, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83547.
62 Crandon, 494 U.S. at 164, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83547.
" Id. at 166-67, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83548.
" Id.
" Id. at 167, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83548.
68 Id. at 167, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83548-49.
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The Court stated that while there are valid policy arguments
both in favor of and against Boeing's pre-government employment
payments, it is not the Court's duty to approve or disapprove of the
payments. 67 The Court noted that because section 209(a) is a crim-
inal statute the rule of lenity should apply, thus any ambiguity over
the statute's breadth should be resolved in the defendants' favor
until Congress provides a clearly contrary meaning. 68 Therefore,
payments made by private sources before the recipient enters gov-
ernment service do not violate section 209(a). 69
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that he did not
believe that pre-employment payments are necessarily exempt from
section 209(a), although he did believe that the payments in question
were exempt from the statute because they were not periodic pay-
ments and did not serve as salary for federal service." Although
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the two clauses of section
209(a) are coextensive, he wrote that there is no evidence that
Congress intended to require current employment status in either
clause." Not only is such a reading of section 209(a) grammatically
incorrect, according to Justice Scalia, it is also logically incorrect
because, while it is impossible for a person to be a government
official before entering government service, it is possible for a pri-
vate source to pay the salary of a government officer in violation of
the second clause of the statute before or after that officer's actual
government service. 72 Thus, Justice Scalia reasoned that because
Boeing's payments to former employees who resigned to enter gov-
ernment service were lump-sum, rather than periodic payments,
section 209(a) did not apply. 73
Justice Scalia then used the language and history of section
209(a) to show that the statute applies only to periodic payments. 74
He first argued that the government wrongly interpreted section
209(a) broadly as prohibiting the payment of an official's "compen-
sation" when in fact the act prohibits the more specific payment of
"any salary, or any contribution to or supplementation of salary" of
67 Crandon, 494 U.S. at 167-68, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83548.
66 Id. at 168, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83549.
69 Id. at 168, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83548-49.
70 Id. at 168-69, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83549 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion.
" Id. at 169-71, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83549-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72 See Crandon, 494 U.S. at 170-71, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83550 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
73 Id. at 183-84, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83555 (Scalia, J., concurring).
74 !d. at 171-75, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83550-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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an official. 75 Next, Justice Scalia stated that the first two versions of
section 209(a) were clearly aimed at regular, salary-like payments
and that the government even admitted that the 1962 amendment
did not alter the meaning of the statute as established under its
earlier versions.7" He also provided some policy reasons for limiting
section 209(a) to periodic payments. 77 From a historical perspective,
Justice Scalia claimed that it would not seem strange in 1917, when
the predecessor to section 209(a) was originally enacted, for Con-
gress to prohibit only periodic payments as it was a regular practice
for government officials to receive such payments at that time. 78 As
for the present, he declared that periodic payments pose a greater
risk of corruption and many lump-sum payments, such as grants
or gifts, are innocent payments that provide necessary income for
those in public service and should not be criminalized."
Justice Scalia attacked the government's reliance on previous
authority that has interpreted section 209(a) to apply to lump-sum
payments. 8° He noted that the government had relied upon admin-
istrative authority almost exclusively as few courts had had the
opportunity to interpret section 209(a). 8 ' Justice Scalia then wrote
that an administrative interpretation of a criminal statute was not
worthy of judicial deference as courts, not administrative agencies,
implement criminal law. 82
Noting the difficulty that administrative agencies had had in-
terpreting section 209(a) consistently, Justice Scalia concluded that
lump-sum payments should be left outside the reach of the statute."
He stated that the administrative history shows that section 209(a)
is unmanageable if interpreted to cover more than periodic salary
payments. 84 The government could enforce the statute more effec-
tively, according to Justice Scalia, if it limited section 209(a) to the
75 Id. at 171-73, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83550 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 173-74, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed, (CCH) at 83550-51 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia also agreed with the majority that, because section 209(a) is a criminal statute, any
conflicts concerning its meaning should be resolved for the defendants. Id. at 175, 36 Cont.
Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83551 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77 Crandon, 494 U.S. at 175-76, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83551-52 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
78 Id. at 175, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83551-52 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 175-76, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (UCH) at 83552 (Scalia, J., concurring).
SD Id. at 176-83, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83552-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 176-77, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83552 (Scalia, J., concurring).
82 Crandon, 494 U.S. at 177, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83552 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 178-83, 36 Cont. Gas. Fed. (UCH) at 83553-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 178, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83553 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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prohibition of periodic salary payments and regulated lump-sum
payments by executive order or administrative regulation. 85 Apply-
ing his reasoning to the facts of the case, Justice Scalia stated that
Boeing's lump-sum payments to former employees who left the
corporation to enter government service did not violate section
209(a). 86
The Court's holding in Crandon allows private sources to make
lump-sum severance payments to government candidates before
those candidates officially enter government service. 87 As the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted, this was a case of first impression
as no previous court had decided if payments made before the
recipients enter government service violate section 209(a). 88 In hold-
ing that such pre-employment payments do not violate the statute,
the Court relied on the language of section 209(a), as well as the
statute's legislative and administrative history, which the Court
stated required the recipient to be a government employee at the
time of payment. 89 Applying the rule of lenity, the Court interpreted
the statute narrowly and challenged Congress to supply a broader
meaning if such was intended. 90
The Crandon decision clears the way for corporations to en-
courage employees to accept government positions by providing
severance payments that approximate the former employees' lost
benefits, thereby easing the financial loss of those who leave the
corporation. Over-staffed corporations now have a more humane
alternative to mandatory retirements or layoffs; those corporations
can provide monetary incentives for employees to resign and enter
public service. By the same token, such monetary incentives should
help remove the economic barriers that have apparently kept the
federal government from benefitting from the skills of highly tal-
ented members of the private sector.
Although the majority claimed that such pre-employment
lump-sum payments are not as likely to lead to corruption as on-
going payments, Justice Stevens did note that the threat of employee
favoritism for the former employer is still a valid concern.9 ' While
88 Id. at 182-83, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83554-55 (Scalia, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 183-84, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83555 (Scalia, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 168, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83548-49.
88 See United States v. Boeing Co., 845 F.2d 476, 479, 34 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) ¶ 75498,
at 81689 (4th Cir. 1988).
" Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158-67, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83544-48.
88 Id. at 168, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83549.
8' Id. at 167-68, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83548.
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it seems rather unlikely that a government official would have the
opportunity or the desire to favor a former employer merely be-
cause of a single severance payment, Congress enacted section
209(a) to prevent the appearance of impropriety, even if that ap-
pearance arises in otherwise innocent payments. 92 A situation such
as that in Crandon, however, in which there is no evidence of the
private party seeking favoritism or the former employees offering
it, is so devoid of any unethical appearance that it should be beyond
the concern of section 209(a).
Under Justice Scalia's interpretation of section 209(a), a viola-
tion would require periodic payment of an official's salary, rather
than mere employment status at the time of any type of payment. 93
His interpretation of the statute seems to favor a narrower, reading
of the statute than the majority's because it would allow private
sources to make payments to individuals even after those individuals
enter government service as long as such payments are in lump-
sum rather than periodic form. Justice Scalia's opinion is more in
line with both the original purpose of section 209(a), to remove the
appearance of conflicts-of-interest in government service, and with
the government's later attempts to encourage public service than is
the majority opinion," Lump-sum payments appear more innocent
than periodic payments, even periodic payments made before the
recipient enters government service. Also, allowing private parties
to make lump-sum payments to officials at any time allows those
officials to accept needed income such as cash grants or gifts and
thereby may prevent many officials from leaving public service for
economic reasons. While only a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia's
interpretation of section 209(a) hopefully signals a shift of the Court
toward an even narrower interpretation of the statute's scope so as
to facilitate private sector movement into government positions.
In sum, during the Survey year, the Court in Crandon held that
lump-sum payments made by private sources to former employees
before those employees assume their governmental duties do not
violate section 209(a). 95 Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion,
stated that such payments do not violate the statute because they
are lump-sum, rather than periodic payments. 96 This decision is a
92 Id. at 164-65, 36 Cont. Cas, Fed. (CCH) at 83547.
" Id. at 168-69, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83549 (Scalia, J., concurring).
" Id. at 164-66, 166-67, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83547, 83548.
95 Id. at 1006-07, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83,548-49.
98 Id, at 1007, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83,549 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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victory for those who want to enter government service from the
private sector and for private parties who want to encourage such
service through monetary incentives. Section 209(a), however, is
only one of a handful of federal conflict-of-interest statutes. 97
Nevertheless, the unanimous Crandon decision demonstrates that
the Supreme Court is unwilling to extend the conflict-of-interest
laws to innocent lump-sum payments made to individuals before
those individuals actually enter government service, recognizing
that the benefits of encouraging participation in public sector jobs
outweighs any detriment.
V. ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT
A. * Federal Preemption of State Tort Law Claims in the Nuclear
Industry: English v. General Electric Co.'
In 1974 Congress enacted the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974 ("ERA" or the "Act") to promote the development of atomic
and other energy sources within the United States. 2 The Act con-
tains a "whistle blower provision," section 5851, which prohibits
retaliatory discharge of and discrimination against nuclear industry
employees who report safety violations to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission ("NRC"), or who participate in any proceeding to en-
force regulations under ERA or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 3
Since passage of ERA, federal courts on several occasions have had
to decide to what extent ERA preempts state law actions stemming
from conduct and events falling within the statute's purview. 4
In general, federal preemption of state law occurs in three
situations. 5
 The first is when Congress explicitly provides in a statute
that federal law preempts state law. 6 Second, if federal legislation is
silent on preemption, it preempts state law only when the federal
legislation regulates conduct in a field over which Congress in-
97 Id. at 1002, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) at 83,544-45.
* By Peter Augustine Kraus, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990).
2 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 5801(a) (1988).
3
 Id. § 5851(a).
' See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984); Norris v. Lumber-
men's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1151 (1st Cir. 1989).
5 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275.
6
 See id. at 2275; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 1130,216, 30,220 (1983).
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tended the federal government to have exclusive control.' A court
may infer this congressional intent either when the federal regula-
tory scheme is so pervasive that no room is left for states to supple-
ment it, or when the federal interest in an area is so great that it
must preclude state regulation of the same subject. 8
 When the ques-
tion of preemption involves areas of law customarily occupied by
the states, congressional intent to occupy the field exclusively must
be "clear and manifest."9
 Finally, federal law preempts state law
when there is an actual conflict between the laws that makes it
impossible to follow both.'° Such preemption occurs also when state
law stands as an obstacle to Congress's goals in enacting the legis-
lation."
In the seminal case of Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Development Commission, the United States
Supreme Court in 1983 held that the federal government had
completely occupied the field of nuclear safety. 12 In Pacific Gas, the
plaintiff utility company challenged a California law that prohibited
the construction of any nuclear power plant until a state agency
had found that the federal government had implemented adequate
disposal procedures for nuclear waste." Pacific Gas argued that the
California law was predicated on safety concerns and that the ,fed-
eral government exerted exclusive control over nuclear safety reg-
ulation." Although the Supreme Court agreed that the federal
government did occupy the entire field of nuclear safety, it held
that the states retained their traditional control over economic aspects
of public utilities.' 6 The Pacific Gas Court, after considering the
California statute's legislative history, accepted the California legis-
lature's avowed economic purpose as the law's rationale.' 6
 Thus, the
See English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
" See English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
9 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
to English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275; Florida Lime Be Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963).
11 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
" 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983).
14 Id. at 194-95.
14 Id. at 204.
IS Id. at 207-08.
16 Id. at 216. The purported economic reason for the law was that a lack of adequate
disposal procedures for nuclear waste could ultimately lead to the shutdown of nuclear
reactors and unpredictably high energy costs. Id. at 213-14. The Pacific Gas Court also
rejected, for similar reasons, petitioner's argument that the California statute contradicted
the NRC's own determination that adequate waste disposal existed and therefore it would
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Court held that a state law prohibiting nuclear plant construction
for economic reasons rather than safety reasons was not
preempted.''
Even after Pacific Gas, the question remained whether nuclear
industry employees could assert claims based on state tort law for
harm suffered while working for nuclear employers. The United
States Supreme Court partially answered this question in the 1984
case of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., in which it held that federal
law did not preempt a claim for punitive damages stemming from
personal injuries suffered in a nuclear accident.I 8 In Silkwood, an
employee at a nuclear fuel production plant was exposed to radia-
tion at work.'° She died shortly thereafter in an auto accident, but
her father as administrator of her estate filed suit based on common
law tort principles. 2° The Silkwood Court reasoned that there was
no evidence that Congress, in enacting and later amending the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, intended to foreclose state remedies
for those suffering from radiation injuries in a nuclear plant. 2 ' The
Court observed, moreover, that Congress in passing the Price-An-
derson Act in 1957—establishing an indemnification scheme for
suits against nuclear power facilities—assumed that state tort actions
for personal injuries would remain available. 22 The Court held,
therefore, that a state-based award of punitive damages did not
conflict with the purposes of the federal scheme of nuclear regu-
lation." Thus, the Supreme Court recognized that there exist some
legal claims beyond those provided by federal legislation, even when
the cause of action arises from a failure of plant safety. 24
permit licensing of more nuclear plants. Id. at 218-19. Finally, the Court rejected petitioner's
argument that the California statute frustrated the ERA's objective of encouraging nuclear
power, reasoning that Congress left room for the states to prohibit nuclear plants for eco-
nomic, not safety, reasons, Id. at 223.
17 Id. at 222-23.
13
 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,258 (1984).
13
 Id. at 241.
23 Id. at 242-43.
21 Id. at 251.
22 Id. at 251.
23 Id. at 258.
24
 Justice Powell, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, asserting that
the majority's decision undercut the regulatory authority of the NRC. Id. at 285 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). He noted that the imposition of punitive damages in this case meant that a lay
jury would be applying safety standards completely separate from those promulgated by the
NRC. See id, at 283-84 (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, a lay jury could find that even though
the defendant company complied with NRC regulations, the company could be held liable
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A split in the federal courts developed, however, regarding
whether federal nuclear regulation preempts other state tort law
claims. In the 1989 case of English v. General Electric Co. ("English
I"), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that ERA preempted a state law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress stemming from the retaliatory discharge of a
whistle blowing employee of a nuclear facility. 25 Later in the same
year, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held, in Norris v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., that ERA
does not preempt plaintiff's state law claims for wrongful discharge
and for breach of the implied covenant'of fair dealing. 26 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in English to resolve the "apparent"
conflict between the circuits regarding exactly which state law ac-
tions are preempted. 27
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court held
in English v. General Electric Co. ("English II") that ERA does not
preempt a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress stemming from the retaliatory discharge of a whistle blow-
ing nuclear employee. 28 The Court held that such a claim neither
falls within the preempted field of nuclear safety nor conflicts with
specific provisions of the Act. 29 Consequently, after English II, em-
ployers in the nuclear industry who subject their employees to
retaliatory discharge are liable under both ERA's whistle blower
provision and state laws that allow actions for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. According to the Supreme Court's test as set
forth in English II, the only state tort remedies preempted by ERA
for punitive damages if the jury felt that the regulations did not achieve their purpose. Id.
at 284 (Powell, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
Marshall, noted that the majority's opinion "enables a state to enforce a standard that is more
exacting than the federal standard." Id. at 265 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25
 871 F.2d 22, 23 (4th Cir. 1989).
25 881 F.2d at 1151 (1st Cir. 1989).
27 English v. General Elec. Corp., 110 S. Ct. 862 (1990). The Supreme Court seems to
have said "apparent" conflict because Norris and Engh;sh I were not in direct conflict; the two
cases involve different claims. There was, however, an actual split between the federal district
courts within California on the issue of preemption of wrongful discharge claims. See, e.g.,
Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1518-19, 123 L.R.R.M. 3245, 3248-49 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (whistleblower provision of ERA preempts state claim for wrongful discharge);
Stokes v. Bechtel North Am. Power Corp., 614 F. Supp. 732, 744-45 (N,D. Cal. 1985)
(whistleblower provision of ERA is permissive remedy which supplements state law of wrong-
ful discharge but does not supplant or preempt it).
25 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2281 (1990).
29 Id.
472	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:3O5
are those laws that have a nuclear safety rationale, have a direct
and significant effect on nuclear safety decisions, or otherwise di-
rectly conflict with or frustrate the purposes of the federal law."
In English II, Vera English worked as a laboratory technician
from 1972 to 1984 at the General Electric ("GE") nuclear fuel
production facility in Wilmington, North Carolinas' In February
1984, English complained about a number of alleged safety viola-
tions at the plant to GE's management and to the NRC. 32
 One of
these safety breaches was the failure of plant personnel to clean up
radioactive spills in the laboratory. 33
 Unsatisfied by GE's response,
English, at one point, deliberately failed to clean a work table left
contaminated by radioactive material by a preceding shift. 34 She
also outlined the contaminated areas with red tape, which resulted
in a brief work stoppage while the area was inspected and cleaned.35
A short time later, GE charged English with deliberate failure
to clean up the radioactive contamination, and assigned her tem-
porarily to other work." Then, on April 30, 1984, GE told English
that it would terminate her employment unless she successfully bid
for another position that did not expose her to nuclear materials. 37
'English did not find such a position, and consequently GE termi-
nated her on July 30, 1984. 38
In August, English filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
under the whistle blower protection provision of ERA." This pro-
vision makes it unlawful for a employer in the nuclear industry to
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for initi-
ating or threatening to initiate an enforcement action under ERA,
for testifying in such a proceeding, or for participating in any way
in such a proceeding. 4° English charged GE with wrongful discharge
39 See id.
31 Id. at 2273.
12 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
55 Id.
35 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2273.
37 Id.
3" Id.
39 Id.
49
 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) (1988). Section 5851(a) states:
(a) Discrimination against employee
No employer, including a Commission licensee, an applicant for a Com-
mission license, or a contractor or a subcontractor of a Commission licensee or
applicant, may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any
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in retaliation for her complaints.'" The matter was referred to an
NRC administrative law judge, who found that GE had violated the
whistle blower provision. 42 The case was dismissed, however, be-
cause English had not filed it within the thirty day limitations period
set forth in the statute:*
In March of 1987, English filed a civil suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, claiming
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and requesting punitive and compensatory damages:" The district
court allowed GE's motion to dismiss on the grounds that section
5851(a) of ERA preempted both the wrongful discharge and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims:* The district court did
note, however, that English had pleaded a valid claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law:* On the
other hand, the court noted that even if section 5851 did not
preempt the claim for wrongful discharge, the plaintiff had failed
to state a claim for wrongful discharge.47 English appealed the
district court's decision on the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, but not the wrongful discharge claim." The United
employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request
of the employee) —
(1) commenced, cause to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause
to he commenced a proceeding under this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C.A. 2011 et seq.], or a proceeding for the
administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this chapter
or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
(2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or;
(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner
in such a proceeding or in any other manner in such a proceeding or in any
other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq.].
Id.
41 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2274.
42 Id.
45 Id. The statute provides that the aggrieved employee must bring an action within
thirty days of the violation. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1)
(1988). The Secretary of Labor determined that the "violation" occurred on May 15, the
date GE notified English of its final decision on the disciplinary action. English, 110 S. Ct. at
2274.
Id. at 2274.
's English v. General Elec. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 1006, 1015, 1017-18 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
46 Id. at 1017.
47 Id. at 1015.
1° English, 110 S. Ct. at 2274 n.4.
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States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision on the basis of the lower court's reasoning and
analysis of the law. 49
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that sec-
tion 5851 does not preempt English's emotional distress claim under
state law. 5° In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Blackmun,
the Court rejected both of GE's arguments for preemption of the
state intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. First, the
Court rejected the argument that the state law on which the claim
was based fell within the field of nuclear safety, which the federal
government had preempted completely." Second, the Court re-
jected the argument that the state tort claim conflicted with specific
provisions of ERA. 52
In its analysis, the Court first reiterated the situations in which
federal preemption of state law occurs." The Court noted that
because the federal nuclear regulatory statutes said nothing ex-
plicitly about preemption, a holding of preemption would have to
rest either on "field preemption" or on a direct conflict with the
Act. 54
 Although the lower courts rested their findings of preemption
only on purported actual conflicts with ERA, GE argued both field
preemption and actual conflict before the Supreme Court. 55
In refuting GE's field preemption argument, the English II
Court observed first that its decision in Pacific Gas had established
that Congress had indeed occupied the entire field of nuclear
safety. 56
 The Court noted, however, that Congress, in enacting sec-
tion 5851, demonstrated no clear intent to preempt state tort laws
that traditionally were available to employees who allege the type
of outrageous conduct that English claimed. 57
 The Court observed
that to hold that section 5851 preempted all state tort remedies
relating to retaliatory conduct by nuclear employers would imply
that it preempted all state law criminal remedies for similar retal-
iatory conduct as wel1. 58
 The Court refused to accept that Congress
45
 English v. General Elec. Corp., 871 F.2d 22,23 (4th Cir. 1989).
50 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2281.
m Id. at 2279.
" Id., at 2281.
55 Id. at 2275-76. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
general rules of preemption as set forth by the English II Court.
54 See id. at 2275-76.
55 See English, 110 S. Ct. at 2276.
" Id. at 2277.
57 Id. at 2279.
58
 Id. at 2277.
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intended this result." The Court recognized that although the state
law supporting the claim bore some relation to nuclear safety, its
primary objective was to protect employee rights. 60 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that the state law claim did not fall within the
preempted field on the mere rationale that it arose from conduct
covered by the Act. 6 '
The Court also rejected English's view of the extent of federal
preemption in nuclear safety matters. English argued that the rule
of Pacific Gas was that only state laws that were motivated by safety
fell within the preempted field. 62 Although the Court agreed that
the safety motivation formed part of the preempted field, it asserted
that a safety motivation was not necessary to put a state law in the
preempted field. 63 The Court maintained, rather, that a state law
having a direct effect on nuclear safety, even if enacted with a non-
safety motivation, would also fall within the preempted field. 64
The Court noted that it was clear that the law behind English's
emotional distress claim was not motivated by nuclear safety, and
thus the only question was whether the state law has so great an
effect on nuclear safety as to be preempted. 65 The Court first ob-
served that not every state law having the slightest effect on safety
decisions of nuclear plant managers would be preempted, but that
the effect must be direct and substantial. 66 The Court held that the
state law at issue did not have such a direct and substantial effect.°
The English II Court bolstered its conclusion by comparing this
case to its decision in Silkwood, in which the Court held that a claim
for punitive damages stemming from a nuclear accident is not
preempted." The English II Court reasoned that potential liability
for punitive damages from personal injuries from a nuclear accident
would affect safety decisions more directly than would potential
liability for infliction of emotional distress in retaliation for whistle
blowing." Consequently, the Court asserted that it would be "odd,
if not irrational" to conclude that a punitive damages claim was not
59 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2277.
88 Id.
61
 Id.
6V Id.
85 Id. at 2278.
" English, 110 S. Ct. at 2278.
85 Id.
66 Id.
87 Id.
68 Id. at 2278-79,
69 Id. at 2279.
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preempted but that the emotional distress claim was. 7° The Court
held, therefore, that there was no "clear and manifest" desire of
Congress to preempt state tort claims such as English's.'"
The Court also rejected the district court's holding that En-
glish's claim violated specific provisions of section 5851. 72 The dis-
trict court relied on three specific provisions of section 5851. The
first was a provision stating that the prohibition of retaliation does
not apply when an employee has deliberately violated ERA or the
Atomic Energy Act. 73 The Court did not think that this provision
reflected congressional intent to bar all relief to whistle blowers who
intentionally violate safety regulations. 74 The Court instead noted
that the provision specifically limited its applicability to the remedy
provided in section 5851, and that there was no evidence in the
statute or legislative history that Congress intended to bar state tort
actions." The Court also noted that, in any case, an administrative
law judge had found that English had not violated any safety reg-
ulation."
The second purported conflict with section 5851 was the ab-
sence of any authorization for exemplary damages for retaliatory
conduct against employees. 77 The district court had held that this
absence implied a congressional intent to bar all state actions that
authorize exemplary damages. 78 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, observing that section 5851 does, in fact, authorize ex-
emplary damages in actions brought by the Secretary of Labor. 79
The Court further noted that state actions are not ordinarily
preempted merely because they impose liability beyond that pre-
scribed by federal law. 8° Consequently, the Court stated that it could
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2279-81.
73 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(g) (1988).
74
 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2280.
75 Id.
75 Id.
" Id.
79 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2280.
79 Id. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 states in part: "In actions brought under
this subsection, the district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief
including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary damages." 42
U.S.C. § 5851(d) (1988).
99 English, 110 S. Ct. at 2280 (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105
(1989)).
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not conclude that Congress meant to preempt all state actions per-
mitting exemplary damages.'"
Third, the Court rejected the district court's holding that the
short time limitation for actions under section 5851 reflected a
congressional decision that whistle blowers should not be able to
recover for retaliation after the limitations period under ERA has
expired. 82 The district court reasoned that if a state law remedy
were still available after the time limit for filing an action under
section 5851, employees would have less incentive to bring actions
under that section, and as a result, regulatory agencies would re-
main unaware of safety violations." Rejecting that reasoning, the
Court observed that many retaliations for whistle blowing arise
because of safety complaints that employees make to federal regu-
latory agencies. 84 Thus, the enforcement agencies are usually aware
of the violation regardless of whether the plaintiff claims relief
under section 5851 or state law." In addition, the Court did not
believe that employees would ignore their remedies under section
5851 and rely exclusively on state law remedies. 86 The English II
Court found that assertion merely speculative.°
The Court concluded that English's state law claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted either by
falling into the preempted field of nuclear safety or by directly
contradicting or frustrating section 5851 of ERA. 88 Accordingly, the
Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded
the case for adjudication of the emotional distress claim. 89
Subsequent to its decision in English II, and on the basis of its
holding in that case, the Supreme Court remanded the case of
81 Id.
87 Id. at 2281.
83 Id.
" English, 110 S. Ct. at 2281.
es
66 Id.
87 Id.
S8
86 Id. On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina allowed English to amend her complaint to include factual allegations relating to
the emotional distress claim. English v. General Elec. Co., 765 F. Supp. 293, 297 (E.D.N.C.
1991). The court denied, however, English's motion to amend her complaint to include a
claim for bad faith wrongful discharge, reasoning that North Carolina law does not recognize
the claim. Id. at 295-96. The court also noted that English's failure to appeal the dismissal
of the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, which North Carolina had
recently recognized, precluded her from reasserting that claim. Id. at 295.
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Masters v. Daniel International Corp. 9° In Masters, the defendant com-
pany allegedly discharged the plaintiff in retaliation for reporting
safety violations to the NRC. 9 ' In its original decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that ERA
preempted state law claims for wrongful discharge. 92 On remand,
however, the appeals court held, in light of English II, that ERA did
not preempt the wrongful discharge claim."
The Supreme Court's decision in English II will have several
effects on the nuclear industry. First, the Court's holding in English
II provides a test for federal field preemption of other state claims
stemming from retaliatory actions of nuclear employers against
whistle blowing employees. After English II, the analysis of field
preemption will involve determining, first, whether the state law is
motivated by nuclear safety concerns,,and second, whether the state
law has a significant and direct effect on nuclear safety decisions of
nuclear employers. Federal law will preempt state law that has either
of these traits.
The Court asserted that it was granting certiorari to English I
in order to resolve a conflict between the circuits. English II does
not, however, really resolve the conflict between the holdings of
Norris and English I. Norris involved preemption of a wrongful dis-
charge claim, whereas the claim in English I was for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. A strict reading of English II provides
only guidance, not a diapositive rule, for wrongful discharge claim
preemption analysis. Although the Supreme Court has not yet spe-
cifically ruled on the question whether ERA preempts state actions
for wrongful discharge, it implicitly indicated in its treatment of
Masters that it also intended English II to control the question of
preemption of wrongful discharge actions.
Given this interpretation, English II may have a significant im-
pact on a number of industries. ERA's whistle blower provision was
modeled on a similar provision in the Mine Safety and Health Act."
Numerous other federal statutes contain analogous whistle blower
provisions. 95
 Nevertheless, though English II may be influential, it
99 110 S. Ct. 3208, 3208 (1990).
91
 Masters v. Daniel lnt'l Corp., 895 F.2d 1295, 1296 (10th Cir. 1990).
92 Id. at 1296.
93
 Masters v. Daniel Intl Corp, 917 F.2d 445, 456 (10th Cir. 1990).
" See Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1518, 123 L.R.R.M. 3245, 3247
(C.D. Cal. 1986).
95 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. if 2622(a) (1988); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(A) (1988); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971(a)
(1988).
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will not be dispositive of whether these other whistle blower provi-
sions preempt state actions for wrongful discharge or intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The reason is that preemption is
field-specific; preemption analysis in one field, such as nuclear
safety, may not apply to others.
Another effect of English II is that it opens the door to large
settlements and jury verdicts for whistle blowers who bring state
tort claims, including claims for wrongful discharge and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 96 Practitioners suggest that these
potentially large jury awards will deter retaliatory discharge more
effectively than would the federal remedy, which in most cases is
limited to actual damages."' Not only do discharged whistle blowers
get a second bite of the proverbial apple if they miss the time limit
of a federal statute, it is a bigger bite, because a jury verdict is
potentially much larger than the likely decision of an administrative
agency. 98
In sum, the Supreme Court's decision in English 11 has three
major effects. First, it provides a test for federal preemption of state
tort claims stemming from retaliatory conduct by nu -clear employers
against whistle blowing employees. Second, it explicitly allows inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claims for flagrant retaliatory
conduct, notwithstanding ERA's whistle blower provision. Finally,
although the Supreme Court in English II ruled on the specific
question of preemption of an emotional distress claim, it gives notice
to lower federal courts that state claims for wrongful discharge
probably escape preemption as well. These claims are far more
common and easy to establish than emotional distress claims. The
effect on the nuclear industry, and perhaps on other industries
covered by federal whistle blower legislation, will be to deter em-
ployers from retaliating against whistle blowing employees, for fear
of large jury verdicts based on state tort claims.
96 See Court Lights Way to Big Awards: Nuke Whistlebiowers Win, NATI L.J., July 9, 1990,
at 3.
97 See id.
99
	 Court Decision May Open Door to Large Whistleblower Tort Claims, NUCLEARFUEL,
June 11, 1990, at 9.
